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Abstract
We give in this article some mathematical insights into archaeology
models. We first introduce the wave of advance model developed by Am-
merman and Cavalli-Sforza and an improvement byMendez and Fort. Par-
ticular solutions of the underlying equations, called travelling waves by
mathematicians and waves of advance by archaeologists, are good notions
in order to describe the propagation of agriculture during the Neolithic pe-
riod. We present existence results for such solutions and compute their
propagation speed. The time-delayed model could indeed be viewed as
a toy-model in order to investigate kinetic reaction-diffusion equations,
which has recently been introduced in order to describe microscopic bi-
ological populations dynamics, and that were studied on their own with
mathematical tools.
1.1 Reaction-diffusion models in archeology
1.1.1 The wave of advance model
The first use of reaction-diffusion equations in an archaeological framework is due
to Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza in their seminal work Ammerman-Cavalli-Sforza
(1984), which investigated the spread of agriculture in Europe during the Neolithic
transition. Using carbon 14 datations of archeological sites, they observed that the
diffusion of agriculture starts fromMiddle-East in 7000 BC and then spreads in Europe
at an approximate speed of 1 km/yr. In order to explain the existence of such a linear
propagation speed, they used the classical Fisher-KPP equation
@tu D u = ru(1  u/umax). (1.1)
This equation was first introduced in the 30’s by Kolmogorov et al. (1937) and Fisher
(1937), both in the framework of biological invasions. It has then been used in lots of
models, related to genetics, chemistry, combustion, economics, ecology etc.
It relies on the hypothesis that the population is large enough to be modelled by a
continuous density variable u = u(t, x), and that the following interactions between
individuals drive their evolution:
• the population disperses with a flux that is proportional to the gradient of density
(Fick Law), at a rate D,
• at each time step dt, the population gives birth to a number ru(t, x)dt of new
individuals, where r is the reproduction rate,
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• the environment is assumed to only contain a finite quantity of resources, which
leads to a maximal density of population umax and creates the nonlinear death
term  ru2/umax.
Due to this nonlinear term, the equation cannot be explicitly solved. The trajectory
followed by a given individual cannot be predicted. However, this model gives rise to
deterministic asymptotic patterns at the population scale: the level lines of the popula-
tion density behave like circle at large time t >> 1, containing a surface proportional
to t2. This is characteristic of a complex system.
A fundamental mathematical property of equation (1.1) is the existence of travel-
ling waves solutions, that is, solutions of the form u(t, x) = U(x   ct), where U is
positive and smooth, U( 1) = umax, U(+1) = 0. Here, U is called the profile of
the travelling wave and c 2 R is its speed. The shape of such solutions implies that
if one shifts the time from t to t + T , then the solution keeps the same profile and is
only translated by a lenght cT . It was proved in Kolmogorov et al. (1937) that there
exists a travelling wave with speed c if and only if c   c⇤ = 2pDr. Moreover, the
travelling wave with minimal speed c⇤ attracts, in a sense, the solutions of the initial
value problem (1.1) associated with compactly supported initial data. In other words,
if one introduces a density of population in some given location of the space and lets
it evolve through (1.1), then it will propagate in all directions with speed c = c⇤ and
will “look like” the wave with minimal speed c⇤ at large times. Note that the minimal
speed c⇤ = 2
p
Dr only depends on the linearization near the steady state u = 0 of
the nonlinear equation (1.1), it does not depend on the saturation threshold umax. This
means that the waves is “pulled” by the edge of the invasion, where U ' 0.
Coming back to the Neolithic transition problem, Ammerman-Cavalli-Sforza (1984)
identified travelling wave solutions as an appropriate mathematical equivalent of the
waves of advance empirically observed. Using anthropological observations of prein-
dustrial farmers, they estimated the parameters: D ' 1100 2200 km/gen, a generation
time ⌧ = 25 years and r ' 0.029   0.035 per year. This gives a propagation speed
c⇤ = 2
p
Dr between 2.25 and 3.50 km/yr and a mean value of 2.86 km/yr, which has
the same order of magnitude as the empirical speed 1 km/yr.
This validates this “wave of advance model“ and gives a mechanism from which
the linear spreading speed naturally arises, meaning in particular that this transition is
not driven by some external force. This model has then been used in many works on
the diffusion of technologies or languages in early populations. It was improved, in a
way that we will describe in the next section, by Fort et al. (2004) in the Palaeolithic
framework, in order to show that the speed of the wave of recolonization might not
have been limited by the climate change but only by the intrinsic characteristics of the
population.
1.1.2 The time-delayed model
The two physicists Fort-Mendez (1999) observed that the Fisher-KPP equation (1.1)
relies on the Fick law. Namely, one assumes that the migration (flux) rate at time t is
proportional to the gradient of the density of population at time t. This approximation
is too rough for human populations, for which one expects the migrations to occur at
a generation scale: the gradient of population at time t should give rise to a migration
flux at time t + ⌧ , where ⌧ is the generation time. This gives a delay term in the Fick
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Figure 1.1: Figure from Fort-Mendez
(1999): comparison between the wave-
of-advance model and the time-delayed
model. Each point was associated in
Ammerman-Cavalli-Sforza (1984) with
a dated archaeological sites where ev-
idence of agricultural activities were
found, distances being measured as
great circle routes from Jericho (the
presumed center of diffusion). Dates
are conventional radiocarbon ages in
years before present (BP). The solid
line is the regression by Ammerman-
Cavalli-Sforza (1984). The other three
lines are least-squares fits with slopes
calculated from the classical wave-of-
advance model (dashed-dotted line), the
time-delayed model (dotted line). We
do not discuss here the dashed line, the
interested readers being referred to Fort-
Mendez (1999).
law, which leads to the new hyperbolic reaction-diffusion equation:
⌧
2
@ttu D u+
 
1  r⌧
2
+
2ru
umax
 
@tu = ru(1  u/umax). (1.2)
The mechanism leading to this equation is very simple and indeed it is used in many
fields such as forest fire modelling, epidemics, chemistry (see Fort-Mendez (1999) and
the references therein).
Assuming that the propagation speed should be given by the leading edge of the
invasion, where u ' 0, as for the classical Fisher-KPP equation (1.1), Fort and Mendez
heuristically derived the following propagation speed for equation (1.2):
c⇤⌧ =
2
p
rD
1 + r⌧2
. (1.3)
Evaluating r, ⌧ and D as Ammerman-Cavalli-Sforza (1984), and noticing that the es-
timation of D should be divided by 4 since the population evolves on a 2d plane and
not a 1d line, this gives a propagation speed between 0.84 and 1.24 km/yr, with a mean
value 1.04 km/yr. This is much closer from the empirical speed 1 km/yr, validating this
corrected delayed model. These results are displayed in Figure 1.1.
However, this computation of the speed c⇤⌧ relies on the approximation that only the
leading edge of the invasion is important. Indeed, such an approximation is a bit risky
from a mathematical point of view: the term @ttu changes the nature of the equation.
There is a balance between the parabolic and the hyperbolic terms, and it is known
that hyperbolic equations might give rise to singular solutions such as shocks instead
of smooth travelling waves.
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1.2 Mathematical investigation
1.2.1 Computation of the propagation speed for hyperbolic reaction-
diffusion equations
A mathematical study of equation (1.2) was recently provided by Bouin et al. (2014a),
showing that one should distinguish two regimes.
If the delay is sufficiently small (r⌧/2 < 1), then the same behaviour as for the non-
delayed Fisher-KPP equation occurs. Namely, there exists a smooth travelling waves
solution of speed c for all c   c⇤⌧ and the one with minimal speed c = c⇤⌧ is stable, in
a sense. We mention here that this framework was investigated mathematically in the
older paper Hadeler (1988), using different techniques.
When the delay becomes larger (r⌧/2   1), typical hyperbolic phenomenon arise.
Namely, there exists a travelling wave of speed c for all c   p2D/⌧ =: ec⇤⌧ , and
the travelling wave with minimal speed c = ec⇤⌧ is discontinuous if r⌧/2 > 1, that is,
it is a shock. This means that the propagation is not driven by the leading edge of
the front. Indeed, as the migration time ⌧ is large, the wave equation operator ⌧2@ttu 
D u dominates equation (1.2) and the solution evolves with the associated speed ec⇤⌧ =p
2D/⌧ . The shapes of travelling waves in these various regimes are displayed in
Figure 2.
As a consequence, the approximation made in Fort-Mendez (1999) is not valid in
general. Nevertheless, the parameters involved in Fort-Mendez (1999) satisfy r⌧/2 <
1, so that the computation of the minimal speed c⇤⌧ is correct in this particular setting.
But if r⌧/2 > 1, then the propagation speed is ec⇤⌧ > c⇤⌧ .
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Figure 1.2: r = 2, D = 1, umax = 1. When ⌧ < 1, the wave-of-advance (i.e.
travelling wave) is smooth and the speed is determined by the leading edge, where
u ' 0. When ⌧   1, the wave is not smooth anymore: the density of population grows
suddenly from u = 0 to u = 3/4 for ⌧ = 2.
1.2.2 Generalization: a kinetic approach to reaction-diffusion
As already mentioned, equation (1.2) is involved in other fields of applications. Apart
from archaeology models, it arises for example in bacteria dynamics modelling, where
it could be viewed as a simplification of a more general kinetic reaction-diffusion equa-
tions. Such equations are both interesting from a modelling point of view since it gives
a microscopic interpretation to classical reaction-diffusion equations, and from a math-
ematical point of view. Let us briefly describe these promising prospects in order to
conclude this paper.
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Such a microscopic approach was initiated recently by Cuesta et al. (2012), who
introduced Fisher-KPP equations with a kinetic distribution kernel:
@tf+v ·rxf M(v)⇢f+f = r⇢f
 
M(v) f , for all (t, x, v) 2 (0,1)⇥RN⇥V,
(1.4)
where ⇢f (t, x) :=
Z
V
f(t, x, v)dv, V ⇢ RN is the space of admissible speeds,
M(v)   0,
Z
V
M(v)dv = 1.
Here, f is a density of populations parametrized by the time t, the space x and their
speed v. The left hand-side is associated with the movement of the population with
speed v and its random changes of speed with probability M(v)dv. The right hand-
side modelizes the births and deaths of the population. Such models might be well-
fitted in order to investigate microscopic populations dynamics such as bacteria (see
the mathematical biological papers cited in Bouin et al. (2014b)).
If the kernelM is a combination of Dirac massesM = 12 ( v0 +   v0), then simple
computations show that (1.4) turns into (1.2) under appropriate changes of variables.
Equation (1.2) was thus first investigated in Bouin et al. (2014a) as a toy-model in order
to understand the more general equation (1.4).
In the asymptotic regimes where the change of speeds occurs very frequently, it
could be proved that the solutions of equations (1.4) converge to solutions of the classi-
cal Fisher-KPP equation (1.1) under an appropriate rescaling. Cuesta et al. (2012) used
this observation in order to construct travelling waves solutions of equation (1.4) in a
perturbative regime when the set of speeds V is bounded.
Indeed, Bouin et al. (2014b) showed that such travelling waves exist in general, not
only in perturbative regimes, as soon as the set of speeds V is bounded, that is, the
speed of each individual cannot be too large. Moreover, one can show that the associ-
ated propagation speed is given by the leading edge of the front. The difference with
equation (1.2) is that this speed is not explicit anymore but is given by some integral
equation involving the kernel M(v). When V is unbounded, that is, when each indi-
vidual could take arbitrarily large speeds, then travelling waves do not exist anymore
Bouin et al. (2014b). Indeed, in this case the propagation is superlinear. For exemple
when V = R andM(v) = e v2/
p
2⇡, the leading edge of the front is located approx-
imately at x ' t3/2. The unerstanding and the rigorous proofs of these phenomenon is
the subject of works in progress.
Conclusion
We first described in this article mathematical models involved in archaelogy. The
classical model introduced by Ammerman-Cavalli-Sforza (1984) gives a mechanisti-
cal interpretation to the emergence of “waves of advance”, observed for example in the
neolithic colonization of Europe, showing that such propagation phenomenon is not
driven by any external force. These waves are associated with travelling waves solu-
tions of the Fisher-KPP equation. The order of magnitude of the propagation speed
derived from this model could be improved by introducing a time-delay in the equa-
tion, as suggested by Fort-Mendez (1999), giving rise to a hyperbolic reaction-diffusion
equation. This equation was rigorously investigated by Bouin et al. (2014a), who iden-
tified two different regimes: if the delay becomes too large, then the approximation
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made by Fort-Mendez (1999) is not valid anymore and shocks, that is, non-smooth
travelling waves, arise. Hyperbolic reaction-diffusion equations are indeed simplifi-
cations of more general kinetic reaction-diffusion equations, which are involved for
example in bacteria dynamics models. The investigation of these equations is more in-
volved and might give rise to contrasting phenomena, such as superlinear propagation,
which are still not completely understood (see Bouin et al. (2014b)).
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Abstract
Urban project is a complex object resulting from interaction of several
operations in progress on the Territory. The systemic approach developed
here investigates the modelling of urban system as a possibility to go over
contemporary fragmentation and complexity which assign strongly Plan-
ning of the Territory and Urban-Planning disciplines. These cope with the
necessity for renewal of traditional modes of action in favour of reflexive
approaches reflecting the experiment applied here. The modelling of ur-
ban system realized by the setting-up of interactive tool of map making is
the indicator of the interactions between the various elements of the urban
project. This tool is a part of experiments led on the urban observatories
contributing to give a new vision of projects management, more flexible
and adjustable to the context of uncertainty which is our, and attentive to
the unexpected and interactions.
2.1 Introduction
This contribution is based on a town-planning research, related to the coherence of
the urban project in a context of uncertainty and complexity, applied to the case of
the City of Saint-Etienne in France. Urban-Planning and Planning of the Territory are
guided by a structuring principle of territorial coherence (Zepf & Andrés, 2012 ; Zepf
& Novarina, 2009; Jourdan, 2012; Faludi & Peyrony, 2011). However, complexity and
fragmentation inherent in contemporary conditions of the urban development questions
very strongly this objective (Ascher, 2001; Chalas, 2004; Kokoreff and Rodriguez,
2004). In the first time, we will demonstrate how the urban project can be broached
as a complex system resulting from interaction of several planning operations taking
place on the territory. After underlining this systemic character, we will develop stakes
related to the modelling of urban system. The methodology developed for this research
is based on the experiment of interactive tool realized with the city of Saint-Etienne,
and revealing interactions between different projects of the territory. The research rep-
resent an attempt to go over uncertainty which assigns nowadays urban-planning and
planning of the territory. It investigates the systemic approach and the modeling of
urban project as a tool for decision support and city projects management, in quest for
territorial coherence.
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Figure 2.1: The municipal territory of Saint Etienne
Source: Chemin-Le Piolet
2.2 The urban project as a complex system
The urban project is a polysemous and multi scale concept (Bourdin & Prost, 2009
; Genestrier, 1993 ; Panerai & Mangin, 1999 ; Rey et al., 1998; Tsiomis & Ziegler,
2007), that can be understood at different levels, alluding to, at the same time, a project
of several architectural buildings, an operation of complex planning at district level,
a city or urban area project (Merlin & Choay, 2005). The urban project also takes
many dimensions: technical, political, economic and social (Ingallina, 2003). It will
be understood here in its spatial dimension, as the combination of various planning
actions or projects carried out at the city of Saint-Etienne. In this publication we will
tackle the urban project, not as the compilation of the various projects of the territory,
but as the combination in which projects come into interaction reinforcing, weakening,
etc. The urban project is consequently seen as a complex system resulting from many
interactions between projects (Toussaint and Zimmermann, 1998).
2.2.1 The major spatial components of the city urban project
The research topic is the project of the city of Saint-Etienne. On Figure 2.1, the mu-
nicipal boundary of Saint-Etienne is represented by the pink outline, and buildings are
in grey. We used these base maps to identify different project areas according to their
natures , ladders, etc.
The dominant and general public view of city projects comes mainly through an
approach to large projects represented by hatching roses (Figure 2.2). The perimeters
of these complex and emblematic urban projects represent exceptional territories in
which public actors take part heavily to accelerate the development of economic hubs,
the replacement of precarious districts, the design of new districts, etc. This outstand-
ing intervention is motivated by its strategic specificity at the global territory level.
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Figure 2.2: The perimeter of major projects
Source: Chemin-Le Piolet
The territories are excluded from the common law, and are subject to operational ar-
rangements (public-private partnerships, global urban planning procedures, etc.) and
distinctive monitorings (the setting of a specific organization in project mode for ex-
ample). These are areas in which local actors have great knowledge and about which
they communicate a lot in a territorial marketing logic.
This vision, synthesizing the city project through major projects, seems reductive
in a systemic approach. Our approach advocates an expanded vision of the city project,
that encompasses a multitude of actions, taking major projects but also actions, more
common and anonymous, that move the territory into consideration. The challenge in
this systemic approach, is to include the diversity of projects that make up the territory,
to develop an all-embracing vision, and to exceed focus generally carried on major
urban planning projects. It is integrating ordinary city in the thought of global urban
project. The city so-called common, represents 80 % of the territory but is not the
subject of cultural, residential, or commercial emblematic major public programs, and
yet, this city is also changing, according to the operations in more common districts,
private interventions of limited replacement in the plot, etc. These projects involved in
the evolution dynamics of the territory, and therefore of the overall urban project.
In this way, the overall urban project of the city of Saint-Etienne, represents a
system in which multiple emblematic operations involve such major projects, or more
anonymous actions dealing with the common city. It therefore appears as a system
combining varied elements such as major projects, cross functional projects such as
transport infrastructures, equipment and utilities projects, and the varied operations
encompassed in what we will call the "diffuse".
• The “Diffuse” (Figure 2.3) provides the most expanded possible vision on the
dynamics of the territory. Areas not covered by complex operations, contain
however varied dynamics regarding private operations and/or public local ac-
tions. They are consequently squarely included in the overall dynamics of the
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Figure 2.3: “Diffuse projects”
Source: Chemin-Le Piolet
Figure 2.4: List of municipal kindergartens
Source: Chemin-Le Piolet
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urban project, without requiring a strong action of the public actor in term of
project. These projects are of a smaller scale and of one-off nature, as shown in
Figure 2.3. It may be the renewal of a square in a district, a small public garden,
the creation of a block of flats, the setting-up of fac´ade restoration, etc.
• Equipment and utilities projects raise the question of territorial balance, through
the implementation of various public policies. They embrace projects of equip-
ment and services to the people such as kindergartens, shown in Figure 2.4,
schools, associations, etc. It is to develop a balanced offer, in terms of equip-
ment and services, to the population in the different districts.
• Cross-functional projects whose transport infrastructures are emblematic, strongly
impact the territories they cross. High structuring stakes of the municipality
surround them. Examples of the public transport (Figure 2.5) and Green lane
projects (Figure 2.6) in Saint-Etienne are representative of these particular char-
acter projects.
2.2.2 The combination of many projects at municipal level
Resulting from this use of the urban project as a system, we are interested by the
interactions between these various elements. It is to identify how these elements work
in synergy, comforting or not the projects amongst themselves and the overall project.
Thus, the urban project cannot be reduced to the sum of the different projects developed
in the area, but rather their combination in which some of themwill weaken, strengthen,
annihilate themselves or each other etc.
Thus, cross-functional projects can represent a boosting or nuisance vector for other
operations in progress, and challenge their progress and future. For example, the pass-
ing of a public transport in a district can be an opening up factor for the revitalization
project of the district. Or the setting-up of a green lane to a smooth inter-district con-
nection, can enhance operation of housing nearby. The setting-up of a highway, can
both connect spaces, while representing a nuisance and urban split for crossed areas.
Similarly, several ’diffuse’ actions matched together, may impact a large project by
producing competing projects such as a new housing offer with a similar target and
quality, office areas, etc.
All these actions or projects developed and produced by various actors, come into
interaction with each other, and impact the overall system. In the field of urban plan-
ning, each planning of public areas, any renovation or construction of equipment or
various housing impact the district not only where the operation is taking place but
also in the city in its entirety. It is actually appropriate to speak of congruence, rather
than impact between projects, because in this complex system, it becomes very difficult
to assess which element has an impact on any other. Each project coming into reso-
nance with the other actions on the territory can influence the overall strategies of the
city project and change the balance of the urban project, notably in terms of equipment
distribution, public utilities access, etc.
The challenge, in this systemic approach of the urban project, therefore lies in
the consideration of many projects which component it. This task falls to the public
actor, who is responsible for the development of the territory, and whose role is to
coordinate projects together, in order to promote synergy, rather than a weakening of
urban dynamics, and to reduce the inequalities which might occur. These projects
under the action of a multitude of actors, the stake of the coherence of these actors and
their actions represent, in our opinion, the current major challenge for city planners.
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Figure 2.5: Possible drawing for the public transport in Saint Etienne
Source: Chemin-Le Piolet
Figure 2.6: Possible drawing for green lane, inter-districts link
Source: Chemin-Le Piolet
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2.3 The quest for coherence of the urban project
2.3.1 Coherence and complex system
The system is broached by E. Morin as "different elements combinatorial associa-
tion"2 (Morin, 2005, p. 28). The sociologist and philosopher also points out: "systemic
virtue is to have placed at the centre of the theory, with the notion of system, not a dis-
crete elementary unit, but a complex unit, a "set" that cannot be reduced to the "sum"
of its constituent parts "3 (Morin, 2005, p. 29). Several versions of the system concept
alludes to the logic and organization as resultant of its structure. The system appears
as “a set of equipments or not, mutually dependent on each other to form an organized
whole”4 (Lalande, 2006, p. 1096). Thus, the concept of "coherence" is implicitly
included in the internal working of the system.
When it is complex, system working doesn’t appear much decryptable even inter-
twined and therefore its logic and coherence escape. It is the complexity that takes us
away from the coherence concept as many parameters become intertwined in interac-
tion. Complexity prevents from assessing the future state of the system and its various
parameters. The complexity is the "characteristic of a system which, due to the het-
erogeneity of processes that take place, has the ability to evolve in different directions,
which makes this dynamic difficult to predict from present conditions".5 (Levy and
Lussault, 2003, p. 188).
Thus, taking an interest in the coherence of the urban project as a complex system,
reflects a certain paradox which would be similar to breaking through the logic which
leads the system and clearing up its complexity. This paradox particularly impacts the
land settlement and town-planning disciplines, of which the projection of the "urban
system" in the time is one of the founding principles. Thus, the urban action collides
with the complexity of the system on which it must operate.
2.3.2 Incertitude and fragmentation of urban systems
It must be noted that the land settlement is now occurring in a context of increasing
complexity and uncertainty. Urban transformations, changing territories and projects
appear extremely unpredictable and question the land settlement practices. Contempo-
rary dynamics such as globalization and metropolitanization have caused a loss of intel-
ligibility figures of the cities, confusing the keys of reading and action on the territories
(Chalas, 2009). Multiple uncertainties impact the town-planning such as economic,
environmental and social instability of the territories, the future consequences of in-
novations in the mobility and new communication technologies, etc. The uncertainty
and complexity are the paradigms of contemporaneity. In this sense, they radically
transform the way we think about territories and actions to lead taken on them.
Moreover, the framework for developing and implementing various land settlement
projects is becoming increasingly fragmented. We are in particular witnessing a frag-
mentation of public actors competences through the "institutional millefeuille" result-
ing from the French decentralization. The financial framework constrains public actors
and the involvement increasingly significant of private actors and people in the produc-
tion of the city increase tenfold the partnership aspect of these projects.
2 Personal translation from the text of the author
3 Personal translation from the text of the author
4 Personal translation from the text of the author
5 Personal translation from the text of the author
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In this way, the urban project results from the combination of actions led by multi-
ple public and private actors. It appears fragmented as a result of a multitude of projects
and actors interacting amongst themselves, and it becomes extremely complex to pre-
dict the future effects. These projects are so numerous that it seems to be impossible
to assess how the global urban system will evolve. Especially, within each project,
economic, sociological, economical, political and environmental parameters influence
their own progress, success, impact, etc.
And yet, the particularity of the discipline is to take part on the territories. Town
planning is a "science of action" (Merlin, 2009) based on the principle of beneficial
response to the current or future working of the territory. The approach developed
here is based on the consideration of the territory as a system. Therefore, taking into
account the interactions that drive our complex urban systems emerges as one of the
major challenges in the discipline but also becomes the way to expand our thinking of
the "coherence" of the urban project.
The analysis of the systems traditionally operated through the black box principle
(Wiener, 1948), listing the incoming and outgoing and by deduction the production
of the system, does not seem adapted to the land settlement disciplines. Indeed, the
challenge for these disciplines is to influence trends deemed not desirable before that
they do not produce too many undesirable effects. The aim is therefore to take into
account the in progress dynamics and not once they have produced irreversible effects.
The complexity of operating urban systems and the inability of land settlement ac-
tors to predict their evolution have been highlighted above. The challenge of the urban
project coherence is therefore in the broadest possible knowledge of ongoing and future
projects in order to "re-act" knowingly. This approach of the urban project distanced
itself from the traditional planner vision of the land settlement. The integration of
contemporary complexity and uncertainty inherent in urban systems reduce long-term
urban anticipation in favour of an informed and reflexive management of the urban
project.
This sense of the urban project cannot be only limited to sloppiness and emergency
logics. It is vital to manage the urban project, not to undergo urban developments. This
management is based on 3 elements of the urban project: the expected vision for the
future of the territory, strategies deployed to work towards this vision and the fulfilment
of these strategies through projects. In our opinion, the coherence of the urban project
lies in the articulation between these elements. This articulation is based on a strong
principle of reflexivity in which it is no more a question of stating an action plan in a
linear way, but re-examine the current action based on the first effects produced and
new parameters used in interaction (Ascher, 2004).
In this changing and fragmented context, the job of the public actor appears as
the conductor of the general meaning of the action. He guarantees in this way, the
coherence of the urban project across the entire city. It is a matter of overcoming the
breaking up of actions and actors of the system by giving a comprehensive and shared
vision of the territory. The main challenge for the public actor lies therefore in the
broadest possible knowledge of ongoing projects in the area and in the implementation
of a readable global urban project.
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2.4 Modelling of complex system: The urban project
atlas of Saint-Etienne
2.4.1 To a "global" and "informed" management of the urban
project
Faced with challenges of readability and reflexive management of the urban project,
this reflection has led to the modelling of complex urban system of Saint-
Etienne. This experiment was managed by the town-planning services of the city
of Saint-Etienne and a tool for readability and coherence of the urban project called
Atlas of the urban project in Saint-Etienne has been created.
In 2010, the fragmentation of the urban project in Saint-Etienne is marked daily
by the lack of a common representation among the planning actors. Each of them de-
veloping its own communication media on his own projects (large projects, thematic
cross-functional projects such as the public transport, etc.). The lack of support to rep-
resent all projects, including in particular diffuse and private projects, does not enable
to take the evolution of the ordinary city and the territory into account as a whole.
So, the urban project is the subject of multiple partial representations reflecting the
fragmented governance that implements it. The complex urban system is therefore
broached in a divided and partial way by each of these actors. From this perception
of the system results a partial management and vision of the urban project that will
have to be exceeded by the experiment of the modelling of complex urban system as a
whole.
For the modelling of the urban project such as complex system, the support used
is the map. It allows to represent each project in its spatial form to reveal possible
future interactions through a temporal slicing. It is therefore to develop a partnership
tool representing all projects, regardless of the project ownership. The partnership
dimension is here very important because each actor has his own data of his project
and it is necessary to group them in order for the tool to work.
The modelling of the complex urban system, The Urban Project Atlas, works as:
• An element-resource: a database, a filing of town-planning studies, a reporting
and monitoring of projects
• A tool for decision support and production analysis that informs us about urban
form, the progress of projects, and makes the connection with strategic planning
documents and public policies.
2.4.2 The temporal map revealing interactions
The core of the tool is a temporal map. This map is the indicator of the interactions
between the various elements of the system. This is the modelling of different projects
in their urban form at the city scale, according to a common programmatic legend and a
temporal slicing of actions, concerning the short-term (current year), the medium-term
(end of the mandate), and the long-term (beyond the mandate). The major challenge
lies in the completeness and responsiveness of modelling projects, large and small,
private and public. Thus, it is by the support of the community database (building
permits, housing services, displacements, prospective, etc.) to input private operations,
public areas, emblematic town-planning operations and diffuse actions, all project own-
erships. The base map is the cadastral plan of the territory with buildings in grey and
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Figure 2.7: Extracts of the temporal map and legend. Source: City of Saint-Etienne
highways. The outline of the municipality delimits the study area. In a homogenized
corporate identity and style guide, all projects of the territory are represented according
to the categories of programs: public areas, housing restoration, new equipments, etc.
A particular colour corresponds to each program category.
Thus, knowledge and modelling of each project become strategic because they will
be the "indicator” of the "possible" future interactions. This map reveals the inter-
actions between projects at several levels. At first, the mere fact of represent many
projects of the territory on the same map is indicative of the potential interactions be-
tween operations previously considered separately. Thus, such a support opens up new
perspectives in terms of synergies to strengthen or competitions to regulate between
the various ongoing operations. The production of this map making allows to develop
a global vision of the territory and its dynamics, and to examine the equilibrium distri-
bution of the various programs on the territory, for example.
Secondly, the most revealing element of these interactions is the temporal slicing
done with this map making (Figure 2.7). In fact, each project is assigned a specific
temporality, short-term (current year), medium-term (end of the mandate, 2014) and
long-term (beyond the mandate). This temporal slicing can render map making dy-
namic and therefore refine the interaction between projects. It is this dynamic vision
of the fulfillment of "scheduled" projects that will reveal possible interactions and
may cause a re-orientation in terms of programming. Seeing that similar projects are
planned nearby could, for example, make a project initiator postpone the phasing or
develop another type of products, etc.
The Urban Project Atlas is an indicator of ongoing urban dynamics in the terri-
tory and a tool for decision support and production analysis. Through interactivity it
connects the "representation of projects" in terms of urban form, content (program,
planning, etc.) and progress, with the strategic planning documents and major public
policies (Figure 2.8).
This interactive tool based on the principle of articulation scale, allows to include
a global vision of the urban project from the strategy to details of operations. It is now
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Figure 2.8: The urban project Atlas scales articulation principle and interactivity.
Source: City of Saint Etienne
accessible to various officers of the City of Saint-Etienne and their privileged partners
as the urban conglomeration Saint-Etienne Metropolis in particular.
2.5 Conclusions
This action-research led on the interactions in complex systems allowed us to demon-
strate the essential sign of the concept in the field of town-planning and land settlement.
The territory is in essence an extremely complex object, - resulting from the com-
bination of multiple geographic, economic, social parameters, - and thus generating a
"situation" or context whenever new. André Corboz describes it as a combination of
" factors as diverse as the geology, the topography, the hydrography, the climate, the
forest cover and crops, populations, the technical infrastructure, the productive capac-
ity, the judiciary, the administrative zoning, the national accounting, service networks,
policy stakes and so on, not only in all of their interferences, but dynamically, in virtue
of an intervention project"6 (Corboz, 2001, p. 10). The town planning and the land
settlement are complex disciplines by definition since they involve in working on these
areas in order to improve their functioning, reduce inequalities, etc. It is in this sense
an art of synthesis, the consideration of many factors that have to be reconciled, or at
least to reconcile the greatest possible number.
In this way, this contribution dealt with the urban project, the territory project of the
city of Saint-Etienne, as system confronted with complexity, uncertainty and breaking
6Personal translation from the text of the author.
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up of urban areas. And, whose the quest for coherence, has resulted in a reflection
on interactions between multiple projects constituent of the global urban project. The
necessity for renewal of traditional modes of action of the land settlement in favour of
reflexive approaches has been highlighted by this reflection.
As a consequence, the experiment based on this analysis was led through the mod-
elling of complex urban system of Saint-Etienne represented by The Urban Project
Atlas. This interactive tool, whose the core is a temporal map making of projects, acts
as the indicator of interactions between the various elements of the urban system.
This experimental and innovative tool is part of multiple investigations led on the
theme of "the watching of territories." These tools, which can be grouped into the
"urban observatories" category are a way to "enter" the interactions of complex ur-
ban systems, in the sense of their understanding but also representation. The current
rise of these functions of observatory reflects the challenge of taking into account the
interactions and complexity of urban systems for territorial sciences.
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Abstract
In this paper we build a Toy-Model based on Partial Differential Equa-
tions (PDE) that embeds several aspects of Territory Working. In a first
place we describe Territory Working using a Systemic Approach involv-
ing compartments, action-reaction loops and feedback loops. Then den-
sity functions are associated to each compartment and we write a PDE for
each density translating action-reaction loops and feedback loops into co-
efficients or source terms in this PDE. We then obtain a system of four
PDEs that we use for a numerical simulation. The interpretation of the re-
sult of this simulation shows that some aspects of the Toy-Model behavior
are consistant with the working of a real territory.
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, by Territory, we mean a Country or a Town or a set of Towns and Coun-
tries having a coherence and being administrated by a common local government.
As explained in Cullingworth and Nadin (2006), town and country planning needs
an understanding of the interactions occurring within a Territory, at various scales.
With the perspective of providing a solution for this need, our long term goal is to
build a software tool that behaves like a Territory, and in particular that incorporates its
multi-scale-in-time-and-space nature, in order to make simulations, to explore scenar-
ios, to foresee policy impacts, to help to make a decision when facing a change in the
environment or in cultural behavior, etc..
Models of Territory that do not take into account space (see Moriarty and Adams
1976) exist. Now, many questions in town and country planning are related to people
displacement: for instance, daily displacements are linked with decision making con-
cerning transport network and population migration has consequences on construction
policies. Hence, these models are a little limited to help decision making. On another
hand, space models exist for a long time in Spatial Economics (see for instance Vicker-
man 1980, Beckmann and Puu 1985, Meardon 2001) but do not seem to be much used
for the purpose of town and country planning.
A Territory is clearly a Complex System that involves, among others, a geographic
area, people, local government actions and enterprises. It also consumes energy and
produces wealth, goods, services and culture. Comprehend Territory Working glob-
ally is certainly a very difficult task and possessing a rich enough mental picture of it
without using modeling may be impossible.
Hence, As we want to begin the process of understanding Territory Working, we
face with the following issue: we need to build a model of something that we do essen-
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tially not understand. For doing this, the usual analytic modeling method, that describes
precisely the working of every detail of a system and that assembles those details into
a global mathematical model is ineffective.
We need to turn to the Systemic Approach that starts from the global and that of-
fers the possibility to consider only a part of a Complex System or to consider several
parts that are not modeled with the same level of details. For doing this, the Systemic
Approach considers a Complex System as several compartments that act on each other
via action/reaction loops and on themselves via feedback loops. Building a first occur-
rence of the Systemic Model of a given Complex System consists in isolating a few
parts of the System and to assign them the status of compartment. Then, we have to
describe how the parts (or compartments) act on each other and on themselves to define
the action/reaction and feedback loops.
If this task is properly achieved, it is possible to associate with each compartment a
mathematical object and with every loop a mathematical operator acting on one of
those objets. Hence, we finally obtain a mathematical model that can be analyzed or
simulated using usual mathematical tools.
Once the first occurrence of the Systemic Model of a given Complex System is
built, it is possible to add a part in it. That is to say that a new compartment and new
loops are added in the Systemic Model and that a mathematical object and mathemat-
ical operators are added in the mathematical model. It is also possible to go into the
details of one part. This consists in replacing one compartment by several ones and in
re-defining the loops.
In this paper we build a mathematical model, that we call Toy-Model, following
the way described above that embeds several aspects of Territory Working. In a first
step a Systemic Approach leads a Systemic Model. Then, we translate this Systemic
Model into the mathematical one. For that we use density functions as mathematical
objects and PDEs (see Farlow 1993) as mathematical operators. More precisely, the
action/reaction and feedback loops are translated into coefficients and source terms of
the PDEs that give the time evolution of the considered densities.
For the building of the Systemic Model we make choices concerning the parts to
take under consideration. In those choices, there is arbitrariness. Yet, we find clever
to consider that the working of a territory is essentially the consequence of actions of
people living on it and on the economic activity standing on it. Hence we choose to use
a "People" and an "Enterprises" compartments. Then, we want to put our work into the
perspective of the long term goal describe in the beginning of this Introduction. Hence
we choose to introduce an "Energy" compartment as energy is, on the one hand, used
for displacement of people and, on the other hand, is something that burns the wealth
that economy produces. Besides, we choose to embed our Model into a geographical
area because of our long term goal and because, if space is not modeled, no displace-
ment can be taken into account, and so, no related energy consumption estimated.
Thanks to those choices, the simulations made with the resulting mathematical
model allow to visualize the dynamics of people going to work, the energy and wealth
consumptions those displacements induce and the fact that people working in enter-
prises generates wealth. It also helps to comprehend the result of the way this wealth is
split into the part used to improve enterprises’ efficiency, the part allocated to increase
their size and the part that goes to people.
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Figure 3.1: Systemic approach of territory working
3.2 Systemic approach of territory working
We consider that the Working of a Territory results from the interactions between peo-
ple and enterprises on a geographic area and that this interaction consumes energy.
Integrating this within a Systemic Approach results in a Systemic Model which rep-
resentation is given in Figure 3.1. Three compartments are considered. The first one
("People") concerns the population, the second one ("Energy") concerns the energy
questions and the last one ("Enterprises") concerns the world of enterprises. We have,
at this level, a non restrictive definition of what is an enterprise. It can be any organi-
zation producing goods or services and in which people work.
Then, the compartments influence each other or themselves. This fact is symbol-
ized by the arrows. For instance, the arrow which is the more at the top of the figure
translates that when people are at work, they contribute to the production of wealth.
In return, the arrow just below means that displacements are induced by enterprise lo-
cations and the arrow in the left translates that an energy consumption is induced by
those displacements. The three arrows that point on the "Enterprises" compartment
from itself symbolize that enterprises create wealth and that this created wealth is used
by the enterprises for growing up and for their efficiency improvement. The two last
arrows, in the bottom, express that enterprises consume energy to create wealth.
3.3 The toy – model
From the Systemic Model of the previous section, we now build the Toy-Model. In this
Toy-Model, all quantities are dimensionless, meaning that they have no unit and that
their order of magnitude is 1.
In order to provide the reader, as fast as possible, with an interpretation of the equations
that are introduced, we make simulations during the model writing. They are done us-
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Figure 3.2: Initial population density P0 (left) and job-station density E0 (right)
ing Freefem++ which is a Finite Element software tool. All the simulations are done
over the same time interval [0, T ), defined for a real number T > 0, which is driven by
variable t.
The geographic model of the Toy-Model is a disk D, provided with coordinates x,
with a boundary @D. The vector of norm 1, orthogonal to @D and pointing outside D is
denoted µ.
On this disk, several densities, which depend on time, are defined:
• P = P(t, x) is the Population Density.
• E = E(t, x) is the Job-station Density.
• W = W(t, x) is the Wealth-that-goes-to-people Density.
For those densities, initial values are defined: P0 = P0(x) which is the Population
Density when everybody is at home at night, E0 = E0(x) andW0 = W0(x) = 1.
An example of initial density P0(x) is drawn on the left of Figure 3.2 and an example
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Figure 3.3: job-station density E0 times efficiency indicator i0
of E0(x) is drawn on the right of Figure 3.2. The simulation to come will be done with
those initial conditions.
An Efficiency Indicator i = i(t, x) is also defined on the disk. It ranges in [0, 1] and
measures the efficiency of the enterprises at transforming people working into wealth
at every point of the disk; it is initialized at i0.
The product of the initial Job-station Density E0 of Figure 3.2 by the initial Efficiency
Indicator i0 that will be used in the simulation to come is given in Figure 3.3.
From initial Population Density P0 and Job-station Density E , two attractors are
built. The first oneAE = AE(t, x) attracts the Population Density towards Job-stations.
It is defined as
AE(t, x) =
Z
D
P0(x) dxZ
D
P0(x) dx+ ↵
Z
D
E(t, x) dx
(P0(x) + ↵E(t, x)) , (3.1)
where ↵ is a constant larger than 1. The second one AP = AP(x) makes the popula-
tion to go back home. It is defined as
AP(x) = P0(x). (3.2)
With those two attractors, we can simulate the daily motion of the population. For
this, we firstly adopt the convention that day length is 1. Then, we define two functions
tm = tm(t) and te = te(t) depending only on time and periodic of period 1. tm(t) > 0
for instants corresponding to the morning displacements, when people goes to work and
is 0 otherwise; and, te(t) > 0 for instants corresponding to the evening displacements,
when people goes back home and is 0 otherwise. Secondly we write the equation
meaning that in the morning the Population Density is attracted by the Job-station
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Figure 3.4: Displacements from home to work and back (Animation available on
YouTube: http://youtu.be/LkPlVT-a4pg.)
Attractor and in the evening by the Home Attractor:
@P
@t
(t, x) = tm(t) (AE(t, x)  P(t, x))
+ te(t) (AP(x)  P(t, x)) , 8x 2 D, 8t 2 (0,+1), (3.3)
and describing the daily people motion.
An example of the evolution of P is given by the movie in Figure 3.4. In this ex-
ample, the initial densities P0(x) and E0(x) are the ones of Figure 3.2.
In this movie, we can see the alternation of people displacements to their work (in the
morning) and to their home (in the evening). Because of the Job-station distribution
chosen for this example, most of people converges everyday to work in a small region
located near the center of the disk.
This motion generates an energy consumption. It is modeled by a time density   =
 (t), which is constant per day and which value at any given day is the double integral
over the disk of the distances from home locations to Job-station locations weighted by
the locations where Population Density P increases and where it decreases.
In other words,   is a constant over every interval [n, n + 1], n 2 N and its value on
[n, n+ 1] is computed as follows
 n =
Z
D
Z
D
|x  y| PnIncr(x)PnDecr(y) dxdy, (3.4)
where PnIncr is the density of increasing population, where population increases, when
comparing the Population Density in the morning (before people go to work) and in
the middle of the day (when workers are at their job-station). It is defined by
PnIncr(x) = max(P(n+
1
2
, x)  P(n, x), 0). (3.5)
In a similar way, PnDecr is the density of decreasing population, where population de-
creases, when comparing the Population Density in the morning and in the middle of
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Figure 3.5: Evolution of job-station density E . (Animation available on YouTube:
http://youtu.be/PorgK4q5Ds0.)
the day and is defined by
PnDecr(x) = max( P(n+
1
2
, x) + P(n, x), 0). (3.6)
We consider that the fact that people is at work produces Wealth with a rate which
depends on the product of the Population Density P by the Job-station Density E times
the Efficiency Indicator i. To take this into account, we introduce now a wealth pro-
duction rate density ! = !(t, x) which is constant per day. Its value at any given day
(represented by interval [n, n + 1], n 2 N) is in proportion with the product of the
Population Density P by the Job-station Density E times the Efficiency Indicator i at
the middle of the day:
!n(x) =  0 P(n+ 1
2
, x) E(n+ 1
2
, x) i(n+
1
2
, x). (3.7)
In this equation,  0 is a coefficient much smaller than 1, meaning that the time scale of
Wealth variation is large when compared to a day.
It seems pertinent to consider that this Wealth is split into three parts. The first
one is allocated to enterprises’ growth. It accounts for the fact that when an enterprise
works well, it increases its workforce. This first part is a source term in the following
Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) driving the Job-station Density E evolution:
@E
@t
(t, x) =  1 !(t, x), 8x 2 D, 8t 2 (0,+1). (3.8)
In this ODE, which is set in every point of the disk,  1 is a coefficient belonging to
a triplet ( 1, 2, 3) of positive coefficients such that  1 +  2 +  3 = 1. This ODE
means that the growth speed of the Job-station Density is in proportion with produced
Wealth.
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The second part ( 2 !(t, x)) contributes to improve enterprises’ efficiency. This
accounts for that enterprises invest to increase their productivity. This second part
contributes as a source term in the ODE, set in every point of the disk and which is
such that its solution i always ranges in [0, 1]:
@i
@t
(t, x) = i(t, x)(1  i(t, x)) ( 2 !(t, x)   1 !(t, x)) , 8x 2 D, 8t 2 (0,+1).
(3.9)
The term  1 !(t, x) in this equation models that when organization grows, if nothing
is done, its efficiency decreases.
The result of the influence of Wealth on the Job-station Density E and on the prod-
uct of the Job-station Density E times the Efficiency Indicator i are given in the movies
of Figures 3.5 and 3.6 for the same example as in the previous figures.
We see in those movies that, around the small region where most of people converges
everyday to work, there is a strong increase of Job-station Density E and of enterprises’
Efficiency i.
Figure 3.6: Evolution of job-station density E times efficiency indicator i. (Animation
available on YouTube: http://youtu.be/B7gjmu7q8IU.)
The third part of Wealth production will diffuse inside the population. It is then a
source term in the diffusion equationW is solution to:
@W
@t
(t, x)  ⌫ W(t, x) =  3!(t, x)   (t), 8x 2 D, 8t 2 (0,+1), (3.10)
@W
@µ
= FW , 8x 2 @D, 8t 2 (0,+1), (3.11)
where ⌫ is the diffusion coefficient of Wealth within the population on the territory.
In this PDE, the energy consumption time density   is also a source term but with
an opposite action than that of the Wealth production. This is because   induces a
consumption of Wealth. In this PDE there is also a boundary condition on the disk
border, translating the fact that there is a little wealth that enters or leaves the Territory
through its border.
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Figure 3.7: Evolution of wealth densityW . (Animation available on YouTube: http:
//youtu.be/05JNyznPxvw.)
The evolution of Wealth-that-goes-to-people Density is given by the movie in Fig-
ure 3.7, still for the same example as before. We can see the diffusion of the Wealth-
that-goes-to-people from the small region where most of people converges everyday to
work towards the other parts of the Territory.
3.4 Interpretation
Clearly, the simulation made using the Toy-Model does not pretend to be realistic.
Nonetheless, it illustrates that the proposed approach brings a way to couple several
aspects of Territory Working.
For instance, it can handle non-linearities. This is illustrated by the two pictures
of Figure 3.8. The one on the left is the Population Density at midday of the first day
and the one on the right is the Population Density at midday of the last day. We can
see that, in the small region close to the center of the disk, the density is higher in
the right picture than in the left picture. This can be explained as follow: Since many
people works their, wealth is produced, which induces Job-station number to increase.
As a consequence, day after day, more and more people is coming to work in this small
region.
The scales (regarding time and space) have no realistic meaning. Nevertheless, we
can see the capability of this kind of models to account for a wide variety of scales. For
instance, regarding the space scales, in the Toy-model, there is the size of the Territory
(the disk) and there are the characteristic sizes of variation of Population-at-home Den-
sity, of Job-station Density and Enterprise Efficiency.
Besides, this way of modeling allows us to connect several Territories through their
common boundaries and then to consider a large number of connected Territories.
Regarding the time scales, in the Toy-Model there are the characteristic time of Popu-
lation motion, the characteristic time of wealth production and the one of wealth diffu-
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sion.
Figure 3.8: Population density at midday of the first day (left) and of the last day (right)
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we proved that building a mathematical model, based on PDEs, starting
from the Systemic Approach of Complex System, of Territory Working is possible.
Moreover we saw that this Toy-Model can be used to make simulations of the working
of a territory. Clearly this work is modest and far from the long term goal evoked in the
Introduction. Nevertheless, it is a convincing proof of concept and gives confidence in
the fact that it can be achieve.
At this stage, we already can test the various results of various ways to split the pro-
duced wealth between enterprises’ efficiency improvement, enterprises’ size increase
and people.
Once the long term project will be more advanced, we will be able to provide
decision makers with a software tool that somehow behaves like a territory. Hence
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they will be able to use this tool to simulate their planned actions and consequently see
the impact of their decisions. They will also be able to use it to chose between several
scenarios or to optimize a given scenario.
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Abstract
In this article we present the modeling of bi-stability view problems
described by the activity or firing rates of two interacting population of
neurons. Starting from the study of a complex system, the system of
stochastic differential equations describing the time evolution of the activ-
ity of the two populations of neurons, we point out the strength and weak-
ness of this model and consider its associated partial differential equation,
which resolution gives statistical information on the firing rates distribu-
tions. The slow-fast characterization of the solutions finally leads us to a
complexity reduction of the model by the definition of a one-dimensional
stochastic differential equation and its associated one-dimensional partial
differential equation. This last model turns out to be well adapted to the
resolution of the problem giving access, in particular, to reaction times and
performance, two macroscopic variables describing the decision-making
in the view problem.
4.1 Introduction
Decision-making problems in social and natural sciences are often described by means
of complex systems governed by differential equations giving the time variation of
some quantities. We can represent the two choices decision making situation like a set
of particles evolving in double wells potentials (potential functions with two minima or
stable equilibrium points and one maximum or unstable equilibrium point) and submit-
ted to interactions. Each well represents one of the decision states and corresponds to
one attractor of the system. The function describing the double well potential is usually
a fourth order polynomial (like in the Van der Pool equation), and the problem can be
explicitly solved, see for example the book by Galam (2012) for an application to so-
cial sciences. The decision-making process may also be described by the evolution of
the reaction times and performance, two macroscopic variables representing the mean
minimal time a subject needs to make a decision (or a particle needs to exit a potantial
well), and the amount of subjects having choosen a particular decision state (or the sum
of all particles being in a potential well) at a given time.
In this paper we deal with bi-stability visual situations. The decision-making pro-
cess in this context involve a huge number of interacting neurons and it is not possible
to describe it by the knowledge of each single neuron. The synchronization of the neu-
rons activity leads to an equilibrium representing the decision. We can briefly sketch
the situation as follows. A subject is asked to choose between two possible views of
a picture. His sight has to focus on one of these views, and this is done at a neuronal
level. The decision is taken once the focus is done. Neuron-physicists are then in-
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terested in the two macroscopic quantities: the reaction times and the performance.
Since neurons in the visual cortex have different skills and are connected, this problem
can’t be modeled by the description of a single neuron activity, but different popula-
tions of neurons in interaction must be considered. In computational neurosciences, the
decision making of interacting population of neurons (excitatory and inhibitory ones)
have been successfully described by a system of deterministic differential equations,
called the Wilson-Cowan system, see the seminal work by Wilson and Cowan (1972).
In this model, the unknowns are function of time only and represent the mean firing
rate of each population of neurons, i.e. for each population, the mean frequency of the
neuronal signal, hence its activity. Moreover, the underlying potential is not a fourth
order polynomial function and can’t be explicitly computed. More recently, noise has
been added to the model, see Deco and Martì (2007), in order to account for the finite
number of neurons in the mean field approximation used to derive the Wilson-Cowan
model. The non-linearity in the model makes its mathematical analysis difficult. In
particular, it is not possible to write the explicit solution of the stationary associated
problem. Nevertheless, in Deco and Martì (2007) the authors numerically show, apply-
ing the moment analysis, that for the ranges of parameters they are interested in, the
solutions are bi-modal, i.e. double peaked. This method works well, but no closure
to the system of equation is provided. In order to write an approximation of the ex-
plicit stationary solution to the problem, knowing that the solutions must be bi-modal
and applying Taylor expansion methods, it is also possible to define a fourth order
polynomial V , passing from the equilibrium points, see for example Roxin and Led-
berg (2008). This function V is then also used to compute reaction times (by means
of Kramers formula) and performance (by means of the steady state). This approach,
which is usually applied in computational neurosciences, gives results in agreement
with experimental data, see Roxin and Ledberg (2008), but only holds locally.
In this paper, we will consider the partial differential equation associated to the
stochastic system which describes the evolution of the probability distribution function
in terms of the firing rates of the two neuron populations. We will see in the sequel
how its mathematical analysis and numerical simulations can help to reduce the com-
plexity of the problem leading to faster computations of the reaction times and the
performance, and compare the results of the simplified model with the initial one. The
presented complexity reduction method is a good way to overcome the difficulty of not
knowing the explicit form of the underlying potential and the approximated solutions
are defined on the whole domain we are interested in, and not only locally as usually
done in computational neurosciences. The present work resumes the results of several
papers done in collaborations with J. A. Carrillo (London), G. Deco (Barcelona) and
S. Cordier (Orléans), see Carrillo et al. (2011), Carrillo et al. (2013a) and Carrillo et al.
(2013b).
4.2 The mathematical model
Recently bi-stability visual problems have been investigated by considering systems of
stochastic differential equations which describe the time evolution of the firing rates
for two or more interacting populations of neurons (see for example Deco and Martì
(2007) and Roxin and Ledberg (2008)). This kind of models, based on the determinis-
tic Wilson-Cowan one (see Wilson and Cowan (1972)), permits to numerically evaluate
the subject reaction times and the performance together with their variations with re-
spect to the differences on the applied stimuli and/or the weight of the interactions.
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For instance, reaction times correspond to the time needed for the subject to make a
decision, and performance is the number of good responses taken by the subject with-
out limitation on time. The model can be interpreted from a physical point of view as
particles trapped in a double (or multiple) well potential, reaction times corresponding
then to the exit time from a well and performance being given by the density contained
in the well associated to the correct answer.
The model studied in Deco and Martì (2007) considers the time evolution of the
firing rates ⌫1 = ⌫1(t) and ⌫2 = ⌫2(t) of two neuron populations. Their behavior
satisfies the following system of stochastic differential equations:(
d⌫1 =  1(⌫1, ⌫2)dt+ d⇠
d⌫2 =  2(⌫1, ⌫2)dt+ d⇠,
(4.1)
where d⇠ is a white noise of standard deviation   and  1,  2 are the dynamical part of
the equations and model the neuronal activity. They are defined by:
 1 =  ⌫1 +  ( 1 + w ⌫1 + wˆ ⌫2),
 2 =  ⌫2 +  ( 2 + wˆ ⌫1 + w ⌫2),
with  (z) the so-called response function to the mean excitation z, defined by the
sigmoid:
 (z) =
⌫c
1 + exp( ↵(z/⌫c   1)) ,
with ⌫c and ↵ parameters that are fixed by biology and where the mean excitation z
is given by the sum of the applied stimuli ( 1 or  2) and the internal activities given
by a linear combination of the activity of each population weighted respectively by
w and wˆ depending if we are considering the same population or not. Note that, the
weights being symmetric, if the applied stimuli are the same (i.e.  1 =  2), then the
problem is symmetric and is defined as the unbiased case, whereas if one of the stimuli
is larger than the other (say  1 =  2 +   ), the problem loses its symmetry and we
define this situation as the biased case, with the bias given by   . In the following
numerical results, with the exeption of those in Figure 4.3 which consider a slightly
different potential, ⌫c = 20, ↵ = 4, w = 0.45, wˆ = 1.23,   = 0.3,  1 =  2 = 15 and
   = 0.01.
It’s well-know in literature that we can deduce a Fokker-Planck equation from sys-
tem (4.1) applying Ito calculus or considering the forward Kolmogorov equation asso-
ciated to (4.1): for (t, ⌫1, ⌫2) 2 (0,+1)⇥ ⌦,
@tp+r ·
✓
F p   
2
2
rp
◆
= 0, (4.2)
where p = p(t, ⌫1, ⌫2) is the probability distribution function representing the prob-
ability that at time t   0 the firing rates are in (⌫1, ⌫2) 2 ⌦ ⇢ R2+, and with
F = F (⌫1, ⌫2) = (f(⌫1, ⌫2), g(⌫1, ⌫2)) the drift term. The domain ⌦ being bounded
(the square [0, ⌫m]⇥[0, ⌫m], with ⌫m the maximal firing rate value for the neuron popu-
lations), we complete equation (4.2) by the following Robin type (or no flux) boundary
conditions: on @⌦,
F p   
2
2
rp = 0 ,
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and we finally consider the normalized initial condition:
p(0, ⌫1, ⌫2) = p0(⌫1, ⌫2)   0.
As proven in Carrillo et al. (2011), under the assumption of incoming flux, the problem
is well posed and there exists a unique steady state solution of the stationary Fokker-
Planck equation. Nevertheless, as explained in Carrillo et al. (2011) there is no potential
function V = V (⌫1, ⌫2) such that F =  rV . This fact implies that it is not possible
to write explicitly the steady state associated to (4.2). Recall that the steady state and
the potential V are essential for the computing of reaction times and performance.
The bi-dimensional behavior of the solution of (4.2) at a given time is shown in
Figure 4.1: the solution is concentrated around the two stable equilibrium points and
is aligned along the equilibrium manifold. The bi-modal aspect of the solution is well
captured by the numerical simulations of the Fokker-Planck equation (left). When the
situation is biased (i.e. one of the applied stimuli is bigger), then one of the wells
is deeper than the other and the symmetry of the problem is lost. In this situation
the solution at equilibrium (or for large times) is concentrated around the equilibrium
point corresponding to the deeper well, (right). Note that in Deco and Martì (2007) the
authors represented the solution by means of their marginals (i.e. the projections along
each axis) and no bi-dimensional numerical result was obtained.
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Figure 4.1: Solution to equation (4.2). Left : unbiased case. Right : biased case.
4.3 Complexity reduction
Although the behavior of the solution of equation (4.2) is in agreement with what is
expected physically, the application to real problems of this equation, or the use of the
associated numerical simulations, are not competitive, since nor the potential function
V nor the steady state are known and to approximate them numerically requires very
long CPU times.
Nevertheless, the study of problem (4.2) shows that its solution is characterized by
a slow-fast behavior: rapid diffusion towards the equilibrium manifold and slow drift
along the manifold towards the stable equilibrium points. In Carrillo et al. (2013a) we
have proposed a complexity reduction of (4.3) based on this slow-fast characteristic
of the problem and leads to a one-dimensional Fokker-Planck equation living on the
equilibrium manifold (see Berglund and Gentz (2005)). The fast convergence being
along a direction which is given by a linear combination of ⌫1 and ⌫2, we can define
two new variables x and y respectively as the variable along which the fast convergence
is done and the one corresponding to the slow direction (see Carrillo et al. (2013a) for
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more details). With this change of variables the stochastic system (4.1) transforms in:(
dx = f(x, y)dt+ d⇠x,
dy = g(x, y)dt+ d⇠y,
(4.3)
where f(x, y), respectively g(x, y), are the linear combination of the functions  1
and  2, and where d⇠x et d⇠y are two white noises of standard deviation  x and  y .
Summarizing, we may say that f and g are the functions describing the activity of the
combined firing rates x and y, respectively.
We can define the coefficient " as the ratio of the two eigenvalues associated to
the Jacobian matrix of F , in such a way that " ⌧ 1. This coefficient represents then
the time scaling between the fast and slow variables. It is then possible to write the
deterministic part of (4.3) as follows:(
"dx = f(x, y)dt,
dy = g(x, y)dt.
Considering the limit of " going to zero, we can implicitly solve the first equation and
define a curve x⇤(y) such that f(x⇤(y), y) = 0. Replacing in the equation for the slow
variable y, we get:
y˙ = g(x⇤(y), y).
Considering now the stochastic term, we end up with the stochastic differential equa-
tion:
y˙ = g(x⇤(y), y) +  d⇠. (4.4)
We can then consider the associated partial differential equation on [0,1] ⇥ ⌦y , with
⌦y = [ ym, ym]:
@tq + @y
✓
g(x⇤(y), y)q    
2
2
@yq
◆
= 0, (4.5)
where q = q(t, y) is the probability distribution function representing the probability
that at time t   0, the firing rate is in y. This is a one-dimensional Fokker-Planck
equation, and we can endowed it by means of no flux boundary conditions, for y =
{ ym, ym}:
g(y)q    
2
2
@yq = 0,
and the normalized initial condition q(0, y) = q0(y), which is the projection of p(t, ⌫1, ⌫2)
only along the y variable. The slow behavior of the solution persists, since q lives on
the equilibrium manifold along the slow direction. Nevertheless, computational time
costs are reduced by using implicit in time numerical schemes. Moreover, we can com-
pute an approximation of the potential function V and of the stable state. In fact, for a
one-dimensional Fokker-Planck equation the stable state is given by:
qs(y) = exp
✓ 2G(y)
 2
◆
, (4.6)
where G(y) is the potential function associated to g(x⇤(y), y) and defined by:
G(y) =  
Z
g(x⇤(z), z) dz.
55
As shown in Figure 4.2, the complexity reduced equation (4.5) of the initial Fokker-
Planck model (4.2) gives very good results, both in the unbiased and biased cases.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of the solutions along y for equations (4.2) and (4.5), and with
the stable state (4.6). Left : unbiased. Right : biased.
Therefore, it is possible to compute the wanted macroscopic quantities: reaction
times and performance, as done in Carrillo et al. (2013b).
4.4 Application to a three-well potential
The complexity reduction we have discussed for the double well potential is also useful
for studying more complex situations like a three well potential. The main difference
with what has been done previously is in a modified definition of the response function
 . This situation is more realistic of what happens in visual decision making. Before a
decision is made neurons firing rates are all concentrated at around a certain frequency
value (the middle well) and they do migrate towards the other values (external wells)
when the decision is made. Reaction times in the three well potential case are given by
the exit times from the middle well to get to one of the external wells (the deeper one in
the biased case). Whereas performance is defined by the density being, at equilibrium
or for large times, into one specific well. In Figure 4.3 we plot the computed reaction
times (left) and performance (right) both with respect to the difference on the applied
stimuli    and for different values of the coefficient w+, which is one of connectivity
coefficients used in the definition of the weights w and wˆ.
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Figure 4.3: Left : Reaction times. Right : Performance.
The chosen values of the coefficientw+ corresponds to a sub-critical bifurcation sit-
uation: the system passes form three minima to two minima. Indeed, for w+ = 2.5685
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the underlying potential has three stable equilibrium points and two unstable ones,
for w+ = 2.5695 the middle well gets flat (the system is at the bifurcation) and for
w+ = 2.5705 the underlying potential has two wells and separated by a maximum
which has replaced the middle well. Concerning reaction times (left), the larger the
bias is the faster firing rates move towards the deeper well, and when the middle well
disappears it become easier to take take a decision. Concerning, performance (right),
the larger is the bias the more the subjects will give the expected answer, but the disap-
pearance of the middle point doesn’t increase the density of the good decision since the
bias also implies higher maximum values in the potential to overcome in order to get
to the expected well. The same behavior was obtained in Roxin and Ledberg (2008)
for a similar problem and in several experimental results. Nevertheless, the approach
proposed in Roxin and Ledberg (2008) is valid only in a neighborhood of the sponta-
neous state (middle well), whereas the analysis and results presented here are valid on
the whole domain of definition of the problem.
4.5 Conclusions
We have discussed here in the framework of bi-stability view problems and of compu-
tational neurosciences, how the study of the partial differential equation associated to
stochastic differential system of equation, can give complementary informations and
can lead to the computation of macroscopic quantities (as reaction times and perfor-
mance) of interest in the modeling of interacting population of neurons. In particular,
we have presented the complexity reduction method based on the slow-fast behavior
of the solution of a given stochastic differential system and applied it to a three well
potential case.
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Abstract
The large extent of cooperation among humans can be described as a
complex adaptive system made up of interconnected individuals who up-
date their strategy based on experience. When interactions are described as
a single shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), then the events of cooperation are
particularly puzzling. We construct a model in which individuals are con-
nected with positive and negative ties. Some agents play sign-dependent
strategies that use the sign of the relation as a shorthand for determining
appropriate action toward the opponent. In the context of our model in
which network topology, agent strategic types, and relational signs coe-
volve, the presence of sign-dependent strategies catalyzes the evolution of
cooperation. We highlight how the success of cooperation depends on a
crucial aspect of implementation: whether we apply parallel or sequential
strategy update. Parallel updating, with averaging of payoffs across inter-
actions in the social neighborhood, supports cooperation in a much wider
set of parameter values than sequential updating. Our results cast doubts
about the realism and generalizability of models that claim to explain the
evolution of cooperation but implicitly assume parallel updating.
5.1 Introduction
The defining characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) is that they are made
of a large number of interacting components that - together - generate results which are
not observable at the level of each single element (Anderson et al. 1972). In such sys-
tems, even relatively simple local interaction rules can result in very complex behaviors
of the aggregate system (Helbing 2012). Moreover, small variations in the local rules
of interaction can result in large (non-linear) changes at the system scale. Thus, when
studying complex systems, it is important to understand the impact of changes in the
rules of interaction on the aggregate system properties.
One of the most elaborate complex system known is the human society. The hu-
man society is composed of individuals who are already complex in themselves and
who interact with each other generating highly complex patterns. The results of these
interactions are emerging structures, whose behavior can hardly fit simple or linear
models (consider, for instance, financial markets and traffic in cities that are well stud-
ied examples).
What makes social systems uniquely complex is that their components are self-
aware and, as such, act with some - limited - degree of intentionality. Game theory,
that first attempted to model formally the complexity of interdependent intentional de-
cisions (Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944), made drastic assumptions initially that
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(1) humans act rationally and (2) small scale interactions can be aggregated to the
system level through simple extrapolation. These assumptions, however, have been re-
laxed progressively and now social systems are studied considering individuals that
lack perfect foresight about the future consequences of their actions (March 1978,
Simon 1982) and are affected by emotions and feelings (Camerer 2003, Gigerenzer
2008). In this context, an interesting approach to the problem of studying social inter-
actions is provided by evolutionary game theory that tries to explain which strategies
disappear, survive or thrive in the long run in a setup where strategies with higher pay-
offs tend to diffuse. This strain of literature allows to identify reasons and situations
in which strategies that are rational in static games, are not the most successful ones
in an evolutionary context. In evolutionary game theory, interactions are modelled in a
very simple way when one compares them with the complexity of real-world social ex-
changes. Indeed, in these models agents are encoded with strategies that they are then
bounded to follow when interacting with others. This simplification, however, allows
to explore the mechanisms leading to the emergence or to the disappearance of spe-
cific behavioral patterns in social groups. One of the problems to which this literature
has been applied is the theoretical justification of the continuing existence of selfless
cooperative behavior in both nature and society.
The survival and extent of cooperative behavior in human society has for a long
time been considered as one of the main and most difficult questions in the social
sciences (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981, Axelrod 1997, 1984). Social dilemma games
describe situations in which the self-interest of agents is in contrast with the one of
their interaction partners. The most studied and puzzling among them is the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD). Individuals have two options in the PD: the dominant strategy - defec-
tion - guarantees a higher payoff regardless of what the partner does. The alternative
strategy - cooperation - if played mutually, offers a payoff that is higher than the payoff
from mutually playing the dominant strategy. This problem intensifies in a complex
way when one passes from a 2-agent game played in isolation - where defection is
always the winning strategy - to a game played by agents in a structured population
of agents. It has been shown that unstructured populations with individuals interact-
ing with randomly selected partners are unable to solve the puzzle of cooperation as
natural selection generates uniform populations of defectors (Taylor & Jonker 1978,
Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998). Recently, particular interest was devoted to the issue of
evolutionary games in structured (networked) populations. On the one hand, studying
interactions on networks increases significantly the realism of models, as this formal-
ism allows to explicitly consider their inherent locality. On the other hand, limiting the
possible interactions of agents (given the sparseness of interactions), proved to be able
to increase cooperation in the population (Nakamaru et al. 1997, Nowak &May 1992).
The structure of interactions is important because many relevant mechanisms are
channeled through network ties and because behavioral influence spreads differently
in different structures (Phan 2003). Similarly, reputational mechanisms such as image
scoring (Wedekind & Milinski 2000) also flow via network ties. It has been studied
which network topologies are most efficient for the emergence and diffusion of coop-
eration (Hauert 2004, Santos & Pacheco 2005, Johnson et al. 2003). Having formal
analytical proofs, however, is difficult in this context. Most contributions, therefore,
use numerical simulations and agent-based models. This is especially true for the case
in which the co-evolution of network topology and agent types (Santos et al. 2006, Ya-
magishi & Hayashi 1996, Yamagishi et al. 1994) is studied. Among the mechanisms
that improve the conditions of cooperation in dynamic networks are the possibility of
parter selection, exclusion of defecting agents, and exit from relationships (Schuessler
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1989, Vanberg & Congleton 1992, Yamagishi & Hayashi 1996).
In Righi & Takács (2014b) we studied the conditions for the emergence of coop-
eration on dynamic signed networks. Virtually all co-evolutionary models of networks
and cooperation before assumed the presence of positive relations only. We have re-
laxed this assumption and interpret signed ties as expressing the (positive or negative)
emotional content of the social relationship between two individuals. This interpreta-
tion is consistent with evidence that emotions evolved in humans due to their function
in social interactions (Darwin 1965, Frank 1988, Keltner et al. 2013, Trivers 1971).
Signed relations help guaranteeing the diffusion of reputational information about the
agent’s past conduct, thus providing a guiding light for partners in choosing the correct
behavioral response. While relational signs could be interpreted as a form of memory
(Szolnoki et al. 2013), they constitute a cognitively much less costly mechanism, which
can be used as a shorthanded tool that condenses the past history of a relationship. The
sociological intuition behind why negative ties should also be considered for the evo-
lution of cooperation is the relevance of altruistic punishment of defectors (Bowles &
Gintis 2004, Dreber et al. 2008, Ernst & Gaechter 2005, Fowler 2005, Fowler et al.
2005, Rand & Nowak 2011) and the process of stigmatization and social exclusions of
these individuals (Kerr & Levine 2008, Kurzban & Leary 2001). These mechanisms
could result in negative interpersonal ties that in turn help the spread of cooperative
behavior.
In Righi & Takács (2014b) we thus constructed an evolutionary Agent BasedModel
where agents played the Prisoner’s Dilemma on signed networks (where links can be
either positive or negative). We assumed that tense relationships can be resolved ei-
ther by changing the sign or being erased and rewired. We analyzed a setup in which
network topology co-evolves with relational signs and agent strategies. Our major con-
clusion was that the introduction of conditional strategies, that utilize the emotional
content embedded in network signs, could act as catalysts and in general created favor-
able conditions for the spread of unconditional cooperation. We noticed, however, that
the introduction of conditional strategies was successful in eliciting increased coopera-
tion if the network was dynamic (i.e. if there was some positive probability of updating
the network topology). Our results are summarized in Table 5.1.3 In line with the liter-
ature, we found that the evolution of unconditional cooperation occured most likely in
networks with relatively high chances of rewiring and low likelihood of strategy adop-
tion (or strategy evolution). While some rewiring enhanced cooperation, too much
rewiring limited its diffusion. Finally, we provided evidence that, unlike in networks
with positive ties only, cooperation became more prevalent in denser networks.
Table 5.1: Summary of main findings in Righi & Takács (2014b).
Without rewiring With rewiring
Without emotional strategies No cooperation Cooperation through clustering of
strategies
With emotional strategies Some cooperation, only if most
agents are emotional
The emergence and diffusion of
cooperation
In the present study4 we use this general setup to analyze the influence of the up-
date rule, which essentially defines how and when agents interact, on the chances of
cooperative behavior to become widespread in the population. In this way, our research
3This table and the results proposed for the parallel updating case are taken from Righi & Takács (2014b).
4All code and data-files from which the results are obtained are available upon request to the authors.
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follows the pathway of earlier studies that examined synchronous vs real-time interac-
tions in social dilemmas (Huberman & Glance 1993). Two different types of updating
are proposed. The first is sequential, where single couples of agents are selected for
interaction and as a consequence, the payoffs obtained in their interaction drive evo-
lutionary and network update. The second is parallel, in which all agents play at the
same time and average payoffs from the interactions with neighbors are calculated and
used to drive the evolutionary process.
We show how the survival and diffusion chances of cooperation depend strictly on
the type of updating rule used. We provide evidence that under a rather general set of
parameters combinations, the parallel updating rule provides better conditions for the
diffusion of cooperation as it allows conditional strategies that makes use of emotions
to act as catalyst of virtuous behavior. Where the sequential update is applied instead,
unconditional defection progressively diffuses and comes to dominate the population.
The remaining of the paper is divided as follows. In the next section, we describe
our model and its characteristics as they were proposed in Righi & Takács (2014b). In
addition, we describe the details of the two updating rules that we study. The following
Section 5.3 presents our new results, while a discussion concludes (Section 5.4).
5.2 The model
We consider the model first introduced in Righi & Takács (2014b). We study a popula-
tion of N agents. Agents are connected initially in a random network (Erdo˝s & Rényi
1959) where each possible edge exists with probability ⇢ 2 [0, 1] 5. The cardinality ki
of Fi is the degree (or number of network contacts) of agent i. The network is signed
and each network tie is labelled either negative or positive. In this paper, we report
results from setups where each link is initialized with the same probability (1/2) as
either negative or positive.
Each agent in the population can interact and play the single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma
(with binary options of cooperation or defection) with partners selected from its first
order social neighborhood. Among the social dilemmas, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the
one that sets the stakes the most against the emergence of cooperation since it is charac-
terized by the classical payoff structure Temptation(T) > Reward(R) > Punishment(P)
> Sucker(S) (Table 5.2). The maximum payoff, labelled Temptation (T), for each sin-
gle individuals is obtained if each of them by defecting under the assumption that the
other agents cooperates. If it is the case the cooperating agent obtains the Sucker (S)
payoff. However if both agents defect the outcome - where both of them obtain the
Punishment (P) payoff, is sub-optimal with respect to the one where both agents coop-
erate, thus obtaining the Reward (R) payoff. The specific numerical payoffs used here
are the same of Axelrod (1984).
C D
C (R = 3, R = 3) (T = 5, S = 0)
D (S = 0, T = 5) (P = 1, P = 1)
Table 5.2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix.
As discussed, we assume that network signs, embedding an emotional content that
5In Righi & Takács (2014a) we extend our model and we consider also networks initialized as regular
lattices. We show that changing the degree variance of the nodes the results are qualitatively the same.
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follows from previous interaction, can affect behavior. From this point of view, we can
characterize three types of strategies:
• Unconditional Defection (UD);
• Unconditional Cooperation (UC);
• Conditional Strategy (COND): cooperate if the tie with the interaction partner is
positive; and defect otherwise.
While UC always cooperates and UD always defects, the strategy COND is condi-
tional on the sign of the link between the interaction partners. The COND strategy,
therefore, can be interpreted as a differentiated emotional reaction or affectional re-
sponse towards others with harmonic or disharmonic interaction record as it prescribes
cooperation with agents connected with a positive tie, and defection with partners con-
nected with a negative relation. Below, we report results for initialization in which
agents are assigned with one of the three strategies randomly in equal proportions:
(1/3 = µUC = µUD = µCOND = 1/3). Clearly the COND strategy outlined in this
paper provides only a very simplified implementation of the concept of emotion. In
this paper we shy away from the huge complexity that would derive from opening the
black box of human feelings. We provide instead a restrictive definition of emotions,
functional to our construction. The COND strategy is emotional in the sense that it
draws upon the simple, and imperfect, signal provided by the network signs (which in
turn summarizes past behavior of the partner) to condition the agent’s behaviour.
As discussed, our model allows for the co-evolution of network signs, agent strate-
gies and network topology. Network signs and agent behavior influence each other
and the latter also affects the evolution of network topology. Each of these modules
requires some clarification.
Sign update: agent behavior influences relational signs. Relational sign update
simulates the consequences of behavior on the emotional relationship with peers. This
type of update happens automatically, i.e. it is not part of individual strategies. It
is relatively straightforward to assume that a relationship in which both agents defect
turns negative and one in which both agents cooperate turns positive. When actions
differ, we have a more complex case. In this situation an asymmetric tension arises
since the cooperator could be frustrated of having a positive tie with a defector and
the defector could appreciate the cooperation of the partner and might be ashamed of
having a negative tie to him. In this case we assume that the link could change its sign.
Specifically, we assume that a frustrated positive link can turn negative with probability
Pneg and a frustrated negative link can turn positive with probability Ppos. Given the
payoff structure of the PD (where a cooperator always obtains a very low payoff when
its partner defects obtaining a high payoff), it is logical to assume that the frustration
from disappointment is larger than the frustration from shame, that is Pneg >> Ppos.
In particular we fixed Pneg = 0.2 and Ppos = 0.1. The Sign update rule for our model
is summarized in Table 5.3.
Network topology update: rewiring. In addition, we allow for an endogenous up-
date of network topology (as suggested, for example by Santos et al. 2006). It means
that behavior can influence the network structure directly. With a probability Prew
(named rewiring probability) the frustration, emerged as a consequence of different
strategies played in the PD game, can lead the frustrated agent to sewer its relationship
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Agent i plays Agent j plays Old sign New sign
C C + +
C C - +
D D + -
D D - -
C D - With Ppos: +
C D + With Pneg: -
C D + / - otherwise + / -
Table 5.3: Sign Update Rules.
and to search for a new partner. From the technical point of view, the rewiring as-
sumes a certain degree of transitive closure (Granovetter 1973), meaning that we allow
new connections to be created only between friends of friends. This modeling choice
naturally follows from sociological observations. Still, with a small but positive prob-
ability (fixed in the following to Prand = 0.01) the new link can be constructed with
a randomly selected new partner. An example of our rewiring procedure is displayed
in Figure 5.1. In Left Panel, Agent 2 interacts with Agent 1. The former cooperates,
but his partner defects. In the Right Panel, Agent 2 sewers then his link with Agent 1
and forges a new link with one among the friends of his friends. In this example only
Agent 4 is available and the new link is created. By assumption the new link is created
as positive.
1Defect
2Cooperate
3
4
+
+ +
1
2
3
4
+
+
+
Figure 5.1: Example of network topology update through rewiring.
Strategy update: parallel vs dyadic update. Individual payoffs measure the effi-
ciency of an agent’s strategy in its social neighborhood. In this paper, we focus on how
the choice of the timing of this update changes the results regarding the emergence of
cooperation in signed networks. In particular, two alternative types of updating rules
are studied:
• Sequential Update: At each time t, two connected agents are selected randomly
for playing the PD. After playing and observing the relative payoffs, the agent
with a strictly lower payoff (if any) updates its type and adopts the strategy of
the more successful partner with probability Padopt (assumed to be equal for all
agents). Therefore, only the current dyadic payoff matters in the determination
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of the survival chances of a strategy. Including the modules discussed above,
Algorithm 1 reports the pseudo-code of the intra-step dynamics with sequential
updating.
Select randomly two connected agents (i and j);
Play the PD and compute payoffs;
Update relational signs between i and j;
if link is tense then
Rewire link between i and j (with probability Prew);
end
if link is tense and not rewired then
The agent with (strictly) lower payoff adopts the strategy of the partner (with
probability Padopt);
end
Algorithm 1: Intra-step dynamics, repeated at each time step t, in the sequential
update case.
• Parallel Update: At each time t, for each agent i the average payoff across all
its interactions is calculated. Each agent then compares its payoff with the one
of all peers in its first order social neighborhood. If a subset of these agents
has a payoff higher than its own, then agent i will adopt the strategy played
by one of them, selected uniformly at random. Evolutionary update happens,
for each agent, with probability Padopt, which is assumed to be equal for all
players. In order to avoid that the order in which we select the agents influences
the outcome, each of them refers to the situation at t   1 when changing either
its relational signs or the network topology at time t. Moreover, the update of
strategies happens for each agent after observing payoffs, at time t, of every other
agent. Again, including the modules discussed above, Algorithm 2 reports the
pseudo-code for our model intra-step dynamics with parallel update.
for each agent i do
Compute its social neighborhood F t 1i 2 N ;
for each agent j 2 F t 1i do
Play the PD and compute payoffs;
Update relational signs between i and j;
Rewire link between i and j if tense (with Probability Prew);
end
Compute average payoff of agent i;
end
for each agent i do
Observe the average payoffs of each agent j 2 F ti ;
Adopt a random (strictly) better strategy (with probability Padopt);
end
Algorithm 2: Intra-step dynamics, repeated at each time step t, in the parallel update
case.
One can immediately appreciate that the sequence of events is identical in the two
implementations. The number of agents that play at each time step and the rule used
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to determine the evolutionary update, however, are different. While these differences
seem minimal, they are consequential for the chances of cooperation to evolve in dy-
namic signed networks.
The parallel updating strategy is surely the most used in theoretical models featur-
ing evolutionary games. Making a parallel with the real world interactions, this strategy
update method implies that each individual updates his strategy only after having ob-
served the relative payoffs of all his peers. This may be the case in some cases where
very important decisions are made. In all other cases however it is unlikely for this to
happen. On the contrary, many decisions about the future strategy to follow are taken
as consequence of one single event, which is what we model - in a simple fashion - in
the sequential update case. A comparative analysis of these two updates mechanisms
is therefore useful to asses the realism of many of the models available in the literature.
In this sense, it is clear from a theoretical perspective that the decision making in the
two cases is supported by different levels of information. When the agents update in
parallel, each of them has a very good assessment of the performance of the strate-
gies used in their neighborhood. At the opposite, with the sequential update only the
efficiency of own strategy relative to the one of the current partner is available. This
second setup is expected and will favor defection when compared to the first.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Evolution with sequential and parallel updating
The main objective of this paper is to figure out whether the rule of update influences
the chances of emergence for cooperation in the single-shot PD played on signed net-
works.
We find that the two implementations differ radically with regard to the chances of
cooperation to emerge (Figure 5.2). Using the sequential update, all forms of coop-
eration (both in conditional and unconditional strategies) are progressively eliminated
from the population and remaining strategies all defect. Indeed, while the disappear-
ance of CONDs is slowlier than the one of UCs (due to their relatively better perfor-
mance against UDs), given that all signs progressively become negative, all remaining
conditional strategies act as defectors and are effectively impossible to discern them
from universal defectors. This type of evolution, whose statistical relevance for the
selected parameters set is shown in the lower panel of Figure 5.2, is not limited to
these conditions, and it holds in general. This system level evolution follows from the
nature of the micro-level interactions. The COND players safeguard themselves from
direct exploitation from UDs by exploiting the emotional content of the relationship
embedded in the link. In a dyadic comparison, however, they can never outperform the
latter as they progressively diffuse in the population. As a matter of fact, while UCs are
systematically exploited by UDs and thus destined to disappear rather quickly, CONDs
have the "choice" of either progressively turning their links to UD players to negative,
thus becoming functionally equivalent to them; or being progressively eliminated.
The mechanism of rewiring of tense connections has been shown to help the sur-
vival of cooperation in networks (Yamagishi & Hayashi 1996, Yamagishi et al. 1994).
It does so by segregating agents by type and thus increasing the probability that a co-
operator plays with another cooperator (Becker 1976, Nowak 2006, Németh & Takács
2007). The level of rewiring that is proposed in Figure 5.2, however, is not sufficient
to guarantee the survival of cooperation. We will provide a more comprehensive study
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Figure 5.2: Upper panels: dynamic evolution of the proportions of agent types and
network signs in typical simulations. The left panel shows the evolutionary process
with sequential updating and the right panel with parallel updating. Lower panels:
distribution of the final proportions of UDs, UCs, and negative ties in the sequential
(Left panel) and parallel (Right panel) update dynamics (calculated on 100 simulations
each). For all simulations: N=200 and Prew = Padopt = 0.1. The initial population
is divided equally among UC, UD, and COND strategies. Moreover, the network signs
are randomly initialized positive or negative with equal probability and the probability
of existence for each tie is Plink = 0.05.
of the impact of this variable in the following.
When parallel update is applied, things change in favor of the emergence of co-
operation. Now the UCs tend to dominate the population at the end of a significative
number of simulations. COND players are able to obtain payoffs that are higher than
those obtainable by an UD in a mixed population, because averages are calculated
from all interactions in the social neighborhood. While the CONDs do not gain domi-
nance themselves, their presence allows for the evolution of unconditional cooperation.
Again, a look at the interaction level is pivotal to understand these results. The mech-
anism allowing this emerging behavior, described in Righi & Takács (2014b), relies
on the fact that conditional players tend to develop a collaborative relationship with
UCs while not being systematically cheated by UDs. This ensures good performances
of those COND players that act as interphase between the two pure strategy types.
Dynamically, the UDs progressively become CONDs and these, in turn tend to be-
come UCs (which in a connected and clustered world dominated by cooperation is the
strategy with the highest average payoff). This effect is reinforced by the presence of
the possibility of sewering the relationship and rewiring it with a friend of a friend as
negative links can also be erased, which tends to isolate defectors from cooperators.
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5.3.2 The two main dynamics: adoption vs rewiring
Let’s now discuss the results of the previous section in a more systematic fashion.
Our model’s evolution is driven by two major forces. First, agents with lower average
payoff adopt strategies in their social neighborhood that perform better (evolutionary
dynamics). Second, stressed relationships can be rewired (rewiring dynamics). In
order to analyze the joint influence of these two important forces, we study their effects
systematically changing their relative strength (measured as their probability to happen,
respectively, at each time step and interaction). Logically, this is a similar inquiry to
the analysis of network and strategy update in models with positive ties only (Santos
et al. 2006).
Figure 5.3 shows the results for the proportion of minus signs (Left Panels), uncon-
ditional defectors (Central Panels), and unconditional cooperators (Right Panels) for
Padopt 2 [0, 1] and Prew 2 [0, 1] progressively changing values of both variables in
steps of 0.05. For each combination of parameters we provide the average results of 50
simulations.
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Figure 5.3: Effect of the competing dynamics of adoption of strategies with higher
payoffs (vertical axis) and of rewiring of stressed links (horizontal axis) on the final
proportion of negative ties in the network (Left panels), of UDs (Central panels) and
of UCs (Right panels). Top panels show the results for sequential updating and Lower
panels for parallel updating. In all simulations N=200. Network signs are randomly
initialized with equal probability and the population is equally divided between UCs,
UDs and CONDs. The probability of existence for each tie is Plink = 0.05.
Results show that, for the cooperative strategies to survive, there needs to be a rela-
tively low invasion and a relatively high rewiring probability. This is valid for both up-
date mechanisms and it is coherent with what observed in the literature on non-signed
networks: in absence of negative ties, the rewiring mechanism limits the capacity of
UDs to spread in the population. Focusing on sequential update (Figure 5.3, Top Pan-
els), we can observe two characteristic facts. The first is that universal cooperators may
survive, but they never become dominant in the population. Indeed, their proportion
never exceeds the original proportion of one third. The second observation is that coop-
eration survives in this setup only if Prew >> Padopt. This is in line with the literature
considering positive ties only that shows how the scale of network update relative to
the scale of strategy update is a key explanatory factor behind the chances for the evo-
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lution of cooperation (Santos et al. 2006). Network update helps the relative clustering
(it progressively eliminates negative ties with defectors) and the survival of coopera-
tors, while frequent strategy updates provide higher importance to immediate payoffs
and drive the system towards a Hobbesian destiny of no cooperation and negative links.
As we have seen in the previous section, with sequential updating, the dynamics of the
model tends to favor unconditional defectors that thus tend to spread in the popula-
tion. This process of spread is obviously faster, the higher is Padopt and the rewiring
mechanism is here the only mechanism that allows the survival of cooperation.
In the case of parallel updating, the situation is different. Cooperation can now sur-
vive also for Prew ⇡ Padopt. As we have seen before, the parallel update rule provides
a more favorable conditions for the evolution of cooperation than sequential updating,
mainly due to averaging of payoffs across multiple interactions. Averaging of payoffs
and hence the increased importance of being clustered among cooperators increase the
importance of the flexible character of the COND strategy. While UD still provides
the best way to exploit neighbors in the short term in any environment, COND is pre-
pared to defect and achieves at least equally good payoffs with UDs, while cooperates
with cooperator neighbors and consequently earns more on average than UDs in a UD-
dominated environment as well as in a COND-dominated environment. Obviously,
UDs still outperform COND in a UC-dominated environment, but due to strategy up-
dates and rewiring, such a victory is a Pyrrhic one. For these reasons, high rates of
strategy update are here not that bad for conditional strategies as in the sequential up-
date case. Emotional strategies can then act as catalysts of cooperation at least as long
as Prew   Padopt. When Padopt is to high, however, strategy update favors the spread
of universal defection even in the case of parallel updating.
Finally, when cooperation is supported, the proportion of UCs can extend to more
than its initial value (and in some cases even above the initial sum of conditional play-
ers and unconditional cooperators) if the adoption probability is sufficiently small (with
respect to rewiring). On the contrary, when both dynamic forces are strong, the propor-
tion of UCs in the final population decreases in favor of an higher share of conditional
cooperators. Indeed, a dynamic environment with high probability of rewiring asso-
ciated with high probability of adoption allows the emotional strategy to extricate its
power while highlighting the weakness of unconditional cooperation. On the one side,
CONDs tend to diffuse since they obtain systematically higher payoffs than UDs when
at the border between UCs and UDs. The intensity of the adoption rate makes it possi-
ble for CONDs to spread in the direction of universal defectors. On the other side, uni-
versal cooperators are unable to outperform UDs locally and, as a result, their survival
rate decreases, being bounded below only by the fact that network rewires relatively
fast. This creates clusters of both conditionals and (few) unconditional cooperators
that are sustained at equilibrium.
5.4 Conclusions
The evolution of cooperation is one of the most puzzling problems in the social sci-
ences. In this study, we make two contributions to the resolution of the puzzle. First,
building on Righi & Takács (2014b), we make existing models more realistic by allow-
ing negative as well as positive ties among connected agents and, in relation, we intro-
duce and analyze the role of emotional strategies in the single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma.
We show that the simple adaptive rules we defined for evolution results in the emer-
gence of cooperation in a non-trivial way: emotional strategies act as catalysts for the
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success of unconditional cooperation.
Second, we analyze how this conclusion is dependent on whether we implement se-
quential or parallel updates in the model. With this inquiry, we follow earlier studies in
complex systems that examined the importance of assuming synchronous versus real-
time interactions in social dilemmas which showed that such systems might behave
very differently (Huberman & Glance 1993, Lumer & Nicolis 1994). Besides, this
question is important also substantially as sequential and real-time interactions and
updates are much more realistic than parallel ones. In our case, sequential updating
means that single couples of individuals are selected for interactions and evolutionary
and network updates immediately after. This model implementation is contrasted with
parallel update, in which agents play at the same time with all their network neigh-
bors and where average payoffs from all of their interactions determines evolutionary
success.
We provide evidence that the survival and diffusion chances of cooperation are
indeed strictly limited in the sequential update rule case. Under a rather general set
of parameters combinations, the parallel updating rule provides better conditions for
the diffusion of cooperation. We explore the nature and range of these differences by
manipulating two crucial parameters of our model: the extent of strategy updates and
rewiring possibilities. While the rewiring probability should be in general higher than
the strategy update one in order to find universal cooperators in the final population,
the difference between the two can be small in case of parallel update, but needs to be
substantial in case of sequential update.
Our results might imply that the majority of models that study the evolution of
cooperation in networks or spatial settings and offer a solution for the emergence of
cooperation miss an important aspect: they implicitly or explicitly assume that actions
or updates are synchronous. This is in line with our parallel update rule that provides
favorable conditions for the emergence of cooperation via the assistance of emotional
strategies that act as catalysts in the evolutionary process. Most historical events, how-
ever, are sequential or happen in real time. As our results highlighted, the chances of
cooperation are much more limited under such circumstances. This leaves the puzzle
of the evolution of cooperation in case of sequential interactions still to be solved by
subsequent research.
Finally, our model presents very simple strategies based on agents with no mem-
ory. Future research should explore the role of repeated games with memory on the
sustainability of cooperation. Indeed, the introduction of repeated interactions before
rewiring is expected to make this mechanism more effective in preserving cooperation
due to the better available information.
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Abstract
Networked Learning Communities (NLCs) are complex systems made
up of course users with a shared purpose: achieving learning goals. When
these communities and the online courses they take part in are supported
by Virtual Learning Environments (VLEs), studying interactional patterns
and the communication structure of the community is a real challenge for
researchers as VLEs do not usually provide relational data. Researchers
thus have to (1) produce this type of data while building the corpora they
wish to analyse, and (2) resort to specific methodologies to analyse the
corpora built. One such methodology is Social Network Analysis (SNA),
an emerging methodology in the study of NLCs as it offers various mea-
sures and modelling tools for the analysis of relational patterns within a
group. In this chapter, we show how powerful this method is through a
case study on interactional competence development in English as a sec-
ond language through an online course. Indeed, the sociometric analysis of
the corpus built highlighted the influence of the communication tool used
on the interactional load and configuration of interactions, and demon-
strated the extent to which telecollaboration was successful depending on
the tool used. More general conclusions are also drawn on the invaluable
contribution of SNA in the study of NLCs.
6.1 Introduction
The rapid development of computer-based technologies has led to the growing popu-
larity of e-learning systems, thus making web-based education more popular in recent
years. The online courses offered are often supported by Virtual Learning Environ-
ments (VLEs), also called Learning Management Systems or Courseware Management
Systems. These are systems which offer a number of tools which are necessary for a
course to be administered online, the most famous of these being Blackboard, We-
bCT or Moodle. VLEs usually support “the distribution of study materials to students,
content building of courses, preparation of quizzes and assignments, discussions and
distance management of classes” (Drazdilova et al., 2010, p. 299). In addition, they fa-
cilitate communication as they provide a number of collaborative learning tools. These
enhanced learning environments can be considered as social networks of course users
if we accept Garton et al.’s (1997) definition of a social network as “a set of people (or
organizations or other social entities) connected by a set of social relationships, such
as friendship, co-working or information exchange”. As these specific social networks
aim at connecting course users with each other with a view to learning, they can also be
termed Networked Learning Communities as they fit both of the following definitions:
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Networked learning is learning in which information and communication
technology (ICT) is used to promote connections: between one learner and
other learners, between learners and tutors; between a learning community
and its learning resources (Jones and Esnault, 2007).
A learning community is a group of individuals who come together to
acquire knowledge (Dillenbourg et al., 2003).
It should be noted, however, that groups of learners do not systematically become
learning communities (Chanier and Cartier, 2006): the close study of their relationships
and interactions is necessary to determine whether or not a learning community has
emerged from a group of learners.
Finally, in line with Holtzer’s (1995) definition of complex systems as a whole
of interdependent elements (course users) organized for a purpose / a definable ob-
jective (achieving learning goals), NLCs can also be considered as complex systems.
Thus the dynamic nature of these systems lies in the interactions between their com-
ponents which researchers strive to examine. Still, researchers interested in studying
VLE-supported NLCs might have to overcome several obstacles, one of these being
the type of data provided by these new technological learning environments. Indeed,
if the data usually provided by VLEs include user profile, information about student
learning habits, student results and user interaction data (mainly chat logs and posts
on discussion boards), information on participation patterns and on the communication
structure of the group is usually not automatically made available by VLEs (Reffay and
Chanier, 2003).
As a consequence, researchers have to face two problems when working with VLE-
based data:
1. it is sometimes difficult to extract useful information from the data provided
(Drazdilova et al., 2010); for example, connection time is the type of information
that is systematically provided but is difficult to use by researchers as we all
know that a course user who has logged on the VLE can always do something
else (make themselves a cup of tea!) or simply forget to log off, but the system
will still consider this time as connection time; this type of tracking information
is thus very unreliable and often unusable by researchers.
2. In addition, the data provided by VLEs is centered on the individual: no rela-
tional data is usually readily available. Consequently, researchers interested in
the study of interactional patterns have to produce this type of relational data
while building their corpora from the raw data made available by the VLE. One
methodology to then analyse relational data in the study of NLCs is that of Social
Network Analysis (SNA).
The aim of this chapter is to show to what extent SNA is a valuable methodology
to study interactional patterns in VLE-based NLCs. The basic principles and various
applications of SNA will first be examined; then, a case study in the field of second lan-
guage acquisition will be presented in which SNA was used to study the development
of learners’ interactional competence in English as a second language in a VLE-based
NLC. Finally, conclusions will be drawn as regards the usefulness of SNA in the study
of NLCs and its potential implementation within VLEs.
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6.2 Social Network Analysis (SNA)
Social Network Analysis (also known as structural analysis) has developed from three
different traditions or strands (Scott, 2000):
1. Sociometric analysts (Moreno, 1934; Lewin, 1936) whose work on small groups
gave rise to a major technical breakthrough: graph theory (a combination of
mathematics and social theory);
2. Harvard researchers of the 1930s (Mayo, 1933) whose work focused on patterns
of interpersonal relations and the way cliques are formed;
3. Manchester anthropologists (Barnes, 1954; Bott, 1955; Mitchell, 1969) whose
work was based on the first two strands and consisted in investigating the struc-
ture of community relations in village and tribal communities.
These traditions were brought together in the 1960s and 1970s at Harvard to forge
contemporary SNA. It consists of a body of qualitative measures of network structure
(Scott, 2000).
6.2.1 Principles
First, it’s important to understand that SNA is an approach which does not focus on
individual attributes or properties, nor on the fine-grained analysis of every network
participant’s contribution. On the contrary, it focuses on the level of activity of a group
as a whole and on the patterns of relations - the ties (links, connections) relating one
participant to another. Indeed, SNA’s objectives are to study relationships between
individuals and to compute representations that highlight global information invisible
in raw data: formal properties of social configurations.
Although SNA is often considered as difficult to come to grips with (due to the
technical and mathematical language used) (Scott, 2000), its underlying principles are
relatively simple (Garton et al., 1997):
1. The unit of analysis is the relation (between one or more network participants);
2. The main feature of a relation is its pattern (and not the specific attributes of
network members);
3. A relation is characterized by its content, direction and strength;
4. A link (or tie) connects two (or more) participants by one or more relations.
As noted by Drazdilova et al. (2010), SNA is more than an approach and can be con-
sidered as a full methodology for data mining in online educational research following
four steps:
1. Data collection (through the VLE)
2. Data pre-processing: drafting matrices
3. Data mining application: using techniques and algorithms to obtain required
information (specific software)
4. Data interpretation and result implementation (to improve student learning pro-
cesses).
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6.2.2 Two tools, two key indicators
Two Tools
Matrices: A matrix is a table of figures, a pattern of rows and columns where rows
represent each case studied and columns correspond to variables on which attributes are
measured. Matrices are extremely useful as they support mathematical manipulations.
Sociograms: SNA can be used to visualize the network through its graphical repre-
sentation (node-link graph) which aims at mapping chains of connections and at indi-
cating the strength and direction of relations. Participants are represented as nodes and
their connections as lines between the nodes (Figure 6.1). With sociograms, SNA of-
fers a modelling technique which is invaluable to uncover asymmetry and reciprocity,
to identify groups of individuals within the network (named cliques) and to identify
leaders (central - node C in Figure 6.1 ) and isolated individuals (peripheral - node K
in Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1: A sociogram (de Laat et al., 2007).
Two key indicators of SNA
Network density provides “a measure of the overall connections between participants”
(de Laat et al., 2007) and corresponds to the number of observed ties divided by the
number of all possible ties. Network density ranges from 0% to 100%: the more
participants are connected to each other, the higher the density of the network. The
average geodesic distance of a network is defined as “the number of relations in the
shortest possible walk from one actor to another” (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005), in
other words the length of the shortest path to link two nodes. This basic definition of
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geodesic distance is that used by the UCINet software package2. It can be obtained “by
adding distances for all the links in the path between [two people]. If there are multiple
paths between people, we define the distance using the shortest path. If there are no
paths, we define the distance as infinite. This definition [...] generalizes the concept
of geodesic distance” (Dekker, 2005). It is thus expressed as a number of ties and
ranges from 1 to infinity: if the average geodesic distance of a network is 1 (=1), the
length of the shortest path between each participant and their partners corresponds to
one single link, which means that all participants are directly connected to one another
(everyone is interconnected). On the contrary, if one or more participant is not directly
connected to one or more of their partners, the length of the shortest path between them
corresponds to more than one link, which means that the average geodesic distance of
the network will be higher than 1 (>1). Consequently, the closer to 1 the average
geodesic distance of a network is, the more participants are directly connected to each
other.
In a nutshell, SNA is an approach which “offers a method for mapping group in-
teractions, visualizing ‘connectedness’ and quantifying some characteristics of these
processes within a community” (de Laat et al., 2007). It requires the use of specific
software packages to compute, represent and analyze network structure. The most
popular of these are UCINet (Borgatti et al., 1999), Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar, 2014)
and NetMiner (Cyram Inc., 2014).
6.2.3 Applications
According to Drazdilova et al. (2010, p. 301), Social Network Analysis is used in a
variety of fields: from the commercial sphere in the case of viral marketing, to biology
and medical diagnoses for the application of viral prevention; from law enforcement
in order to investigate organized crime to the e-business sphere (online advertising,
recommendation systems and auction markets). SNA has also been used to study or-
ganizational communication: for example, workplace interactions have been analyzed
with SNA after the introduction of computer-mediated communication in the work-
place (Garton et al., 1997). Obviously, virtual social networks have also recently been
studied thanks to SNA: for example, LinkedIn (D’Andrea et al., 2010).
Several studies in the field of educational research have also started using SNA,
among which a few have attempted to study NLCs: while some researchers have
studied elementary school learners’ patterns of interaction during the completion of
a collaborative online task (Palonen & Hakkarainen, 2000), others have studied VLE-
based activities (De Laat et al., 2007; Drazdilova et al., 2010); and while some have
studied postings in a discussion board, as part of an online graduate class (Russo &
Koesten, 2005), others have studied the cohesion of small groups in interactions based
on computer-mediated communication (e-mail, text chat, discussion board) as part of
a French as a Foreign Language course (Reffay & Chanier, 2003). As we can see from
these examples, SNA seems to be an emerging approach in the study of NLCs.
6.3 Case study
In this section, a brief account of one case study will be given to illustrate how SNA
can be extremely useful in the study of computer-mediated communication patterns
2 Source: http://www.arschile.cl/ucinet_ing/calcular.html
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within an NLC. As this is part of a larger study, only part of it will be presented here,
but interested readers might want to refer to Sarré (2013) for more details.
6.3.1 Context and participants
Over one semester (January - June) at Orléans University (Sciences Faculty), 48 first
year Master’s students specializing in Biology took part in a 25-hour online module
of English (as a second language) whose aim was to help them develop all five skills
(reading, listening, writing, speaking, interacting), with special emphasis on interac-
tional competence development. The online module consisted of 6 collaborative tasks
that learners had to complete in groups through computer-mediated communication.
Prior to the start of the course, a computerized language skills diagnosis test was
administered (DIALANG, European Commission, 2004). As taking part in interac-
tions with more competent interactants is claimed to help develop one’s interactional
competence through peer scaffolding (He & Young, 1998), the results of the test were
used to split all participants into 12 mixed-ability groups of 4 students. In addition,
all 12 groups were then split into 3 meta-groups and each was assigned a specific
computer-mediated communication tool to interact with while completing the online
collaborative tasks: a text chat tool (4 groups), a discussion board (4 groups) or a desk-
top videoconferencing tool (4 groups).
6.3.2 Research question
The main objective of the study was to explore L2 Interactional Competence develop-
ment through three computer-mediated communication modes: (1) asynchronous text-
based communication (discussion board), (2) synchronous text-based communication
(text chat), (3) synchronous voice-based communication (desktop videoconferencing).
The research question to answer was the following: Does the computer-mediated
communication mode used have an impact on the interactional load and configuration
of online interactions in a second language?
The main hypothesis consisted in considering that the computer-mediated commu-
nication mode influences the interactional load of learners’ contributions, the social
configuration of their interactions, their integration in their NLC and the efficiency of
their telecollaboration.
6.3.3 Equipment and materials
The online module was based on the technical infrastructure offered by an open-source
VLE: Dokeos 1.8.3 (De Praetere, 2010). It provided, among other functionalities, a
text chat tool and a discussion board. However, as it did not provide any desktop
videoconferencing tool, an external web-based application was used: Flashmeeting
(Knowledge Media Institute, 2010).
Corpus building and analysis also required the use of several technological tools:
• Camstudio (Rendersoft, 2013): an open-source screen recording tool to capture
the videoconferencing sessions;
• EXMARaLDA (Schmidt et al., 2013): a transcription and data mining software
package;
• UCINet (Borgatti et al., 1999): an SNA software package.
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6.3.4 Method
Over the course of the semester, learners had to complete 6 collaborative tasks, the
completion of which required the students to interact in order to solve specific problems
and make decisions as a group. The tasks were part of five subject-specific scenarios
which put learners in realistic situations where they had missions to complete. The
outcome of each scenario was a written language production which could only be done
after the completion of the collaborative tasks: closed problem-solving or decision-
making tasks and open opinion-gap tasks. For example, one of the scenarios about
phytoremediation puts learners into the realistic situation of an internship that they
have to carry out in Crozet, Virginia. During their internship, learners are supposed to
take part in the decontamination process of the Crozet site which used to be an orchard
and got contaminated with arsenic over time. At the end of their internship, they have
to produce a two-page brochure about the phytoremediation procedures used in Crozet
to explain them to the general public, as well as the risks of such procedures. The col-
laborative task they have to complete is a problem-solving task: learners notice strange
phenomena during their internship (deaths of moles and voles, damage of certain types
of fern, etc.) and have to come up with possible reasons for these phenomena as well
as recommendations and measures to be taken to solve the problems observed in the
short and long terms.
Corpus building consisted in collecting, transcribing and tagging data:
• The data collected comprised 24 chat log files in the form of text files (25 440
words), 24 discussion board files copied and pasted into text files (27 324 words)
and 24 videoconferencing files which were captured video files in AVI format
(521 minutes);
• Conversation Analysis-based data transcription and annotation were performed:
chat files were annotated, discussion board files were annotated and videocon-
ferencing files were transcribed, time-aligned and annotated.
Specific interactional resources were tagged in order to analyse the types of interac-
tional resources used in each group and draw specific interactant profiles as well as
conclusions in terms of interaction efficiency. The interactional resources under study
(Figure 6.2) were all considered to be indicators of the ‘interactional load’ (or “mea-
sures of interactive involvement”, Skehan 2003) of the exchanges, that is the extent
to which interactants truly engage with their interlocutors through their use of specific
interactional resources which enable them to negotiate meaning, coconstruct discourse
and manage the interaction. An interaction with a very low interactional load often
takes the form of parallel monologues, i.e. interactants talk to each other but do not
take their interlocutors into consideration, so do not truly engage with their interlocu-
tors. The resources under study thus were to show to what extent each interactant (1)
took part in the coconstruction of meaning and (2) made good use of their interactional
competence.
6.3.5 Results
The interactional resources used per computer-mediated communication mode pre-
sented in Table 6.1 show that learners almost consistently used more interactional re-
sources in the text chat groups, with the exception of negotiation routines which were
more numerous in the videoconferencing groups: this can probably be explained by
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Figure 6.2: Tagged interactional resources
the fact that learners interacting with videoconferencing experienced more technical
glitches which gave rise to more negotiation routines (as non-comprehension, whether
because of a technical problem or a language problem, is what usually sets off a nego-
tiation routine). The data can be even finer-grained, as shown in Figure 6.3.
As we can see in Figure 6.3, the number of interactional resources used to cocon-
struct meaning follow the global pattern mentioned above: text chat groups consistently
used more than the other groups. We could, in turn, examine the other types of inter-
actional resources under study with such detail. Still, however interesting they may be,
these quantitative analyses do not account for how the various interactional resources
are used within the NLCs. This is where SNA comes into play to provide a more quali-
tative analysis of the data. As previously mentioned, the first thing we need to perform
SNA is relational data.
Figure 6.4 represents the extraction of the annotated data and shows that each par-
ticipant is potentially assigned three separate tiers: tiers coded [v] (v for verbal) cor-
respond to the orthographic transcription of the exchange, the other tiers [NOM] (for
Negotiation Of Meaning) and [INTERAC] (for Interactional resources) are devoted
to the tagging of the specific interactional resources under study. During the tagging
phase, interpersonal links between participants were also coded on resource-specific
tiers. For example, on line 2, when LAU asks MAM to clarify what she just said, this
particular interactional resource (a clarification request - coded SCR on the [NOM]
tier as this is a signal used in negotiation of meaning routines) was tagged as well as
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Table 6.1: Interactional resources used per computer-mediated communication mode
Resource
Category Resource Type Text Chat Videoconferencing
Discussion
Board
Negotiation of
Meaning
Negotiation routines 54 102 14
Negative feedback 61 58 0
Coconstruction
Positive alignment
moves 1 109 583 260
Negative alignment
moves 155 55 59
Interaction
Management
Social formulae 345 154 165
Metacommunication 242 230 25
TOTAL 1966 1182 523
Figure 6.3: Coconstruction resources used per CMC mode
the participant it was addressed to (the SCR tag is followed by (MAM) to identify the
participant). Another example can be seen on line 3 when COR says she agrees with
MAM: on the [INTERACT] tier, the AAP tag has been used to identify the type of in-
teractional resource used (a Positive Assessment Activity), as well as the (MAM) tag to
indicate who the link is made with. Thanks to this specific tagging of interpersonal link
from the raw data, which is a way of producing relational data, matrices were drafted.
The matrix shown in Figure 6.5 represents all the links made by the members of
Group 1 during the completion of their 6 collaborative tasks. Column A and line 1
show sets of three letters which are used to identify participants, the convention com-
monly used being to indicate the origin of the link on the line and the destination of
the link in the column. Each cell presents the number of connections made between
the different participants as coded on the [NOM] and [INTERACT] tiers. For exam-
ple, line 3 column B shows that JUM made direct interactional contact with HAY 18
times. As connections between participants can be two-way (reciprocal ties) and as
the intensity of each tie does matter (number of connections made), the sociograms
drafted were both valued and directed. Thanks to these matrices, density and geodesic
distance measures were conducted using the UCINet software package and the results
are presented in Table 6.2.
In addition, weighted (or valued) directed graphs were produced using UCINet to
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Figure 6.4: Extraction of tagged data
Figure 6.5: Group 1 Matrix
86
Table 6.2: Density and average geodesic distance
Density Average
Geodesic
Distance
Group 1 22.1667 1
Group 2 26.7500 1
Group 3 36.1667 1Text Chat
Group 4 29.9167 1
Group 5 7.1667 1
Group 6 14.5000 1.083
Group 7 27.9167 1Videoconferencing
Group 9 4.5833 1.250
Group 14 12.4167 1
Group 15 9.3333 1.111
Group 16 3.8333 1.167Discussion Board
Group 17 2.0833 1.167
show who interacted with whom during the completion of the online tasks (interac-
tional patterns and communication configuration). An additional attribute was added
to the graphs: the amount of participation (number of turns) was represented by the
nodes themselves (the bigger the diameter of a node, the more the learner participated
in the interactions).
6.4 Discussion and Conclusions
In all 3 computer-mediated communication modes (Figures 6.6 to 6.9), SNA has made
it possible to identify one (or more) key player(s), the “virtuosos” (Perkins and New-
man, 1996) who are “highly skilled practitioner[s] of e-discourse”, in other words, a
participant who “serves as a guide, gentle teacher and exemplar” (ibid., p. 163).
SNA also showed that text chat interactions are the most symmetrical ones as their
characteristics include: (1) balanced participation and strength of ties, (2) reciprocal
ties only (geodesic distance = 1), (3) interactional load is high and well distributed
(high density).
A the other end of the scale, the sociometric analysis also highlighted the fact that
discussion board interactions are the most asymmetrical ones as their characteristics
include: (1) unbalanced participation and weak ties, (2) few reciprocal ties (geodesic
distance >1), (3) one (or more) peripheral participant(s), the “lurkers” (Perkins and
Newman, 1996) who are participants who do not actively take part in the exchanges
but simply read/listen to other participants’ contributions, (4) interactional load is low
and unevenly distributed (low density): there are many “parallel monologues” (House,
2002).
As for Desktop Videoconferencing interactions, SNA showed that they are the most
difficult ones to map as half seem fairly symmetrical, and half asymmetrical. It is hy-
pothesized that this may be due to the videoconferencing tool itself: indeed, Flash-
meeting - like most desktop videoconferencing applications to date - does not allow for
multiple speakers to speak at the same time when using their webcam (audio and video
feeds), which means that a queuing system has to be used to be given the floor. This
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Figure 6.6: Text chat (group 1)
probably explains why certain participants rush and say everything they need to say
without really engaging with their interlocutors as they are afraid they might not get
to talk again later in the exchange. Whatever the interpretations, this type of qualita-
tive analysis would not have been possible without using a methodology like SNA. As
previously mentioned, this sociometric analysis is part of a larger study which includes
in-depth quantitative analyses and qualitative micro-analyses based on the tagged inter-
actional resources presented here in order to uncover the interactional patterns at work
when participants truly engage in a computer-mediated exchange and display their in-
teractional competence in a second language.
Clearly, there is a growing need today for new ways of analyzing NLCs as social
interactions are now central to online learning communities and not “simply scaled-up
individuals and ties” (Garton et al., 1997). This is where the SNA approach provides
real added value, especially when studying computer-mediated communication, as it
(1) is a valuable complementary analytical tool in NLC research, (2) can be an answer
to the need for data triangulation, (3) has a role to play in mixed-method research. It
seems necessary indeed to study NLCs as complex environments in rich ecological
settings both from a quantitative and a qualitative point of view. For all these reasons,
SNA is definitely a promising approach in the study of networked learning communi-
ties.
Finally, in an ideal world, we could go as far as to imagine that future VLEs will
make the most of SNA and start implementing monitoring functionalities which will
automatically make relational data available to tutors and researchers as these are often
a lot more relevant and interesting than connection time, for example!
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Figure 6.7: Videoconferencing (group 9)
Figure 6.8: Videoconferencing (group 7)
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Figure 6.9: Discussion board (group 17)
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Abstract
Complex networks are highly heterogeneous in nature and can be struc-
tured into multiplex layers, each having same nodes but different types of
links. Link prediction is one of the important tasks in the analysis of com-
plex networks. It has a wide range of application: recommender systems,
protein-protein interactions, identification of criminal links, and prediction
of scientific and commercial collaborations to name a few. In this paper
we provide a formal definition of link prediction. We give a brief account
of various existing link prediction approaches, focusing mainly on dyadic
topological approaches. We present two new approaches of link predic-
tion. Both tackle the problem of predicting future collaborations between
authors in a co-authorship network. The first approach is based on super-
vised rank aggregation where we use a rank based model to learn weights
for different topological predictors. In this approach we use an existing
rank aggregation method and our newly proposed method of weighted
rank aggregation, to find the new links. The second approach works in
a multiplex scenario, where we propose to use some new attributes to cap-
ture multiplex information available in different network layers (each hav-
ing different type of links within the same nodes), to enhance the perfor-
mance of prediction of future collaboration between authors. We experi-
ment on DBLP datasets and preliminary results validate our approaches.
keywords: link prediction, multiplex network, complex network anal-
ysis, supervised rank aggregation, supervised machine learning.
7.1 Introduction
Complex networks and their characteristics have gained considerable attention of re-
searchers in the field of computational analysis of social networks. Complex network
can be any real world network which have an abstract form without any predefined
structure or pattern of evolution. At times, they can be highly dynamical in nature,
evolving or changing constantly. Also, starting with a tiny form, in this era of big data,
they take the form of huge networks. Analyzing these dynamic large-scale networks is
a major challenge for social network researchers. These networks are often heteroge-
neous in nature. That means a real network may have different types of nodes and also
different types of links. Multiplex networks are a category of heterogeneous complex
networks, which essentially have different kinds of links between same nodes. They
can be represented as a set of simple networks, each having the same nodes but differ-
ent sets of links. A common example of multiplex network is a scientific collaboration
networks. Researchers or authors of research papers are an important part of these
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networks. They can be linked if they have co-published some articles or if they have
published their articles in the same conferences or the domain of their research are the
same. They can also be linked if they have referred to same works in their articles.
Figure 7.1 shows a diagrammatic representation of a scientific collaboration network
and multiplex structures present within them. In panel (b) of Figure 7.1, it is shown
how a authors network can be represented by multiplex layers, each having same nodes
but different types of links or edges.
(a) Scientific collaboration networks
(b) Multiplex layers in author (researchers) network
Figure 7.1: Multiplex structure in a scientific collaboration network
One of the most important problems in the analysis of complex networks, is the
problem of link prediction (Liben-Nowell & Kleinberg 2003a, Lü & Zhou 2011). It
consists in estimating the likelihood of existence or appearance of an edge between
two unlinked nodes, based on observed links and attributes that contain information
about the nodes, edges or the entire graph. It has important applications in many
fields including social, biological and information systems etc. Link prediction has
been widely used in biological networks like protein interaction network (Airoldi et al.
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2006, Eronen & Toivonen 2012), metabolic networks, food web etc. to find missing
links and thereby helps in reducing the experimental cost if the predictions are accu-
rate. In social interaction and scientific or commercial collaboration networks they can
play an important role to predict new associations (new links) (Liben-Nowell 2005,
Al Hasan et al. 2006, Fu et al. 2007). This further has utility in the recommendation
task: a service provided by almost all social networks and mainly used in e-commerce
networks (Huang et al. 2005). Link prediction can also be helpful in finding hidden
criminal links (Fire et al. 2013, Clauset et al. 2008) which is another critical field of
research.
There are two basic types of link prediction: structural and temporal.
• Structural link prediction refers to the problem of finding missing links which
probably exist in a partially observed network or graph (Liben-Nowell & Klein-
berg 2007, Taskar et al. 2003, Yin et al. 2011, Menon & Eklan 2011). Structural
link prediction have obvious utility for finding missing or hidden information in
a network. It has direct application to find unobserved patterns of genes, protein
and yeast interactions for the medical studies on various diseases like cancer,
HIV, Alzheimer etc. (Airoldi et al. 2006, Eronen & Toivonen 2012). It can also
help to find existing criminal links which often remain hidden from the public
eyes.
• Temporal link prediction refers to the problem of finding new links by studying
the temporal history of a network (Benchettara et al. 2009, 2010b, Berlingerio
et al. 2009, Liben-Nowell & Kleinberg 2003b, Al Hasan et al. 2006, Huang &
Lin 2008). So here we have information about the network till time t and the
goal will be to predict a new link that may appear at some point of time in future
say t + k. It has its application primarily in recommendation systems that are
being used widely in e-commerce websites for product recommendations, in any
search engines to help users with probably relevant terms they might be search-
ing, for recommendation of tags in social resources sharing websites like Flickr3,
YouTube4, De.li.ci.ous5 etc. and very commonly used for recommendation of
friends in many social networks like Facebook6 and Twitter7. It has another sig-
nificant use in predicting future collaborations between researchers for academic
or scientific purposes. It also has an important use in order to identify probably
upcoming criminal associations.
The problem have been keenly studied by many researchers over a long period of
time. Many link prediction approaches has been proposed in recent years. They can
be classified as node-features based approaches or topological approaches based on
whether they use node-features or only structural information of the graph for predic-
tion. In node-features based approaches, apart from the structure of graph we also have
some extra information regarding the properties or characteristics of nodes. These extra
information can be helpful in predicting links when the nodes are very sparsely con-
nected in the graph. One such approach is local probabilistic model proposed by Wang
3http://www.flickr.com
4http://www.youtube.com
5http://www.delicious.com/
6http://www.facebook.com
7http://www.twitter.com
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et al. (2007). Topological approaches refer to those which involve only exploitation of
graph structure of the network. They compute scores for pairs of unconnected nodes
based on only the graphical features of the network structure and without any extra
information about the features of nodes. They observe mainly how the connections
have been established between nodes and how they change over time. Based on former
they try to predict a missing link or based on the later they predict a new link. Node
features are very useful when the network graph is very sparsely connected and not
much can be learned from graph topology. Whereas topological approaches are very
efficient in the absence of content of features information. Both have their own utility
and at times a combination of both can come out to give a very good predictor. This
kind of approaches can be termed as hybrid approaches.
The topological (graph based) link prediction approaches can be further catego-
rized as temporal or non-temporal / static based on the fact that whether they take into
consideration the dynamic aspect of the network or not. Another way to classify them
is as dyadic or structural approaches, based on the type of score calculation involved.
The approaches using link score are dyadic approaches where as those looking for min-
ing rules of evolution of sub-graphs can be considered as structural approaches. They
can also be classified as supervised or unsupervised. Supervised approaches generate a
model using many topological scores for unlinked node pairs to predict links where as
unsupervised approaches use a single type of score for the node pairs and mostly use
ranking to predict new links.
In section 7.3, we give brief account of the traditional methods of solving the prob-
lem of link prediction in a complex network, focusing mainly on dyadic topological
approaches. In section 7.4 we describe our approach based on supervised rank aggre-
gation. And in section 7.5 we present our new approach of link prediction in multiplex
networks using multiplex link information.
7.2 Formal definition and notations
Before going further to describe our methods of link prediction, we would like to give a
formal definition of link prediction and the mathematical notations used in the paper. In
topology based link prediction approaches, only the structural properties of the under-
lying graph are used to implement statistical relational learning and to find a model that
will be used to predict links. Suppose we have a social network graph G =< V,E >
where V is the set of nodes or vertices and E is the set of edges present in the graph.
So the goal of link prediction is to find (u, v) pairs such that u, v 2 V and (u, v) /2 E.
For prediction of new links at a certain point of time tn+1 having network infor-
mation till time tn, the network will be presented as a sequence of graphs representing
different snapshots of the network at different points of time < t0, t1, ..., tn >. Sup-
pose the temporal sequence of graphs is G =< G0, G1, ..., Gn >, so the goal of link
prediction here will be to find the structure of graph Gn+1. In other words, here we
try to find (u, v) pairs such that u, v 2 V and (u, v) /2 E where V = Sni=0 Vi and
E =
Sn
i=0Ei.
In any network G,  (v) is the set of neighbours of node v and degree of a node is
given by
ki =
⇢ | (vi)| if G is simple graphP
wj 8 xj 2  (vi) if G is weighted graph
In machine learning terms, the unlinked pairs of nodes are called examples or in-
stances. If the time aspect of the network are to be considered also, then the examples
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can be generated as follows. Let G =< G1, . . . , Gn > be a temporal sequence of an
evolving graphs. The whole sequence is divided into two parts: training and testing.
Each part is then again divided into two phases one for generation of examples and
another for labeling those examples. Thus, for example, in training we shall have a
learning and labeling phases resulting in graphs namely Glearn and Glabel generated
by making union of the temporal sequences of the graphs for three corresponding time
slots. The training data is constructed as follows. An example will be a couple of
nodes (x, y) that are not linked in Glearn but both belonging to the same connected
component. The class is obtained by checking whether the couple of nodes is indeed
connected in Glabel. If such a connection exists then it will be a positive example in
the supervised learning task and if no connection exists, it will be a negative example
(Benchettara et al. 2010a). Thus, examples are generated from these graphs for both
training and testing. These examples are also characterized by a given number of topo-
logical attributes computed on learning (or test) graphs. Figure 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate
the process diagrammatically.
Figure 7.2: Generation of examples
Figure 7.3: Construction of learning and labeling graphs
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7.3 Link prediction approaches
The basic and most simple approach for predicting links using network graphs is to
compute similarity scores for the unlinked node pairs and based on this score decide
the presence or appearance of a link between them. In scientific literature we find many
ways of computing this score. They can be neighborhood-based, distance-based or an
aggregation of node properties. These approaches are mostly unsupervised. Below we
list few of the important methods that have been used for link prediction.
Neighborhood based features
Common neighbors: Common neighbors counts the number of nodes (i.e. neighbors)
that are connected to both the nodes under observation. Newman (2004) used
this quantity for studying collaboration networks , while Kossinets (2006) used
it while analyzing large-scale social networks.
CN(x, y) =|  (x) \  (y) |
Jaccard coefficient: Jaccard coefficient calculates the ratio of number of common
neighbors to that of the total number of neighbors of the two nodes (Jaccard
1901).
JC(x, y) =
|  (x) \  (y) |
|  (x) [  (y) |
Adamic Adar coefficient: This metric proposes to weight the common neighbors based
on their connectivity while computing the score. It gives more weight to less
connected neighbors increasing their contribution in the score (Liben-Nowell &
Kleinberg 2007).
AA(x, y) =
X
z2 (x)\ (y)
1
log |  (z) |
It is based on the coefficient proposed by Adamic & Adar (2003) to find similar-
ity between two web pages . For two web pages x and y, sharing a set of features
z, this coefficient is computed asX
z:feature shared by x and y
1
log(frequency(z))
Resource allocation: This metric is based on resource allocation dynamics on com-
plex networks (Ou et al. 2007). Like Adamic Adar coefficient, this index also
depresses the contribution of high-degree common neighbors.
RA(x, y) =
X
z2 (x)\ (y)
1
|  (z) |
Path based features
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Distance based
Shortest path length: Number of edges in the shortest path between x and y in can
also serve to predict links. It is also known as the distance between nodes. The
more is the distance, the less is the similarity between the nodes and the less is
the chance of having an link between them. This metric captures the fact that
the path between two nodes in a social network can affect the formation of a link
between them following the fact that friend of a friend can be a friend in a social
network.
Katz’s index: One of the well known scoring index, commonly known as Katz index,
has been proposed by Katz. (1953). It is based on paths between nodes in a
graph. It sums over a collection of paths and is exponentially damped by length
to give shorter paths more weights. Mathematically it is defined as,
Katz(x, y) =
1X
l=1
 `⇥ | path(`)x,y |
where path(`)x,y is the set of paths between x and y of length ` and   is a positive
parameter (i.e. damping factor) which favors shortest paths. The same can be
presented using adjacency matrix
Katz(x, y) =  Axy +  
2(A2)xy +  
3(A3)xy + . . .
Axy is the adjacency matrix where the values are either 1 or 0 based on whether
x and y are directly connected. (A2)xy is the matrix showing numbers of paths
of length 2 between x andy and so on. A very small   leads to a score close to
number of common neighbors because long paths contribute very little. So the
matrix showing Katz score between all pairs of nodes can be found as
K = (I    A) 1   I
  must be lower than the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of matrix A to
ensure the convergence of above given equation (Lü & Zhou 2011).
Random walk based
Matrix forest index: Matrix forest index computes the similarity between two nodes
as the ratio of number of spanning rooted forests where the two nodes are in the
same tree rooted at one of the nodes, to all the spanning rooted forests of the
network. It can be computed asM = (I  L) 1, I being the identity matrix and
L = D A is the Laplacian matrix of the network whereD is the degree matrix
and A is the adjacency matrix (Chebotarev & Shamis 1997). This index was
used for collaborative recommendation task in the work of Fouss et al. (2006).
Hitting time and commute time: Hitting time is a random walks based feature that
counts the time required by a random walker to go from node x to node y in a
graph. It is defined as the expected number of steps required for a random walker
to walk from one node to the other. Shorter hitting time may denote the nodes
are similar and can have higher chance of linking in future. As this metric is not
symmetrical, often for undirected graphs, average commute time is used instead.
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If HT (x, y) is the hitting time to reach node y from node x, average commute
time is given by
CT (x, y) = HT (x, y) +HT (y, x)
A negated value of hitting or commute time can be used as a score for predicting
links.
Rooted Pagerank: Pagerank denotes the importance of a node x by summing up the
importance of all other nodes linked to x. This importance can also be repre-
sented by stationary distribution weight of a node. This feature can be altered
to find a similarity score between two nodes and is termed as rooted pagerank
in Liben-Nowell & Kleinberg (2007). The similarity between two nodes x and
y is measured as the stationary probability of y in a random walk that returns
to x with probability 1   ↵ in each step, moving to a random neighbor with
probability ↵. Rooted pagerank for all node pairs can be computed as follows.
RPR = (1  ↵)(I   ↵N) 1
whereD is the diagonal degree matrix andN = DA 1 is adjacency matrix with
row sums normalized to 1.
PropFlow: PropFlow captures the probability that a restricted random walk starting
from one node x ends at another node y in l or less steps using link weights as the
transition probabilities. The restriction is that a walk terminates on reaching y or
on revisiting any node including x. The walk selects links based on their weights
which produces a score to estimate likelihood of new links. This measure is a
more localized measure of propagation and is insensitive to topological noise far
from the source node (Lichtenwalter et al. 2010).
Aggregation of node features
Preferential attachment: Preferential attachment combines the degrees of the two con-
cerned nodes and can be used as a score for predicting links. Here the probability
of appearance of a new link is directly proportional to the degree of the observed
nodes (Barabási & Albert 1999).
PA(x, y) =| kx ⇥ ky |
For a simple un-directed and un-weighted graph the degree of a node is equal to
the number of neighbors i.e. kx =  (x).
Sum of neighbors: In the work of Hasan et al. (2006), the authors have used sum
of neighbors as a topological feature for characterizing an unlinked node pair.
Formally, it can be defined as  (x) +  (y)
Aggregation of clustering coefficients: As described in chapter. 1, clustering coeffi-
cients of a node quantifies the probability of the neighbors of the node to get
connected to each other.
cf(x) =
3⇥#Triangles adjacent to x
#Possible triples adjacent to x
This property can also be used for link prediction by taking an aggregation (sum
or product) of the clustering coefficients of two unconnected nodes. So the sim-
ilarity score for any two nodes x and y will be
CC(x, y) = cf(x)⇥ cf(y) or CC(x, y) = cf(x) + cf(y)
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In a seminal work proposed in Liben-Nowell & Kleinberg (2003a), authors have
shown that simple topological measures representing relationships between pairs of
unlinked nodes in a complex network, can be used for predicting formation of new
links. Let’s consider the case of applying common neighbors as a topological measure.
Let L by the list of pairs of unlinked nodes (belonging to same connected component).
We have L = {(x, y)}. Let  (x) be the function returning a set of direct neighbors of
node x in the graph. The common neighbors function of two nodes x, y is then defined
by:
CN(x, y) = | (x) \  (y)| (7.1)
The listL is sorted according to the values obtained by applying the common neighbors
function to couples of unlinked nodes. The top k couples of nodes are then returned as
the output of the prediction task. The assumption here is that, the more a couple of un-
linked nodes share common neighbors, the more they are likely to have a link in future.
In Liben-Nowell & Kleinberg (2003a) k is equal to the number of really appearing
links. Other types of topological measures can be applied for the same purpose.
Many other works have been published focusing on how to combine different topo-
logical metrics in order to enhance prediction performances. One widely applied ap-
proach is based on expressing the problem of link prediction as a problem of binary
classification. The idea is to compute for each unlinked couple of nodes in L, a set
of topological measures. Then with each element in L, associate one of the labels:
Linking (positive) or Not-linking (negative) based on the status of the graph at
a future step. The dataset hence computed (topological features with classes) can then
be used to learn a model, for discriminating the linking class from the not-linking one
using classical supervised machine learning approaches (Hasan et al. 2006, Benchettara
et al. 2010a).
Another main category is matrix based approaches. In the work presented by
Menon & Eklan (2011), the authors use supervised matrix factorization approach for
link prediction. The model learns latent features from the structure of a graph. The
authors show that combining these latent features with explicit node features and also
with outputs of other models to make better prediction. They propose a new approach
to deal with class imbalance problem by directly optimizing a ranking loss. The model
is optimized with stochastic gradient descent and also scales to large graphs. Another
work on temporal link prediction given in Gao et al. (2011) is also a model based on
matrix factorization. Authors exploit multiple information sources in the network to
predict link occurrence probabilities as a function of time. They propose a unique
model combining global network structure, content information of nodes and local
proximity information. For combining the temporal information of the network, they
use a weighted exponentially decaying model to build an aggregate weighted link ma-
trix over a set of T time slices.
Other approaches include Probabilistic models, Stochastic block models, Hierar-
chical models etc. A more detailed survey on link prediction and approaches can be
found in Al Hasan & Zaki (2010) and Lü & Zhou (2011).
7.4 Supervised rank aggregation based link prediction
None of the previous work, attempt to combine the prediction power of individual topo-
logical measures by applying computational social choice algorithms (or what is also
known as rank aggregation methods Chevaleyre et al. (2007)). Rank aggregation can
be defined as a process of combining a number of ranked lists or rankings of candidates
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or elements to get a single list and with least possible disagreement with all the experts
or voters who provide these lists. These methods were a part of social choice theory
and were mostly applied to political and election related problems (Mémoire sur les
élections au scrutin 1781, Young & Levenglick 1978, Black et al. 1998). These tech-
niques were designed to ensure fairness among experts while combining their rankings
and hence all experts are given equal weights. Expressing the link prediction problem
in terms of a vote is straightforward: candidates are examples (pairs of unconnected
nodes), while voters are topological measures computed for these pairs of unlinked
nodes. Then we have a voting problem with quite huge set of candidates and rather
a reduced set of voters. These settings are very similar to those encountered when
considering the problem of ranking documents in a meta-search engines where voting
schemes has also been applied with success (Dwork et al. 2001b, Aslam & Montague
2001, Montague & Aslam 2002).
In our settings, prediction performances can be boosted by weighting differently the
applied topological measures in function of their individual performances in predicting
new links. We propose here two different weighting schemes. Weights are used in two
different weighted rank aggregation methods: The first one is based on the classical
Borda count approach (Mémoire sur les élections au scrutin 1781), while the second is
based on the Kemeny aggregation rule. The later is known to compute the Condorcet
winner of an election (if it exists): the candidate that wins each duel with all other
candidates is the winner.
Before describing the approaches based on supervised rank aggregation which
refers to the same process of combining rankings but giving different weights to voters
and these weights are learned in a due process of training, here is a brief description
about two of the well known classical rank aggregation methods.
• Borda’s methodMémoire sur les élections au scrutin (1781) is a truly positional
method as it is based on the absolute positioning of the ranked elements rather
than their relative rankings. A Borda score is calculated for each element in the
lists and based on this score the elements are ranked in the aggregated list. It is
primarily applicable to complete lists of ranked elements. Complete ranked lists
are lists with exactly same elements but in different orders or ranking. Also, in a
list Lk, the rank of an element x is represented by Lk(x). For a set of complete
lists L = [L1, L2, L3, ...., Ln], the Borda’s score for an element x and a list Lk
is given by:
BLi(x) = {count(y)|Li(y) < Li(x)&y 2 Li} (7.2)
The total Borda’s score for an element is given as:
B(x) =
nX
t=1
BLi(x) (7.3)
Borda’s method is mostly applicable to complete lists and is not very suitable for
partial lists where the lists can have some different elements. Borda’s method
being a absolute position based method, is incapable of correctly treating ele-
ments which are not present all the lists taken into consideration. One option is
to assign all unranked elements with equal scores as suggested in Sculley (2007).
This is a separate topic of research and out of the scope of this paper.
• Kemeny optimal aggregation proposed in Dwork et al. (2001a), makes use
of Kendall Tau distance to find the optimal aggregation. Kendall Tau distance
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counts the number of pairs of elements that have opposite rankings in the two
input lists i.e. it calculates the pairwise disagreements.
K(L1, L2) =| (x, y) s.t. L1(x) < L2(y) & L1(x) > L2(y) | (7.4)
The first step is to find a initial aggregation of input lists using any standard
method. The second step is to find all possible permutations of the elements in
the initial aggregation. For each permutation, a score is computed which is equal
to the sum of distances between this permutation and the input lists. The permu-
tation having the lowest score is considered as optimal solution. For example,
for a collection of input rankings ⌧1, ⌧2, ⌧3, ....., ⌧n and an aggregation ⇡ , the
score is given by:
SK(⇡, ⌧1, ⌧2, ⌧3, ....., ⌧n) =
X
i2n
K(⇡, ⌧i) (7.5)
The speciality of Kemeny optimal aggregation is that it complies with Condorcet
principle which is not the case with positional methods like Borda’s algorithm
(Young & Levenglick 1978) . Condorcet principle states that if there exists an
item that defeats every other item in simple pairwise majority voting then, it
should be ranked above all other.
In spite of all advantages Kemeny optimal aggregation is computationally hard
to implement. So while looking for an alternative solution that gives similar kind
of aggregation but is computationally feasible, we are led to another approach
named Local kemenization (Dwork et al. 2001a). A full list ⇡ is locally Kemeny
optimal aggregation of partial lists ⌧1, ⌧2, ⌧3, ....., ⌧n, if there is no full list ⇡0 that
can be obtained from ⇡ by performing a single transposition of a single pair of
adjacent elements and for which
SK(⇡0, ⌧1, ⌧2, ⌧3, ....., ⌧n) < SK(⇡, ⌧1, ⌧2, ⌧3, ....., ⌧n)
In other words, it is impossible to reduce the total distance of an aggregation by
flipping any adjacent pair of elements in the aggregation.
Looking into the work based on rank aggregation techniques, we can say that not
much have been explored when it comes to application of rank aggregation in link
prediction. Moreover these works apply mostly unsupervised rank aggregation algo-
rithms giving equal weight to all the experts who provide the ranked lists. One of the
well known work is weighted majority algorithm proposed in Littlestone & Warmuth
(1989) where the authors have proposed to use weights for predictors, all having equal
weights in the beginning. There is a master predictor which makes the final prediction
based on the class which corresponds to a maximum total weights of predictors. If the
final prediction is wrong then weights of all predictors who disagreed with that label, is
increased by a factor   such that 0    < 1 and thus reducing the effect of unworthy
predictors at each iteration. This approach has a limitation that the performance of the
master predictor can be at most equal to the best performing predictor. On the contrary,
the use of rank aggregation can provide even better prediction at times. This may be
due the fact that, in these algorithms, the “likes” of majority of the predictors is given
higher preference. At the same time, the “dislikes” are given least preference. So these
algorithms are much more spam/noise resistant.
A significant work on supervised rank aggregation has been done in Liu et al.
(2007) where authors propose supervised aggregation by Markov chain to enhance the
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ranking result on meta-searches. However, it has been shown that Local Kemenization
improves on Markov chain-based approaches (Dwork et al. 2001a).
Another very recent work is in Subbian & Melville (2011) where the authors use
supervised rank aggregation to find influential nodes and future links. Authors propose
their own supervised Kemeny aggregation method based on quick sort and applied
it to Twitter and citation networks. However, their method is mostly based on the
topological features of nodes. Where as our work is based on the features of a couple
of nodes(edges) with a use of merge sort algorithm to find supervised local Kemeny
aggregation. The reason why we use merge sort is that it is seemingly more stable than
quick sort.
In the next part (subsection 7.4.1), is the description about our work on link pre-
diction using rank aggregation. We contribute in three ways: first we provide a way to
generate weights for the topological measures; second, we propose a new way of intro-
ducing weights to approximate Kemeny aggregation; and third, we use supervised or
weighted rank aggregation to link prediction task in complex networks. Our approach
is evaluated in the context of a link prediction task applied to academic co-authorship
networks. Experiments are conducted on real networks extracted from the now well
known DBLP bibliographical server.
7.4.1 Link prediction by supervised rank aggregation
Each attribute of an example has the capacity to provide some unique information
about the data when considered individually. The training examples are ranked based
on the attribute values. So, for each attribute we will get a ranked list of all examples.
Considering only the top k ranked examples and with an assumption that when we
rank the examples according to their attribute values, the positive examples should be
ranked on the top, we compute the performance of each attribute. This performance
is measured in terms of either precision (maximization of identification of positive
examples) or false positive rate (minimization of identification of negative examples)
or a combination of both. Based on the individual performances, a weight is assigned
to each attribute.
For validation, we use examples obtained from the validation graph characterized
by same attributes and try to rank all examples based on their attribute values. So for
n different attributes we shall have n different rankings of the test examples. These
ranked lists are then merged using a supervised rank aggregation method and the
weights of the attributes obtained during learning process. The top k ranked exam-
ples in the aggregation are taken to be the predicted list of positive examples. Using
this predicted list, we calculate the performance of our approach. k in this case is equal
to the number of positive examples in the validation graph.
Weights computation
We propose to compute voters (topological measures) weights based on their capability
to identify correct elements in top k positions of their rankings. Weights associated to
applied topological measures are computed based on the following criteria :
• Maximization of positive precision: Based on maximization of identification
of positive examples the attribute weight is calculated as
wi = n ⇤ Precisioni (7.6)
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where n is the total number of attributes and Precisioni is the precision of
attribute i based on identification of positive examples. Just to remind, precision
is defined as the fraction of retrieved instances that are relevant.
• Minimization of false positive rate: By minimizing the identification of nega-
tive examples we get a weight as below
wi = n ⇤ (1  FPRi) (7.7)
where n is the total number of attributes and FPRai is the false positive rate
of attribute ai based on identification of negative examples examples. False pos-
itive rate is defined as the fraction of non-relevant instances that are retrieved as
relevant.
Supervised rank aggregation
First let’s define some basic functions used later in defining weighted aggregation func-
tions. LetLi be a ranked list of n candidates (a vote). Li(x) denotes the rank of element
x in the list Li. The top ranked element has the rank 0. The basic individual Borda
score of an element x for a voter i is then given by:
Bi(x) = n  Li(x)
Let x and y be two candidates. We define the local preference function as follows :
Prefi(x, y) =
(
1 if Bi(x) > Bi(y)
0 if Bi(x) < Bi(y)
(7.8)
Introducing weights in Borda aggregation rule is rather straightforward:
Let (w1, w2, . . . , wr) be the weights for r voters providing r ranked lists on n
candidates. The weighted Borda score for a candidate x is then given by:
B(x) =
rX
i=1
wi ⇤Bi(x) (7.9)
To approximate Kemeny aggregation (Dwork et al. 2001a) we introduce weights into
the definition of the non-transitive preference relationships between candidates. This
is modified as follows. Let wT be the sum of all computed weights i.e. wT =Pr
i=1 wi. For each couple of candidates x, y we compute a score function as follows:
score(x, y) =
Pr
i=1 wi ⇤ Prefi(x, y) The weighted preference relation( w) is then
defined as follows :
x  w y : score(x, y) > wT
2
This new preference relation is used to sort an initial aggregation of candidates in order
to obtain a supervised Kemeny aggregation. The initial aggregation can be any of
the input lists or an aggregation obtained by applying any other classical aggregation
method like Borda. In our algorithm, we have applied merge-sort for the time being.
7.4.2 Experimentation
We evaluated our approach using data obtained from DBLP 8 databases. DBLP is a
scientific bibliography website containing a large database of articles mostly related
8http://www.dblp.org
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to computer science. Our network consists of authors as nodes and they are linked if
they have co-published at least one paper during the observed period of time. The data
corresponds to year between 1970-1979. We create three datasets out of that. Follow-
ing the procedure described previously, we generate examples for each dataset. Table
7.1 provides information about the training or test graphs while Table 7.2 summarizes
information about the examples generated.
Years Properties Co-Author
1970-1973 Nodes 91Edges 116
Density 0.028327
1972-1975 Nodes 221Edges 319
Density 0.013122
1974-1977 Nodes 323Edges 451
Density 0.008673
Table 7.1: Graphs
Years # Positive # NegativesTrain/Test Labeling
1970-1973 1974-1975 16 1810
1972-1975 1976-1977 49 12141
1974-1977 1978-1979 93 26223
Table 7.2: Examples from co-authorship graph
We applied our approach to the complete datasets. For rank aggregation, we have
used supervised Borda and supervised Kemeny methods. We compare our approach
with link prediction approaches using basic machine learning algorithms like Deci-
sion tree, Naive bayes and k-Nearest neighbors algorithm. We name our approaches
as Supervised Borda 1 and Supervised Borda 2 based on how the attribute weights are
computed. 1 represents weights computed based on maximization of positive precision
and 2 represents weights being computed based on minimization of false positive rates.
We will follow the same convention to represent supervised Kemeny. We selected the
following topological attributes: Number of common neighbors (CN), Jaccard coeffi-
cient (JC), Preferential attachment (PA) (Huang et al. 2005), Adamic Adar coefficient
(AA) (Adamic et al. 2003), Resource allocation (RA) (Zhou et al. 2009) and Shortest
path length (SPL).
Table 7.3 summarizes the results obtained in terms of F1-measure. F1-measure
is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. Recall is the proportion of correctly
predicted links out of total number of actual new links and precision is proportion of
correctly predicted links out of total number predictions made. Formally it is given by
F =
2 ⇤ Precision ⇤Recall
Precision+Recall
(7.10)
While K-nearest neighbors and our method based on Borda and supervised Borda
failed to provide any substantial results (due to which we have not listed them in the
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Learning:1970-1973 Learning:1972-1975
Test:1972-1975 Test:1974-1977
Decision tree 0.0357 0.0168
Naive Bayes 0.1032 0.0070
Kemeny 0.2449 0.0860
Supervised Kemeny 1 0.4286 0.2581
Supervised Kemeny 2 0.4286 0.2258
Table 7.3: Results in terms of f1-measure
table), our approximate Kemeny and supervised Kemeny based methods outperform
the decision tree and naive bayes algorithms for both datasets. This shows the validity
of our approach.
Although it is still early to say that rank aggregation based methods are better per-
forming than the other approaches of link prediction, the preliminary results do show
that rank aggregation especially with Kemeny method indeed adds some new informa-
tion which may enhance the result of prediction task. This is quite encouraging for
us to continue this work further. Still, the fact remains that rank aggregation methods
especially Kemeny method has a high computational complexity which questions its
applicability for link prediction in large scale networks. To cope with this we will be
working on application of top-k rank aggregation. Much work needs to be done in this
regards.
7.5 Link prediction using multiplex links
All these work that we see till now, address the link prediction in only simple networks
having homogeneous links. In this section we explain how prediction of links can be
done in a multiplex scenario and how prediction performances can be enhanced using
multiplex information.
To our knowledge, not much have been explored in this aspect. Although there
are a few recent work proposing methods for prediction of links in heterogeneous net-
works (networks which have different types of nodes as well as edges (Yizhou Sun
et al. 2011), there have also been few work on extending simple structural features like
degree, path etc. to the context of multiplex networks (Battiston et al. 2013, Berlinge-
rio et al. 2011), but none have attempted to use them for link prediction. We propose a
new approach for exploring the multiplex relations to predict future collaboration (co-
authorship links) among authors. The applied approach is supervised machine learning
based, where we attempt to learn a model for link formation based on a set of topolog-
ical attributes describing both positive and negative examples. While such an approach
has been successfully applied in the context on simple networks, different options can
be used to extend it to the multiplex network context. One option is to compute topo-
logical attributes in each layer of the multiplex. Another one is to compute directly new
multiplex-based attributes quantifying the multiplex nature of dyads (potential links).
Both approaches will be discussed in the next section.
109
7.5.1 Our approach
Our approach includes computing simple topological scores for unconnected node
pairs in a graph. Then we extend these attributes to include information from other
dimension graphs. This can be done in three ways: First we compute the simple topo-
logical measures in all dimensions; second is to take the average of the scores; and third
we propose an entropy based version of each topological measures which gives impor-
tance to the presence of a non-zero score of the node pair in each dimension. In the end
all these attributes can be combined in various ways to form different sets of vectors
of attribute values characterizing each example or unconnected node pair. Formally,
we have a multiplex graph G =< V,E1, . . . , Em >, which in fact is a set of graphs
< G1, G2, . . . , Gm > and we want to compute a topological attributeX on it. For any
two unconnected nodes u and v in graph Gi (where we want to make a prediction),
attribute X(u, v) computed on Gi will be direct attribute and the same computed on
all other dimension graphs will be indirect attributes. The second category computes
an average of the attribute over all the dimension i.e. Xaverage =
Pm
↵=1X(u,v)
[↵]
m for
u, v 2 V and (u, v) /2 Ei. where m is the number of types of relations in the graph
(dimension or layer). In the third category we propose a new attribute called product
of node degree entropy (PNE) which is based on degree entropy, a multiplex property
proposed by Battiston et al. (2013). If degree of node u is k(u), the degree entropy is
given by: E(u) =  Pm↵=1 k(u)[↵]ktotal log(k(u)[↵]ktotal ) where ktotal =Pm↵=1 k(u)[↵] and we
define product of node degree entropy as
PNE(u, v) = E(u) ⇤ E(v)
We also extend the same concept to define entropy of a simple topological attribute,
say Xent
Xent(u, v) =  
mX
↵=1
X(u, v)[↵]
Xtotal
log(
X(u, v)[↵]
Xtotal
)
where Xtotal =
Pm
↵=1X(u, v)
[↵]. The entropy based attributes are more suitable to
capture the distribution of the attribute value over all dimensions. A higher value in-
dicates uniform distribution attribute value across the multiplex layers. We address
average and entropy based attributes as multiplex attributes.
7.5.2 Experiments
We evaluated our approach using data obtained from DBLP9 databases of which we
created three datasets, each corresponding to a different period of time. Table 7.4
summarizes the information about the graphs of each dataset. Each graph has four years
for learning or training and next two years are used to label the examples generated
from the learning graphs. Examples are unconnected node pairs and they are labeled
as positive or negative based on whether they are connected during the labeling period
or not. Table 7.5 shows the number of examples obtained for each dataset.
We use the same attributes that were used in the previous section for supervised
rank aggregation based approach i.e. Number of common neighbors (CN), Jaccard
coefficient (JC), Preferential attachment (PA) (Huang et al. 2005), Adamic Adar co-
efficient (AA) (Adamic et al. 2003), Resource allocation (RA) (Zhou et al. 2009) and
Shortest path length (SPL). For any attribute XX
9http://www.dblp.org
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Years Properties Co-Author Co-Venue Co-Citation
1970-1973 Nodes 91 91 91Edges 116 1256 171
1972-1975 Nodes 221 221 221Edges 319 5098 706
1974-1977 Nodes 323 323 323Edges 451 9831 993
Table 7.4: Graphs
Years # Positive # NegativesTrain/Test Labeling
1970-1973 1974-1975 16 1810
1972-1975 1976-1977 49 12141
1974-1977 1978-1979 93 26223
Table 7.5: Examples from co-authorship graph
• XXaut : Value of attribute was computed on co-authorship graph during learn-
ing period
• XXven : Value of attribute was computed on co-venue graph
• XXcit : Value of attribute was computed on co-citation graph
• AvgXX : Average of the attribute value over the different relation graphs in our
casem = 3 as we are using co-authorship, co-venue and co-citation graphs.
• PNE : Product of node degree entropy. If degree of node i is k(i), the entropy
for node i is calculated as
Ei =  
mX
↵=1
k(i)[↵]
ktotal
log(
k(i)[↵]
ktotal
)
where ktotal =
Pm
↵=1 k(i)
[↵] and
PNE(i, j) = Ei ⇤ Ej
• XXent : Entropy value of the corresponding attribute (based on the entropy
equation proposed for node degree in the work of Battiston et al. (2013))
XXent(i, j) =  
mX
↵=1
XX(i, j)[↵]
XXtotal
log(
XX(i, j)[↵]
XXtotal
)
We apply decision tree algorithm on one dataset to generate a model and then tested
it on another dataset. We are using data mining tool Orange10 for that. We use four
types of combinations of the attributes creating five different sets namely: Setdirect
(attributes computed only in the co-authorship graph); Setdirect+indirect (attributes
10http://orange.biolab.si
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computed in co-authorship, co-venue and co-citation graphs); Setdirect+multiplex (at-
tributes computed from co-authorship graph with average attributes obtained from three
dimension graphs, and also entropy based attributes); Setall (attributes computed in
co-authorship, co-venue and co-citation graphs, with average of the attributes, and also
entropy based attributes); and
Setmultiplex (average attributes and entropy based attributes). Table 7.6 shows the re-
sult obtained in terms of F1-measure and area under the ROC curve (AUC). We can see
that there is improvement in the F1-measure when we use multiplex attributes. AUC is
better for all the sets that include multiplex and indirect attributes for both datasets.
Learning:1970-1973 Learning:1972-1975
Attributes Test:1972-1975 Test:1974-1977
F1-measure AUC F1-measure AUC
Setdirect 0.0357 0.5263 0.0168 0.4955
Setdirect+indirect 0.0256 0.5372 0.0150 0.5132
Setdirect+multiplex 0.0592 0.5374 0.0122 0.5108
Setall 0.0153 0.5361 0.0171 0.5555
Setmultiplex 0.0374 0.5181 0.0185 0.5485
Table 7.6: Results of decision tree algorithm
The results clearly show that inclusion of different types of links surely affects
the prediction of new links in a better way. Though marginal, the enhanced results
in preliminary experiments do seem to validate our approach and encourage further
experimentations.
7.6 Conclusions
In this paper we present the problem of link prediction in complex networks and multi-
plex networks. We present here a brief state of art of various link prediction approaches
focusing mainly on dyadic topological approaches. The unsupervised methods involve
computation of scores for unlinked pairs of nodes. While neighborhood based scores
are easy to compute, some path based measures like Katz, commute time, rooted pager-
ank can be really time consuming. Same is the case of other matrix based approaches
which have issues of computation time and memory when applied on real large scale
networks. This makes them difficult to be employed for evolving real networks. So
some approximate solutions for these measures such as truncated Katz and more can
be a good choice.
In supervised approaches, especially machine learning based methods attempt is
made to combine the effect of various topological attributes to generate a model which
is then used to predict links on a test graph. Same is done in our proposed approach
based on supervised rank aggregation. While machine learning methods have been in
use since a long time and have given reliable performances in various contexts, super-
vised rank aggregation method is quite new and requires much work to establish its
applicability in real applications. Also the fact remains that as they involve use of ag-
gregation methods like approximate Kemeny aggregation, they have a computational
complexity of O(rn log(n)) where r is the number of attributes used and n is the num-
ber of examples in each input ranked list provided. But the preliminary results we get
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on the DBLP datasets validate the approach and encourage us to explore the method
further.
A major challenge faced while using these types of supervised approaches, is the
well known extreme class skewness or class imbalance problem. The number of ac-
tual new links is very small as compared to the number of possible links. As we can
see, in the DBLP datasets we have used, the ratios of positive vs negatives links are
1:113, 1:248 and 1:282 in the three datasets respectively. Also note that this imbalance
increases with the size of graphs used for experimentation. This makes it more diffi-
cult for an algorithm to generate a good model and give a good inference on the test
data. Although very few of the negative examples have actual predictor value as pos-
itive examples, the model ends up giving a large number of raw false positives. Also
in presence of large class skew, the information carried by the positive examples gets
diluted in the vast negative class. Moreover unlike classical machine learning context,
in link prediction, correct classification of positive examples are more important. Most
common solution to this problem, as suggested by the existing research, is sampling
of negative examples. This can be done by random methods or by using some filters
by distance, node degree etc. Another way on which we are working is to use a fil-
ter based on community detection algorithm. The assumption here is that, two nodes
that do not belong to the same community, tend to remain unlinked for a longer period
than compared to those belonging to the same community. Thus they can have more
meaning as negative examples during the learning of model. Each method has its own
advantages and disadvantages, but some some can be fairer than others. The sampling
of data is mostly done on the learning data. Sometimes it is required to sample test
data like the case when extremely large number of test examples causes unreasonable
demands on processing resources and storage. If for any reason this has to be done,
proper care should be taken based on the context where link prediction is to be done.
More details about class imbalance problem can be found in Al Hasan & Zaki (2010),
Lichtnwalter & Chawla (2012). In Lichtnwalter & Chawla (2012), there is a detailed
description about how the predictor performance changes with sampling of test data.
They also provide valuable information about which performance measure is to be used
for evaluating different link prediction techniques.
Last but not the least, we have presented in the end of this paper, how to extend the
traditional supervised machine learning based link prediction approach to predict links
in multiplex networks. We propose new attributes that capture multiplex information.
By applying them for the prediction of co-authorship links, we show that the use of
multiplex attributes improves the prediction result. The same method can be used to
predict links in any of the multiplex layers. With the preliminary results, we are really
excited and hopeful that the multiplex information can prove to be very useful for
different tasks in the analysis of the network.
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Abstract
We study the impact of gossip through the dynamic model called Leviathan.
It considers agents gossiping and having an opinion of each other (Def-
fuant et al., 2013). They form their opinions in face-to-face meetings.
They act in self-defence applying vanity, influence each other, and gossip
about their peers. A highly valued speaker for a listener is more influen-
tial. The vanity impact depends on the distance between one’s opinion of
oneself and the opinion conveyed by the speaker. Listeners felt held in low
esteem sanction their speakers by decreasing their opinion of them. Those
felt held in high esteem reward them. Various social phenomena emerge,
in particular consensuses and positivity bias (i.e. a population of a ma-
jority of people judging themselves better than the average). Our study
pointed out that the consensus is almost never reached without gossip. We
also show how an asymmetrical level of openness to the influence of others
depending on how high they are held in esteem is important for the pos-
itivity bias and the bias to negativity, while the number of discussed peer
during a meeting is essential for consensus. These results are discussed
in regards of the debates in social psychology. They are possible and al-
ternative explanations for social phenomena, confirming for example the
bonding property of gossip.
8.1 Introduction
In everyday conversation, 70% of our time is spent gossiping (Emler; 1990, Foster;
2004, Wert and Salovey; 2004)! Our peers are our preferred subject of discussion
whenever we meet each other. This choice is so natural and generic to human societies
that it is an issue of great interest for social scientists. Indeed social scientists com-
monly wonder about the purpose and the impact of such a frequent activity. A body
of literature has proposed many theories explaining why we gossip in terms of socials
functions (Foster, 2004; Conein, 2011; Beersma and Van Kleef ,2012) but the question
remains open to debate.
To participate to the debate, we studied the Leviathan model. It considers agents
gossiping and having an opinion of each other (Deffuant et al. 2013). The question of
the social impact of the gossip is then relevant for this model and our conclusions can
feed the debate in social psychology even if they are only really shown significant for
the model.
The Leviathan model has been recently proposed. It brings a new and unique in-
sight into the relation between agent respective evaluations and group structure. What
is the essence of this model? It is a theory explaining how people structure themselves
120
from the agent need to form an opinion of the others, including themselves. It considers
agent interactions through meeting in pairs. Motivated by the need to be held in high
esteem (Hobbes, 1651), agents act in self-defence, applying a process called vanity.
They protect themselves from being despised by sanctioning the despiser, or favour a
compliment by rewarding the compliment giver. They also gossip about their peers
influencing each other with regard to what they think of them. Various structures and
leadership styles emerge from the meeting dynamics. The result could be an absolute
dominance, a very hierarchical society, or a crisis in which everyone hates each other,
including themselves. Egality and elite are also power structure forms emerging from
the Leviathan model.
The power of such a virtual world model is the understanding of the impact the
agent behaviour has on the structure. The choice to gossip or not can change the whole
way people see each other. The intensity of the gossiping can change the equity of
the structure and the leadership style. Even if the Leviathan model is a very simply
constructed world, we can experiment with this world. We can observe and understand
how agent direct interaction and gossiping practices build the structure. We can prove
the emergence of a leadership style from chosen agent dynamics. That is the reason
why it is the relevant tool to feed the debate, and possibly inspiring new experiments
on social functions of gossip.
In the Leviathan model, gossip occurs during dyadic interactions. That is the most
common situation for gossip accordingly to Conein (2011). However, the model also
considers gossip varying in several ways. It can vary in intensity, from its absence to
a high number of discussed peers: the more people a speaker talks about, the more in-
tense is the gossiping during a meeting. The impact of gossiping is considered accord-
ing to various levels of openness of people. This openness corresponds to a parameter
controlling how high a speaker should be held in esteem to influence the listener. Very
open-minded agents are influenced whatever their level of esteem for their speaker.
Very narrow-minded agents are only influenced by the speakers held in high esteem.
The strength of gossip is also ruled by a propagation coefficient. This coefficient and
the openness are also used to control how strong two talkers influence each other.
In this paper, we are interested in understanding the relation between gossip and
two social phenomena: consensuses and the positivity bias. These two properties of a
population seem altogether somewhat counterintuitive: a population needs some con-
sensuses to act as a group at the same time the positivity bias is said quite universal and
means people diverge. This paradox can perhaps being solved by the understanding of
their links to gossip and its social functions (Foster, 2004).
Deffuant et al. (2013) have shown the Leviathan model is able to exhibit these two
social phenomena. They emerge from the individual need to form a value of themselves
(ie self-value), as well as defining the value of others, through direct interaction and
gossip. The particular role of gossip in their emergence and maintenance has not been
exhaustively investigated in this model.
That is the purpose of this work which starts from four hypotheses: gossip leads
to consensus which increases with its intensity; gossip decreases the strength of the
positivity bias and can suppress it; positivity bias and disagreement are linked to each
other; positivity bias and bias to negativity occurring in the Leviathan model appear
conjointly whatever the level of gossip (they have been conjointly diagnosed in the
first investigations of Deffuant et al., 2013). Overall, our hypotheses are confirmed. We
especially pointed out that the consensus is almost never reached without gossip. We
also show how an asymmetrical level of openness to the influence of others depending
on how high they are held in esteem is important for the positivity bias, as well as for
121
the bias to negativity. The number of discussed peer during a meeting is also shown
essential for consensus.
While the next section is dedicated to a short review of the body of literature, the
following one presents the Leviathan model as well as our experimental design. A
section presenting the results of our analysis comes next. A final section is entirely
focused onto synthesizing and discussing our conclusions.
8.2 Literature review
Firstly, we shortly review the body of literature related to the gossip and the properties
of populations. Secondly, we sum-up what we already know from the Leviathan model
which is susceptible to help our study. This literature review will be used in section
8.3.2 to argue about our hypotheses.
8.2.1 Gossip, reputation and positivity bias in the social literature
The social functions of gossip
In his review, Foster (2004) mentions gossip has been poorly studied in the past. From
the works it has collected, it reports four major social functions of gossip: “informa-
tion (Dunbar and Duncan, 1997), entertainment, friendship, and influence”. Among
the numerous functions proposed by the review, we can cite the following ones. “From
gossip, the individual gets a map of his social environment ... can benefit from an
elevated social status. It allows building norms ... reinforcing friendship through shar-
ing norms..., controlling cheating, ... ; it hold communities together against the forces
of social entropy”. Similarly, the study of Kniffin and Wilson (2005) suggests that
“gossip can be used within groups to enforce norms”. Overall, it seems a lot of social
functions are proposed for gossip without being always supported by experiments, or
hierarchized.
The reputations
Reputations are “consensus among knowledge informations as to the attributes of tar-
gets” (Emler, 1990; Moscovici, 2000; Arrow and Burns, 2004). Emler describes rep-
utations as “social representations” (Moliner (2001), describing this Moscovici’s con-
cept) of the self: “reputations are social constructions, created collectively through
processes of social communication, and are not to be confused with one individual’s
perception of another”. He also explained the reputation emerges from interactions
between individuals who are motivated to form a social identity: “I also want to sug-
gest that defining yourself in terms of a particular social identity is largely a matter of
persuading others to so define you. ... Social identity are conferred or agreed by the
collective, not merely assumed by the individual. ... they imply shared definitions. ...
they are overtly expressed or communicated claims on the individual’s part. ... those
claims are negotiated with others.” This negotiation and sharing is made through direct
interactions between individual and gossip as it is again explained by Emler (1990):
“... that people do regularly exchange information about their mutual acquaintances
(Emler and Fisher, 1981). In a series of small-scale exploratory surveys of the infor-
mal conversations of students and teachers, we discovered that the most common topic
of conversation after self-disclosure was named acquaintances, ... Gossip of this kind
does seem to be a pervasive human activity (Paine, 1967), and given the frequency of
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such conversations (Emly and Grady, 1986), it seems a reasonable inference that peo-
ple do in fact engage in extensive information-gathering about reputations. But in these
conversations we also exchange a great deal of information about ourselves. There are
grounds for believing these aspects of conversation concern our own reputations.”
Complementary to Emler’s point of view, we have to cite the process of self-
categorization through which an individual socially defines himself as a group member.
The category that we can also call stereotype, can be seen as a reputation. This process
is the core of the social identity building and the group formations and maintenances
(Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1984; Turner et al., 1987; Hogg et al., 1990).
The positivity bias
On the contrary of a consensus, a positivity bias comes from someone’s self-judgement
better than the others. But similarly to the consensus, it is also a social phenomenon,
not the fact of an individual. Indeed, it is diagnosed in an experiment when a majority
of participants to the experiment said they are better than the average (Hoorens, 1993).
The positivity bias, which can be also called confirmatory biased or illusory superiority
(Hoorens, 1993) is strongly supported empirically. It is diagnosed especially when to
the classical question “do you assess yourself better than the average in a particular
domain”, a more or less large majority of people answers “yes”. It is well established
that people tend to rate themselves as better than average across many domains. Only
the size of the majority of people answering “yes” seems to change over the “domain”.
For example, it is well known driver rate themselves better as the average whatever
their level of training and experience (Waylen et al., 2004). The same authors indicate
us: “Grayson (1998) found that, in a sample of more than 1000 motorists, 80% con-
sidered themselves to have better than average driving ability”. Many other examples
of what it is also called self-serving bias are given in (Myers et al., 2009), as “90%
of business managers rate their performance as superior to the average”. This bias has
been shown quite universal (Myers et al., 2009). Gossip from which the universality
and the importance have been also shown (Foster, 2004; Conein, 2011; Beersma and
Van Kleef ,2012) is said being a source of self-suffering as well as a way to punish the
cheaters. It probably impacts onto the positivity bias since it seems able to decrease
someone’s self-opinion (ie the opinion people have of themselves).
8.2.2 The Leviathan model, the reputation and the positivity bias
The modelling approach
The Leviathan has been designed accordingly to a classical approach in the field of
social simulation or in sociophysics. It consists in making a few simple assumptions
about the rules of interactions between agents and the way they change their opinions.
The aim is to study the obtained emerging behaviours. In some of these models, the
agents have binary opinions (Sznajd-Weron, 2005; Galam, 2008), while in others the
opinions are continuous (Deffuant et al., 2000, Fortunato et al., 2005; Deffuant, 2006;
Lorenz and Urbig, 2007; Urbig and Malitz, 2007; Huet and Deffuant, 2008; Gargiulo
and Huet, 2010; Huet and Deffuant, 2010; Gargiulo and Huet, 2012) (see Castellano
et al., 2009 for a review). For some parameters, our model is also close to ones which
include a set of affinities between agents, leading to emerging networks (Carletti and
Righi, 2011).
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The model is called Leviathan in reference to Hobbes (1651) who pointed out that
the feeling to be undervalued is a major source of violence. In practice, the basic
Leviathan model (Deffuant et al., 2013) assumes that each agent can have a continu-
ous opinion about every other agent, truncated if necessary to remain between -1 and
+1. In the initial state, the agents don’t have an opinion about the others. The agents
interact in randomly chosen pairs and two different processes apply. The first one sup-
poses that during any interaction, each agent propagates her opinions about herself,
about her interlocutor and about several randomly chosen other known agents. In this
propagation, highly valued agents are more influential. The second process represents
a vanity effect: an agent likes to be highly valued by the others, thus she increases her
opinion on those who value her well. On the contrary, she decreases her opinion of
those who undervalue on her. These assumptions are inspired by Hobbes (1651), but
also by more recent experiments and observations from social-psychologists (Fein and
Spencer, 1997; Buckley et al., 2004; Srivastava and Beer, 2005; Leary et al., 2006;
Stephan and Maiano, 2007; Wood and Forest, 2011). Moreover, we suppose that the
access to the opinion of the others is not perfect: people may not express exactly what
they think and the listener may misinterpret these expressions. We consider such a
defect as distorting the opinion of the speaker. To model this distortion, we add or
suppress a random noise to the opinion to propagate.
The behaviour of the model
From its first study and despite its simplicity, the model shows a surprising variety of
dynamic structures when changing the parameters. The following structures have been
identified until now:
• Equality. Each agent has a positive opinion about herself; she is connected by
strong positive mutual opinions with a small set of agents and has very nega-
tive opinions about all the others. All agents have a similar number of positive
(and negative) links, called respectively friends (and foes). For some parameters,
network of positive links shows the characteristics of small world networks.
• Elite. The pattern shows two categories of agents: the elite and second category
agents. The elite agents have a positive self-opinion and are strongly sup-
ported by a friend, but they have a very negative opinion of all the other elite
agents and of all the second category agents. The second category agents have
a very negative self-opinion, they have a very negative opinion of all the other
second category agents and their opinion about the elite agents is moderate.
• Hierarchy. All agents share a similar opinion about every other agent (called
reputation) and the reputations are widely spread between -1 and +1. There are
more agents of low reputation than of high reputation: this gives the image of a
classical hierarchy with a wide basis and progressively shrinking when going up
to the top.
• Dominance. As in the hierarchy pattern, all agents share a similar opinion
about every other agent, but a single agent has a high reputation while most of
the other agents have a very low reputation.
• Crisis. Each agent has a very negative opinion of all the others and of herself.
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One can notice that these structures exhibit some properties that we relate to gossip
in the previous section: agreement about opinions; positivity bias; ... The first study
has mainly pointed out the importance of the propagation coefficient of the influence2
comparing to the vanity one for explaining how these structures emerge. The particular
impact of gossip has not been deeply investigated.
Two various forms of positivity bias have been identified in the first study of the
Leviathan and linked to each other.
The first case of positivity bias shown in Deffuant et al., (2013) is associated to
a value of the influence coefficient higher than 0 while the vanity coefficient is zero.
This bias is not appreciated in terms of number of people held in low esteem, but in
terms of the average self-opinion over the time compared to the average reputation
(the average of all the opinions) over time. A small bias in favour of the self-opinion
compared to the reputation is noticed by Deffuant et al., (2013). For these particular
parameter values, the someone’s self-opinion is very close to the opinion others have of
the agent. The bias is due “to propagation coefficient ruling the influence. The higher
is someone’s self-opinion, the larger is her influence propagation coefficient” (since the
other’s opinion of her is very close to this self-opinion). This larger influence is due
to the asymmetry of the propagation coefficient computation ruled by   giving more
influence to some agent held in high esteem. Because of this difference of influence,
when an agent self-opinion is higher than her reputation, the others have less influence
on the self-opinion than when the self-opinion is lower than the reputation (everything
else being equal). However, the effect of this average difference between the self-
opinion and the reputation depends on the value of the agent’s reputation: ... Hence,
highly valued agents tend to lead the other’s opinions and, with the statistical bias for
a self-opinion higher than the reputation, they tend to increase their reputation. This
is the contrary for the badly valued agents who tend to naturally decrease their self-
opinion, only by the effect of the propagation coefficient.
Below a threshold of the self-opinion, the reputations and self-opinions tend to be
biased towards negative values, and above towards positive values. The value of this
threshold depends on parameter   determining the propagation coefficient and also on
k the number of agents about whom the opinions are propagated during the encounters.
Indeed, this number has an impact on how the agents propagate their opinion about the
others.”
These observations are useful to understand the processes when the vanity becomes
higher than zero. First note that the vanity process enhances the tendency of self-
opinions to be higher than the reputations. Indeed, the small statistical positive bias
for self-opinion that is due to the opinion propagation leads, on average, the agents to
consider themselves as more or less undervalued by the others, thus they devalue them
by vanity. This explains the tendency of agents of the Leviathan model to get negative
opinions.
Considering a larger vanity leads us to the second case of positivity bias shown in
Deffuant et al., (2013) even if it has not been identified as such. It is associated to a
very low propagation coefficient for a large vanity one. The reference paper (Deffuant
et al., 2013) does not explicitly talked about positivity bias in this case but it is obvious
from the analytical demonstration regarding how to compute the average number of
agents positively assessed by an agent. Indeed, for this particular parameter values, the
matrix of opinion is symmetrical around the diagonal representing the self-opinion of
individuals. An agent can only be highly positively valued or highly negatively val-
2 both in direct meeting and via gossiping
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ued. The agents maintain themselves with a good self-opinion in a dynamic relational
equilibrium between few friends which flatters them and which are flattered in return,
and a large number of foes which punishes them and which are punished in return. For
these particular parameter values, the number of friends and foes is similar for every
agent. Foes are agents held in low esteem while friends are agents held in a higher
esteem compared oneself. The number of foes can be computed analytically as shown
in Deffuant et al., (2013). This number gives an indication on the strength of the pos-
itivity bias: having more than the (population size minus one) over two foes indicates
a positivity bias. From their demonstration, the authors conclude about the effect of
the main parameters for this particular set of parameter values (a very close to zero
coefficient for the influence and a large coefficient for the vanity):
• ‘Increasing   (noise parameter) decreases the final equilibrium value of the self-
opinion, and hence the final number of friends of each agent;
• Increasing   (ruling the slope of the sigmoid function of the influence parameter)
will decrease the difference of weights between friends and foes and therefore
decrease the equilibrium value for a given number of friends. This will thus
result in a larger number of friends at the stable state;
• Increasing the number of agents in the population decreases the value of the self-
opinions for the same number of friends. Therefore, it will result in a larger
number of friends at the stable state.
• Increasing ⇢ increases the fluctuations around the equilibrium self-opinion and
hence will decrease the number of friends at the stable state. ”
Regarding the “gossip” parameters we are interested in, we retain from the first case
of positivity bias that increasing   decreases the strength of the positivity bias while
increasing ⇢ increases it. In the second case, we retain   and k or an increase of vanity
can change the observed dynamics. Moreover, from the previous work we also know
that for these parameter values, and due to the vanity, the whole population is biased
toward negative. We also notice here the presence of a global bias of the population
toward the negative. This global bias to negativity seems to be a characteristic of the
dynamics of the Leviathan model since it can come both from vanity and influence.
Overall, Deffuant et al. (2013) proposes the positivity bias is due to some particu-
lar equilibria associated to couples of the influence and vanity coefficients. However,
a possible much more importance of the role of gossip in the emergence and the disap-
pearance of the positivity bias deserves a specific investigation.
8.3 Material and methods
8.3.1 The model 3
We consider a set ofN agents, each agent i is characterized by her list of opinions about
the other agents and about herself: (ai,j), 1  i, j  N . We assume ai,j lies between
3In this paper, the Leviathan model functions has been presented in a different order allowing to dis-
tinguish the direct experience of meeting a peer from the indirect contact with peer through gossiping. In
practice, this means that the events do not exactly occur at the same time during the meeting and that the
number of times the bounding feature of the opinion is checked is smaller. The model remains unchanged
despite this small difference.
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-1 and +1, or it is undefined (equal to nil) if the agent i never met j and nobody has
talked to i about j yet. At initialisation, we suppose that the agents never met, therefore
all their opinions are undefined. When opinions change, we always keep them between
-1 and +1, by truncating them to -1 if their value is below -1 after the interaction, or to
+1 if their value is above +1.
The agents interact in uniformly and randomly drawn pairs (i, j) and at each en-
counter, we apply two processes: the face-to-face management, implying influence
attempts and vanity between the two agents meeting each other; and the gossip, con-
sisting in influence trials about people they know (sometimes including themselves).
Someone knows someone else if it has already met it or heard about it. Then in this
case, the opinion of it is different from nil.
We follow the people’s interactions considering a time range called iteration. We
assume one iteration, i.e. one time step t ! t + 1, is N/2 random pair interactions
(each agent interacts N times on average during one iteration).
The following describes the processes occurring during a pair meeting with an in-
cremental approach allowing understanding how they are coupled to each other. We
start with gossip which allows us to explain how agents influence each other. Then we
continue with the management of the face-to-face during which, not only influence,
but also vanity occurs. We finally present the global iterative loop during which pair
meetings occur.
Gossip: agents discuss their peers
Let us assume that agentsiand j have been drawn. During an encounter, we suppose
that agent j propagates to i her opinions about herself (j), about i, and about k agents
randomly chosen among her acquaintances. Moreover, we suppose that if i has a high
opinion of j, then j is more influential.
This hypothesis is implemented by introducing a propagation coefficient, denoted
pij which is based on the difference between the opinion of i about j (aij) and the
opinioni about herself (aii). It uses the logistic function with parameter  . If aij = nil
(j is unknown to i), we assume thati has a neutral opinion about jand we set aij to
0. Let us also observe that, at the initialisation, an agent has no opinion about herself
(aij= nil), before she takes part in a first encounter, thus we also set aij= 0. Then
we compute the propagation coefficient pij , which rules the intensity of the opinion
propagation from j to i :
pij =
1
1 + exp
⇣
 aij aii 
⌘
The parameter   defines the slope of the function close to aij   aii. Figure 8.1 repre-
sents the value of pij when the difference aij aii varies (between -2 and +2), for three
different values of parameter  . One can observe that pij tends to 1 when aij   aii is
close to 2 (i values j higher than herself), and tends to 0 when it is close to -2 (i values
j lower than herself). Indeed, when   is small, pij rapidly changes from 0 to 1. When 
is large, this change is progressive.
A parameter ⇢ controls the impact of the coefficient pij .
The agent i modifies her opinion about the agent z that i talked about applying
the influence coefficient ⇢ by the propagation coefficient to the difference between
what j told about z and what she thinks of z. However, i has no direct access to the
opinion of j and can misunderstand j: for example j may not express exactly what
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Figure 8.1: Examples of variations of the propagation coefficient pij when aij   aii
varies, and for four values of the parameter   when   decreases, this function tends
towards a threshold function returning 0 for negative entries and 1 for positive entries.
they think and/or i may misinterpret these expressions. To take this into account in the
model, the propagated opinions are distorted by noise. This noise is identical for every
conversation and can also be seen as a difficult context not allowing the two partners to
perfectly understand each other.
To take into account this difficulty, we consider the perception of i as the value ajz
more or less a uniform noise drawn between -  and   (  is a model parameter). This
random addition then corresponds to a systematic error the agents make regarding the
others’ opinions. More formally, the process can be written in pseudo-code as follows:
Gossip(i, j)
Repeat k times:
Choose randomly z taking into account ajz 6= nil, z /neq j.
If ajz = nil, ajz  0
aiz  aiz + ⇢pij(ajz   aiz + Random(  ,+ ))
Random (- ,  ) returns a uniformly distributed random number between    and +
 , that can be seen as a noise that distorts the perception that i has about j ’s opinions.
The parameter   rules the amplitude of this noise.
The face-to-face activates influence attempt and vanity
During their first meeting, i and j don’t know each other and their opinions are nil.
Then, they instantaneously become 0 which is the neutral opinion. This initiates the
meeting dynamics and allows influence and vanity.
Indeed, when agents i and j meet, they talk about themselves: i talks about herself
and j, while j talks about herself and i. This direct exchange implies two processes oc-
curring at the same time: influence of each of them on what they think about themselves
and the other, and a vanity process applied only by the listener to the talker. This vanity
process expresses that agents tend to reward the agents that value them more positively
than they value themselves and to punish the ones that value them more negatively than
they value themselves. Then, added to the influence i received from j regarding what
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she thinks about j, agent i compares her self-opinion aii to the opinion j tells about her
aij . If the perceived opinion of the other (j) is higher than her self-opinion, i increases
her opinion of j (reward). Else i decreases her opinion of j (punishment).
Parameter ! rules the importance of the vanity process. The modification of i’s
opinion of j is assumed as simply depending on the difference between the opinion of
i about herself and the opinion of j about i (modified randomly slightly).
The face-to-face can be formally described in pseudo-codes as follows:
Face-to-face(i,j)
If aii = nil, aii  0
If aij = nil, aij  0
aii  aii + ⇢pij(aji   aii + Random(  ,+ ))
aij  aij + ⇢pij(ajj   aij + Random(  ,+ )) + !(aji   aii + Random(  ,+ ))
During the interaction, face-to-face(i, j) and face-to-face(j, i) are successively ap-
plied.
Summary
Finally, the model has 7 parameters:
• N , the number of agents;
•  , the maximum intensity of the noise when someone is alluded to;
•  , the reverse of the sigmoidal slope of the propagation coefficient;
• ⇢, the parameter controlling the intensity of the coefficient of the influence pro-
cess (applied to the propagation coefficient);
• k, the number of acquaintances an agent talked about during a meeting - they are
randomly chosen among her acquaintances;
•  , maximum intensity of the noise when someone is alluded to;
• !, the coefficient of the vanity process.
The following algorithm describes one iteration: N/2 random pairs of agents are
drawn, with reinsertion, and we suppose that each agent influences the other during the
encounter.
Repeat N/2 times:
Choose randomly a couple (i, j)
Save the opinions which are going to change in temporary variables to ensure the update
during the i and j meeting is synchronous
Face-to-face(i, j)
Face-to-face(j, i)
Gossip(i, j)
Gossip(j, i)
The update is synchronous: every opinion changes occurring during a meeting are
computed on the same value of opinions taken at the beginning of a pair meeting.
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8.3.2 Hypothesis and methods
This section describes our hypothesis as well as the corresponding experimental design
and the measured indicators. A following subsection describes the results.
Hypotheses
From our literature review, we formulate four hypotheses to test.
H1: In the Leviathan model, the gossip parameters have a strong influence on the
consensus level of the population. In the previous study of the model, the ap-
pearance of consensus has been analyzed in terms of rapport between the power
of the vanity and the power of the propagation of opinion. On the other hand, so-
cial psychology literature explains consensus emerge and are maintained through
direct interaction and gossip - that would be relevant to explore and debate the
specific role of gossip by considering it in the Leviathan model;
H2: In the Leviathan model, the gossip parameters have a strong influence in strength
of the positivity bias. Previous study has mentioned some effect of the openness
of people and sometimes of the number of discussed peer without really investi-
gates them. Moreover, in the literature, gossip is at the same time considered as
dangerous for someone’s self-suffering from a bad reputation, and explained as a
social way to control cheating. That would mean probably gossip decreases the
strength of the positivity bias. Perhaps, it can lead a majority of people to under-
value them. Once again, the Leviathan model can provide elements to discuss;
H3: Positivity bias and consensus level of the population relates each other: it seems
indeed counterintuitive the positivity bias and consensual reputation can be present
conjointly. How a population judging themselves higher than the average can be
agree on someone’s value? We hypothesize there is a negative correlation be-
tween positivity bias and consensus;
H4: Positivity bias and bias to negativity simultaneous occurrence does not depend
on gossip. The two biases have been conjointly observed in the previous study
of the Leviathan model.
Three parameters of the model are involved in the control of gossiping: ⇢,   and
k. While the impact of ⇢ has been already properly studied in regards of !, only two
values of k and   have been tested (respectively 2 and 10, 0.3 and 0.5). Then, in order
to conclude about the impact of gossip in the model, we have to vary more these two
parameters.
To test our hypotheses, we elaborate the following experimental design.
Experimental design
The model includes 7 parameters and it is difficult to make an exhaustive study in
the complete parameter space. While the study of the influence coefficient applied
identically to the influence during the direct meeting and the influence through gossip,
and the vanity coefficient, have been extensively experimented, the gossip process by
itself has not been studied. Indeed, in the model, gossip intensity is controlled through
three parameters: a coefficient of propagation, a number of agents someone talks about
and a kind of openness to influence telling whose gossip is going to be considered by
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a listener. While the first study has varied a lot the influence and vanity coefficients,
only two values have been tested for the other two parameters. To study the impact
of gossip, we have now to focus our experimental design on these two parameters: k
ruling the gossip intensity in terms of number of agents one agent talks about during a
meeting; and  , the level of openness to the influence depending on the level of esteem
for the talker. We also decided to vary the noise  , but not as much as k and  . Also
⇢ and ! vary poorly since their co-variation has been studied in details. We fix N , the
number of agents to 40, in order to make tractable results of our study.
In practice, we vary the other parameters as follows:
• k, the number of discussed acquaintances takes the values 0, 1, 2 , 3, 4, 5, 10,
15, 20, 25 and 30;
•  , ruling the slope of the logistic function determining the propagation coeffi-
cients takes the values 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.06, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9,
1.0;
• ⇢, ruling the intensity of the overall influence by being applied to the propagation
coefficient takes on three values: 0.05, 0.5, 1;
• !, ruling the intensity of the vanity : 0.05, 0.5, 1;
•  , the intensity of noise disturbing the evaluation of other’s opinions takes two
different values: 0.1 and 0.3.
For each set of parameter values, we run the model for 201,000 iterations (one iteration
corresponding to N/2 random pair interactions), and we repeat this 15 times.
Measuring indicators
From iteration 30,000 to 200,000, we measure every the 10,000 iterations a group of
values allowing us to make conclusions about the impact of gossip. The measures, av-
eraging over times of a run and over the 15 replicas gives us indicators. The indicators
we build to test our hypothesis are the following.
The average disagreement to appreciate the consensus level
It is computed as the average over the population of the maximum difference of opin-
ion on someone considering everyone except the agent herself. The average measure
is finally called average disagreement. Disagreement varies from two to about   (for
remembering: we test   equal to 0.1 and 0.3). The value two corresponds to the maxi-
mum difference between the minimum (-1) and the maximum (+1) opinion and   to the
average “noise” around the opinion on someone when everyone agrees on this opinion.
The average number of underestimated agents to appreciate the positivity bias
It is the average number of agents that each agent of our population assesses as lower
than herself. Our experimental design considers a population of 40 agents. This means
that if an agent considers that more than (40-1)/2=19.5 agents as lower than herself,
she assesses herself as better than the average. Then, we decide diagnosing a posi-
tivity bias when the average number of underestimated (equal to “assessed as lower”)
agents is higher than 19.5. Indeed, it indicates than more than 50% of the agents assess
themselves as higher than the average. When the average number of underestimated is
close to 39, it means that almost everyone believes being the highest valued agent in
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the population.
The average rate of positive opinion to appreciate the bias to negativity of the whole
population
We measure the number of positive opinions and compute the average rate of positive
opinions to assess the bias to negativity of the population. Indeed, this bias increases
when the average rate decreases. It is valued 0 when the average rate of positive opin-
ions is 0.5 and maximum when the average rate of positive opinions is 0.
8.4 Results of the study through simulations
This section presents the influence of gossip in the Leviathan model on various aspects
and the results of the test of our four hypotheses. A first subsection shows its influence
on the level of consensus. A second one deals with the positivity bias strength in regard
to gossip. A third one shows how the level of consensus, the positivity bias and the bias
to negativity identified in Deffuant et al. (2013) relate to each other.
8.4.1 Gossip and the level of consensus
Our purpose is to understand the influence of gossip on the consensus level of the
population on the value of each agent. To measure the consensus level, we compute
the average level of disagreement which varies from two to about   (see section 8.3.2
for more details).
Figure 8.2 shows that disagreement decreases with the intensity of gossip in terms
of people someone talked about, k (on the top). Disagreement is particularly high in
absence of gossip (ie k = 0). However, in the bottom panel of Figure 8.2 we can
observe that consensus can be reached even in absence of gossip for some particular
sets of parameter value. This occurs in two different cases: for   < 0.2 and ⇢=0.05
for ! = 0.5 or 1 and ⇢ = 0.5 for ! = 1 in which the disagreement is zero; for    0.2
and ⇢ = 0.5 for ! = 0.05 and ⇢ = 1 for ! = 1 in which the disagreement roughly
corresponds to the average value of tested   (0.1 and 0.3). On the right part of Figure
8.2, we also observe that depending if the vanity is low or high, an increase of the level
of openness can increase or decrease the level of disagreement.
Figure 8.3 on the left shows how these parameters change the average disagree-
ment. For ⇢   0.5, the average disagreement tends to increase with ⇢ and ! and is not
highly sensitive to  . On the contrary, for ⇢ = 0.05, the average disagreement becomes
very sensitive to   when ! is larger than ⇢ (! equal to 0.5 or 1). We observe a par-
ticular “threshold” behaviour occurring for the smaller value of ⇢ and larger values of
! (0.5 and 1), and depending on  ; a low disagreement for   < 0.2, and a high dis-
agreement for    0.2. We know this threshold behaviour is not explained by k since
it always occurs. But even for this low ⇢ = 0.05, we can see on Figure 8.3 on the right
that the average disagreement remains sensitive to gossip since the results for k=0 are
different from the results for k >0 whatever  . Also, on the right panel of Figure 8.3
we can observe, even in the conditions of high disagreement due to a low value of ⇢
and a high   value (red bar), an increase of the gossip intensity. This means again an
increasing of k decreases the average disagreement.
However, when the influence coefficient ⇢ is low (0.05) with a larger vanity (! >0.05),
accepting to be influenced in face-to-face or in gossip by people held in lower esteem
than oneself (ie. larger values of  ) is a source of disagreement between people. For
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Figure 8.2: Average disagreement for various values of k (in abscissa of the graph
on the top), and for k = 0 various values of ⇢ and   ) (in abscissa of graph at the
bottom) and !( = 0.05 blue diamonds; = 0.5 red squares; = 1 green triangles). Each
bar corresponds to the average over all results obtained from every tested values for
all the parameters considered in the experimental design. Error bars correspond to one
standard deviation over these results.
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Figure 8.3: Average disagreement for,   < 0.2 (blue bars) and 0.2   < 0.9 (red bars):
on the left, for various ⇢ and for each value of ⇢, various ! on the right, for various k
(in abscissa) and ⇢=0.05. Each bar corresponds to the average over all results obtained
from every tested values for all the parameters considered in the experimental design.
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Figure 8.4: Average disagreement and average number of friends (on the top), and
average number of agents who think being the best (at the bottom) for !=1, various
values of ⇢ and  . Each dot corresponds to the average over all results obtained from
every tested values for all the parameters considered in the experimental design.
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these conditions, the behaviour is very particular since we observe a threshold:the level
of disagreement is mainly driven by   and depends if   is lower than a threshold around
0.2. Under the threshold the disagreement is low while it is higher above the threshold.
In any case, the average disagreement is decreased by the intensity of gossip (value
of k) but if the influence parameter is low regarding the vanity, it can require a very
high intensity of gossip (large k). This particular behaviour is partly due to the charac-
teristics of our indicator. Indeed, as shown at the bottom panel of Figure 8.4, we can
observe only for our critical small ⇢=0.05 low in regards to ! (=1 in the Figure) that the
  values for which the average disagreement is the lowest corresponds to a zone where
the average number of agents holding themselves in the highest esteem (ie they think
they are the best) is equal to the population size. In this particular case, the average
disagreement is valued zero since it corresponds to the average maximum difference of
opinion on someone without taking into account the self-opinion. Then, as everyone is
valued at worst, the difference is zero and the level of disagreement is assessed as null.
This corresponds to the structure “equality” in which the agents have no friends.
For larger value of  , we observe on the top panel that the number of friends (people
held in a positive opinion by oneself) increases dramatically compared to the measures
for the larger values of ⇢. This set of parameter values corresponds to a particular
equilibrium exhibiting a positivity bias identified in Deffuant et al. (2013) and called
equality. This equilibrium between “friends and foes” (see section 8.2.2 for more ex-
planations) only occurs when ⇢ is very close to be null and the vanity coefficient !
large in comparison. It considered a population of agents having friends held in a large
positive opinion while they have the worst as possible opinion of all the others agents.
Friends have a mutual positive opinion and reward each other. That is the way they are
able to resist to a large set of “hated” agents who punished them and try to destroy the
good opinion they have of themselves. For this equilibrium, the disagreement is close
to the maximum since friends are close to have the best as possible positive opinion and
foes has the worst one. Such a difference of opinions between people is not observable
elsewhere in the parameter space. Overall, that explains why we observe a “threshold”
behavior depending on   for these parameters of ⇢=0.05 and !=0.5 and 1.
The main results of this section are: no gossip, almost no agreement; increasing
gossip decreases the disagreement. A consensus can be hardly obtained when there
is no gossip. It can emerges from the direct meeting only when the influence parameter
is high for a very low vanity coefficient and agents are opened enough to each other.
For other conditions and absence of gossip, the disagreement remains. When gossip
is introduced, the disagreement decreases. More generally, the more people someone
talks about, the more consensual is someone’s value. This confirms our hypothesis
H1: gossip have a strong influence on the consensus level of the population
8.4.2 Gossip and the positivity bias
This section aims to define if and how gossip participates from the emergence of the
agents’ positivity bias in order to test our hypothesis H2. To diagnose the positivity
bias in the model, we compute the average number of agents that each agent of our
population assesses as lower than herself. When this average number is higher than
19.5 (for our experimental design with 40 agents in the population), we diagnose a
positivity bias (see section 8.3.2 for more details).
Figure 8.5 presents how the average number of estimated agents is sensitive to k,
 , ⇢ and !. The bias is almost always observable for k = 0 (see the two panels)
whatever ⇢ or   except for ! = 0.05 and ⇢=0.5 or 1 (at the bottom) except for very
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large values of   (see Figure 8.7,  =100). It is not observable for the same value
leading to a consensus in the previous section (see Figures 8.2 and 8.5 at the bottom).
On the other hand, we notice that an increase of   always decreases the strength
of the positivity bias whatever the other parameters until it disappears (a large
increase of   suppresses all the positivity biases as illustrated in Figure 8.7). The bias
always occurs for lower values of  .
Regarding k, when k is higher than zero, the impact is very complex and depends on
the overall dynamics: from dynamics mainly driven by ! over ⇢ to dynamics mainly
driven by ⇢ over !. We can sum-up the sensitivity to k in three cases. Figure 8.6
shows these three cases. To represent directly the strength of the positivity bias, we
compute the average number of underestimated agents (N   1)/2 with N the size of
the population of agents. This “new” indicator is valued zero when there is no bias and
19.5 when the bias is maximum.
When ⇢ is small (0.05), two cases should be distinguished:
1. ⇢ = ! (0.05): an increase of k decreases the strength of the bias until it dis-
appears or remains at the same level (Figure 8.6 on the top left panel).
2. ⇢ « ! (0.5 and 1): an increase of k increases, and then decreases the strength
of the bias (Figure 8.6, top right panel).
When ⇢ is larger (0.5 and 1 in our experimental design), two regimes exist for a
same couple of parameter value (⇢, !) depending on the value of  :
1. for large values of  , an increase of k decreases the strength of the bias until
it disappears or remains at the same level (Figure 8.6, bottom right panel) ;
2. for low values of  , an increase of k decreases at first, and then increases the
strength of the bias (Figure 8.6, bottom right panel and detail with a zoom in
the bottom left panel).
The vanity coefficient ! plays an important role in absence of gossip (see on
the right of Figure 8.5). It is particularly strong when ⇢ is low in regards of ! and
leads to the largest positivity bias which can be observed in the model. This is this
largest positivity bias identified in Deffuant et al. (2013) and explained as associated to
a particular equilibrium between “friends and foes” (see section 8.2.2 for explanations)
called equality.
The parameters corresponding to the equality are the only ones in our experimental
design requiring a larger value of   (than those of the experimental design) to suppress
the positivity bias. Indeed, left panels of Figure 8.6 show top right corners totally
empty indicating there is no positivity bias in these zones (on the contrary to the top
right figures describing the case “equality”). However we are sure that a   value close
to infinite suppresses the bias. This is illustrated by the Figure 8.7 showing there is no
more positivity bias whatever the parameters for   = 100. Nevertheless, the particular
equilibrium of equality makes the bias very robust to gossip.
Moreover, the sensitivity to k for these values of ⇢ and ! is very particular (see top
right panel of Figure 8.6). An increase of k increases the strength of the bias at first and
then since k continues to increase, the strength of the bias decreases. This particular
behavior is probably linked to the probability of a peer to be subject of discussion
during a meeting. This probability is ruled by k but a small population composed a
large set of foes against a small set of friends is very sensitive to such a probability. As
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Figure 8.5: Average number of underestimated below oneself for various values of k:
on the top, for various values of   (in abscissa), k = 0 (red bars) and k > 0 (blue bars)
and all values of all other parameters; at the bottom for k = 0 and the various ⇢ and
  values and ! =0.5 (red squares), ! =0.5 blue diamonds, ! =1 (green triangles. Each
dot corresponds to the average overall results obtained from every tested value for all
the parameters considered in the experimental design. Error bars corresponds to one
standard deviation over these results.
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a first step, an increase of k makes the probability of “friends” to be discussed by ev-
eryone higher, then agents who have a very strong negative opinion of them make those
of them held in lower esteem more likely to be held in low esteem. This decreases the
average number of agents held in low esteem, and thus the positivity bias. At a second
step, a new increase of k is going to increase the number of evocation of “friends” by
the minority of “friends” itself and “reinforce” them, decreasing the positivity bias at
the same time. However, the bias remains since the difference of opinion between foes
and friends are kept very large by the vanity process. This particular sensitivity has not
been identified in Deffuant et al. (2013).
Figure 8.6: Strength of the positivity bias for: ⇢=0.05 and !=0.05 (on the top left);
⇢=0.05 and !=0.5 and 1 (on the top right); ⇢=0.5 and 1 and every ! (on the bottom
left) with a focus on small values of   (on the bottom right). The size of the circle
represents the strength. This strength is indicated in the centre of the circle in the
zoom on the lower right panel. The blue arrows simply represent the way the strength
changes with the increase of the value of k. For the lower left panel, there are two
arrows since there are two different ways of changing depending on  .
For larger values of ⇢, the impact of vanity is not as high and the sensitivity of
the bias to the intensity of the gossip in terms of the value of k depends on   (see
bottom panels of Figure 8.6). While an increase of k for large values of   decreases
and suppresses the bias, it decreases and increases the bias for small values of  . We
have been unable to explain such a result thus far. The second type of positivity bias
identified in Deffuant et al. (2013) and occurring in absence of vanity, corresponds to
the one observed for these larger ⇢ values. It has been assessed as weak in Deffuant
et al. (2013) since it has been measured for a sufficiently large value of  . However,
we have showed that the positivity bias always occurs whatever ⇢ and ! for low values
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of  . This makes our knowledge about the emergence of the positivity bias more
generic.
To sum-up, the positivity bias always occurs for lower values of  . An increase
of   always decreases the strength of the positivity bias until it disappears what-
ever the other parameters are. It is easy to understand since one agent held in low
esteem has less chance to become held in high esteem than an agent held in high es-
teem to become held in low esteem. Indeed, the influence strength of the agent held
in high esteem is very high, while the one of the agents held in low esteem is close to
zero, especially for lower   and large ⇢. In case of low disagreement between people,
it remains possible people held in high esteem think themselves lower and influence
strongly the listener in this way. On the contrary, agents held in low esteem thinking
themselves higher have a weak chance to change the listener’s mind. When   increases,
the difference of influence between those held in high and low esteem decreases.
In absence of gossip (k=0), the positivity bias is very robust to the value of   for
large values of !, and a very large value of   is required to suppress the bias. When
gossip is introduced (k > 0) and   large enough, the positivity bias can be suppressed
extremely quickly, especially when ⇢ and ! are low (see the disappearance of the bias
in the top left Figure 8.7 (from k=0 to k=1 for     0.1)).
All these results confirm our hypothesis H2 that the gossip parameters have a
large influence on the positivity bias. Indeed, in the Leviathan model, the bias can be
suppressed if agents are open enough to the influence of people held in low esteem,
and not only to the influence of agents held in high esteem. In the absence of gossip,
except for != 0.05 and ⇢= 0.5 or 1, agents have to be almost open to the influence of
everyone with the same sensitivity to suppress the positivity bias. Then, only the gossip
is able to suppress the bias when the hypothesis of a difference of openness to agents
held in low esteem compared to agents held in high esteem is maintained in the model.
The intensity of gossip, in terms of number of people someone talks about, changes the
strength of the positivity bias. However, the way this intensity changes the strength of
the bias differs a lot depending on the coefficient ⇢,   and ! .
8.4.3 Positivity bias, level of disagreement and bias to negativity
We know from the two previous sections that disagreement level is driven by gossip
controlled by k, the number of discussed peers during a meeting, and the positivity bias
is driven by  , the openness to others depending on the level of esteem for them. We
try now to assess our hypotheses 3 and 4 regarding on the one hand the link between
agreement and positivity bias and on the other hand, the link between the positivity
bias and the bias to negativity diagnosed in the Leviathan model.
We hypothesized there is a global negative correlation between positivity bias and
consensus. But we know now they are not driven by the same parameters: while the
consensus is mainly driven by k and ⇢, the biases, particularly here the positivity one,
are mainly driven by   and ! ! Thus it means in practice they can be both present
as well as one present and the other absent. In Figure 8.7, we can observe the dis-
agreement (green circles) tends slightly to increase by step with   whatever k while
the positivity bias (red squares) represented by the part of underestimated agents in the
population tends to decrease. However, we have seen previously the first lowest step
for small values of   is only explained by the lowest value of ⇢ (section 4.1 and left
panel of Figure 8.3) and characteristics of our indicator. Indeed, for ⇢=0.05 and !=1,
the average disagreement is very low for small   because all the agents hold themselves
in the highest esteem and have the poorest opinion of the others. As our indicator do
140
not consider the opinion of oneself for its computation, such a pattern implies a dis-
agreement close to 0 (this corresponds to the average maximum distance of opinions on
everyone except herself when everyone is assessed at the smallest opinion). Regarding
the last step for very large values of  , the increase of disagreement is simply due to
sensitivity to the smallest values of k slightly higher than for lower values of  .Then
we don’t really confirm our hypothesis H3: there is not really a global negative
correlation. Overall, agreement and positivity bias appears quite independently
from each other.
Figure 8.7: Part of underestimated agents (squares), part of negative opinions in the
population (triangles) and disagreement (divided by 2 to be comparable to the two
other measures), averaged over the various measures and values of parameters tested
in the experimental design, for the case “no gossip” (k=0 in plain squares, circles and
triangles), “gossip” (k > 0 in empty squares, circles and triangles) and the various
tested values for the openness sigma (in abscissa). We have added two value for   to
our experimental design (2 and 100) in order to confirm the already observed tendency
of evolution of our indicators.
This is now interesting to see how the bias to negativity identified in the Leviathan
model evolves accordingly to the positivity bias. In Figure 8.7, we can observe that the
part of underestimated agents (red squares for positivity bias) and the part of negative
opinions (purple triangles) tend to evolve closely with the openness. The two indica-
tors decrease as the openness increases until they reach 0.5 indicating there is no bias
anymore for an openness equal to 100. This disconfirms our hypothesis H4. Indeed,
even if as previously observed in Deffuant et al. (2013), the positivity bias and the
bias to negativity are both present for many values of  , they both disappear for
very large openness ( =100) even if they are not equally sensitive to the vanity and
the influence coefficient, as well as k. Indeed, Figure 8.7 shows the bias to negativity
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seems on average poorly sensitive to k while it is not the case for the positivity bias.
Then, both these biases relate each other, particularly through the openness  . The
two apparently different positivity bias identified by Deffuant et al. (2013) are finally
mainly grounded in the same mechanism. This sounds not so obvious and deserves
some explanations.
The strength of the openness is very important: The biases are always present for
a very low openness favouring almost only the influence of those held in high esteem.
The difference in the consideration of the message about herself of someone held in
high esteem compared to someone held in low esteem is responsible for every bias. It
is not only it makes their influence different. In any case, it also makes the vanity
process more determining of what is thought of someone held in low esteem while
the vanity and the influence rules what is thought of someone held in high esteem.
Thus, when the openness is low and the vanity is large, the biases are strong. However,
even when the vanity is low, it still makes their influence different and the biases tend
to remain until the difference of influence between agents held in low and high esteem
becomes not significant for the dynamics, especially in regard of the value of the noise
 .
The explanation for the bias to negativity leads in the fact that the punishment of
someone held in low esteem has a stronger impact than an equivalent punishment of
someone held in high esteem: that is the major explanation for the bias to negativity.
This is highly sensitive to the value of the self and of the vanity coefficient !. When
the openness is very large, the propagation coefficient tend to be a constant whatever
the level of esteem for the speaker and only the influence and the vanity coefficients, as
well as the self-opinion determines the evolution of the speaker (if we consider k = 0).
The explanation of the positivity bias leads in the fact that one agent held in low
esteem has less chance to become held in high esteem than an agent held in high esteem
to become held in low esteem. Indeed, the influence strength of the agent held in
high esteem is very high, while the one of the agents held in low esteem is close to
zero, especially for lower   and large ⇢. In case of low disagreement between people,
it remains possible people held in high esteem think themselves lower and influence
strongly the listener in this way. On the contrary, agents held in low esteem thinking
themselves higher have a weak chance to change the listener’s mind. When   increases,
the difference of influence between those held in high and low esteem decreases. This
explains that this bias is sensitive to the vanity ! and the influence ⇢ coefficients.
When the openness increases, the suppression of the positivity bias occurs quicker
than the one of the negativity bias. It is due to the complementary sensitivity to the
influence coefficient ⇢ as shown in section 8.4.2. (see Figure 8.5).
From Figure 8.7, we can also deduce the link between gossip parameters and
emerging structures (see 2.2.2 for their definitions). The absence of gossip favours
disagreement and positive bias. This means in terms of emerging structure that the
structures elite but mainly equality are favoured by the absence of gossip. On
the contrary, as gossip strongly decreases disagreement, it favours dominance, and
mainly hierarchy, even more for larger values of openness favouring positive opin-
ions. We notice that counterintuitively, the hierarchy is favoured by openness to
most people while equality is favoured by a population of very narrow people
almost just influenced by people held in higher esteem. Indeed, an increasing open-
ness increases agreement and positivity, and decreases positivity bias (part of underes-
timated agents).
The suppression for large values of   of the positivity bias and the negativity bias
indicates that much of the known structures can’t be observed for such a value of  .
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Indeed, regarding their definition, it seems only hierarchy remains.
8.5 Synthesis and discussion
This section synthesizes our results about the behaviour of the model and the gossip
parameters. It considers at first the link between gossip and the emergence and main-
tenance of a consensus. Secondly, it deals with gossip and bias to oneself or to the
others. These two properties, consensus and biases, defined in the Leviathan model the
observed structures of opinions. Overall these three facts are useful to examine how
our results can feed the debate of social scientists about the social functions of gossip.
We globally found that the level of consensus is mainly driven by gossip, espe-
cially by the number of peers discussed during a discussion. On the other hand, the
biases, the positivity bias and the bias to negativity, are grounded in the face-to-face
and mainly explained by the openness depending on the level of esteem for the
speaker. The gossip has only a secondary effect on biases, quite complex and depen-
dent from the vanity and influence coefficients.
8.5.1 Gossip and consensus
In the Leviathan model, the number of peer discussed during a meeting is the main
parameter explaining the emergence of a global consensus about agents’ values, espe-
cially when the influence coefficient is low. The main results are: (1) no gossip, almost
no consensus about what to say or what to think about others; (2) increasing gossip
decreases the disagreement. Indeed, a consensus can be hardly obtained in absence
of gossip. It can emerge from the direct meeting only when the influence parameter
is high for a very low vanity coefficient and agents are opened enough to each other.
In other conditions and absence of gossip, the disagreement remains. When gossip
is introduced, the disagreement decreases. More generally, the more people someone
talks about, the more consensual is someone’s value. This confirms our hypothesis H1:
gossip have a strong influence on the consensus level of the population.
This is in accordance with the social psychology literature (Wert and Salovey, 2004;
Foster, 2004; Emler, 1990). Similarly to what is outlined by these authors, gossip in
the Leviathan model is a source of reputation, giving each agent a status structuring the
population. It maintains the agent status and thus the group structure. It guarantees the
connection between people and a sufficient level of agreement regarding the structure.
Following Wert and Salovey (2004), gossiping maintains the structure. For our
model, it is not only responsible for maintenance: the structure emerges from gossip;
it is different depending on the presence and the strength of gossip (measured as the
number of peers discussed during a meeting).
Indeed, basically, without gossip, people structure themselves based on a very pos-
itive bias (very high self-esteem) while they despise others (tendency to negativity).
This is the domain of the equality structure mainly driven by the openness of people
to each other defining the number of friends of an agent. Regarding “real” groups of
individuals, this result tends to confirm the importance, in absence of gossip, of the
level of openness for the emergence and maintenance of a structure based on a network
of friendships.
In the model and always without gossip, for high values of influence, other struc-
tures are susceptible to emerge but they are rare all over the parameter space. It tends
to confirm the idea proposed by Hobbes that a strong power is necessary to organize
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the social space. But this is only true in absence of gossip in the Leviathan model. To
sum-up, we can say that norms can’t emerge without gossip, except if influence and
openness are very large for a low vanity but the agreement is just based on face-to-face
and can’t be obtained if not everyone meet everyone!
This confirms gossip as a bonding mechanism as well as not only necessary for
the maintenance of norms but also for their emergence. Indeed, even if the Leviathan
model does not consider this case, gossip can link agents not talking each other directly.
But it is not only a bonding mechanism, it is also a way to build and transmit social
representations. Some authors (Wert and Salovey, 2004) argue gossiping maintains
the structure by sanctioning people who do not respect norms. From our results, we
argue in a slightly different way since the structure is not only maintained by the ability
of people to sanction or reward each other through gossiping. It is also because agents
reinforce their position in the structure not only talking about themselves but also, from
their point of view, relative to the agents they know. This allows the emergence of a
consensus since, overall, people not only give one-by-one the opinion they have on a
given person but of the structure from their own point of view. The more agents we
gossip about, the more completely the description of the structure is discussed and the
higher the agreement on the structure. Not only, as said in Foster (2004), the agent
gets a map of his social environment, ... but he can, as outlined by Emler (1990)
negotiate her own social identity by influencing her own ranking not only through
direct interaction where each other talks about them, but also by directly influencing a
large subpart of the ranking trying to transmit her own ranking. Then, finally defending
her own reputation through gossip, the agent disseminates her view of the structure
and help the emergence and maintenance of a global structure. This sounds quite in
accordance with the literature and confirms the dynamic validity of the theory (Dunbar
and Duncan, 1997; Conein, 2011).
In the model, in terms of structure of the population organized through opinions,
while the introduction of gossip mainly favours an elite structure, a larger increase of
gossip in terms of number of discussed peers favours finally a hierarchy. This can be
diagnosed since the elite structure is associated to a high positivity bias and a strong
disagreement while a low positivity bias and a high level of agreement characterized
the hierarchy. In practice, increasing gossip allows passing from a structure based
on relationships and lead by a network of friends to a structure based on norms and
consensus about social representations.
In particular, gossip helps to the emergence of recognized leaders. In the Leviathan
model, leaders are agents who have a positive reputation: everyone has a positive opin-
ion of them with only small variations from an agent to another. From Deffuant et al.
(2013), we know leaders only appear when reputations are consensual and the propa-
gation coefficient sufficiently large compared to the vanity. It gives agents held in high
esteem the opportunity to impose her point of view on everyone’s value since everyone
agrees on her higher status. In the social literature, if gossip has been often cited in
terms of status maintenance, it has rarely been cited for high status emergence (to our
knowledge, except Emler, 1990), even if the danger of gossip for the reputation have
been often discussed (Foster, 2004).
In the Leviathan, the emergence of leadership is also strongly determined by the
asymmetrical influence of people held in low and high esteem. It is probably the most
important parameter in the explanation of the status emergence and maintenance, what-
ever the form of leadership style or the structure form. Huet (2013a) has shown in the
Leviathan that, since the gossip is introduced in the dynamics for a sufficient level
of openness, a leader is susceptible to appear in the population. Also, the number of
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leaders only depends on the level of openness since agents practice gossiping.
The question about the characteristics of the leaders and the various associated
leadership style makes debate in social psychology (Hogg, 2001; van Knippenberg
et al., 2004; Uhl-Bien, 2006; Martin, 2009; Huet 2013a). Investigating further the
Leviathan model on this question would be interesting.
8.5.2 Biases and a “conditioned-to-esteem” openness
This section is much more dedicated to our study of the link between gossip and bi-
ases. We have investigated the relations between the gossip and the positivity bias, the
positivity bias and the agreement level about opinions, the positivity bias and the bias
to negativity of all opinions. Our study shows the great importance of the openness to
the peer influence. The influence is partly ruled by a sigmoid function parameterized
by an openness. This makes more influential an agent held in high esteem: The higher
it is held in esteem, the more influential is the agent. In particular, when the openness
is zero, only the agents held in high esteem are influential; those considered as lower
than oneself are not influential.
The openness strength explains most of the biases strength. Indeed, our main re-
sults are: (1) the positivity bias and the bias to negativity decrease when the openness
increases; (2) a very large openness makes the biases disappearing; (3) while the bi-
ases decreases with the increase of the openness, the disagreement increases; (4) the
disagreement level, then the positivity bias, but not the bias to negativity, are sensitive
to the absence of gossip (the introduction of gossip decreases the disagreement level
and the positivity bias on average).
The value of the openness is very important. The vanity can be seen as a self-
enhancement and self-protection mechanism which ensures by itself to an agent a pref-
erence for herself. Then the first intuition was to consider vanity as responsible for the
bias to negativity as well as the positivity bias. However, following the Leviathan, it
is only a reinforcing mechanism. The main cause of these biases comes from the way
people are more or less open to the other’s influence depending on their level of esteem
for them.
When the openness is small implying the influence is very conditioned by the level
of esteem for the speaker: (1) the punishment of someone held in low esteem has a
stronger impact than an equivalent punishment of someone held in high esteem: that
is the major explanation for the bias to negativity; (2) one agent held in low esteem
has less chance to become held in high esteem than an agent held in high esteem, to
become held in low esteem: that is the explanation for the positivity bias. Both these
mechanisms are reinforced by the strength of the vanity which is harsher for people
held in low esteem compared to people held in high esteem since it is not compensated
by their influence about their own value. The openness makes the way people defined
themselves in the dynamics. Especially, when it is small, people held in high esteem
and people held in low esteem have a very different dynamics. People held in high
esteem drives the opinions on themselves through their own influence and neglect what
the other say about them. They are quite active in the formation and the maintenance of
their self-opinion. On the contrary, people held in low esteem are very passive regard-
ing their self-opinion. They are much more defined through the vanity process applied
by their talker, especially through the punishment. It leads them to see themselves more
and more negatively through the influence of people they held in high esteem.
When the openness becomes larger, everyone becomes equally influential regarding
the propagation coefficient. This makes each agent more active in the definition of her
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self-opinion as well as in the definition of the opinion of others. In such situation, the
biases to oneself (positivity one) and to the others (negativity one) disappear. However,
these two biases are not equally sensitive to the vanity and the influence coefficient,
as well as to k. So it is not possible from our experiments to observe a positivity bias
without observing a bias to negativity. But it is possible to observe a bias to negativity
without positivity bias, particularly for large openness and low influence coefficient.
This remains an utopia considering the “real” world. Indeed the positivity bias is uni-
versal. Its effects can be temporary or locally decreased (Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000)
but remain overall.
The positivity bias and the bias to negativity have never been explained, to our
knowledge in terms of openness to others or in terms of interaction with others. They
take place in the need of two people to form an opinion of each other to be able dis-
cussing. This opinion is built from a mutual influence which a matter of esteem and
from some self-enhancement or self-protection mechanism. In the literature, gossip
is at the same time considered as dangerous for someone’s self-suffering from a bad
reputation, and explained as a social way to control cheating. That would mean proba-
bly gossip decreases the strength of the positivity bias to avoid the cheating. Perhaps,
it can lead a majority of people to undervalue them. On the contrary, the Leviathan
model argues gossip has only a small effect on biases and is not responsible for them
overall. It can in fact increase or decrease slightly the biases depending on the vanity
and the influence coefficients but very poorly compared to the impact of an openness
conditioned to the level of esteem. This can explain the difficulty to conclude about
the impact of gossip. This can also provide some clues to the apparently contradictory
results showing gossiping can be either majorly negative (Wert and Salovey, 2004) or
positive (Ellwardt et al., 2012).
Agreement, then the positivity bias, but not the bias to negativity, are sensitive to
the absence of gossip (the introduction of gossip decreases the disagreement level and
the positivity bias on average). However, agreement and positivity bias appears quite
independent from each other. They are not driven by the same parameters: while the
consensus is mainly driven by gossip and influence, the biases, particularly the posi-
tivity one, are mainly driven by the openness and the vanity! Thus it means in practice
they can be present as well as one present and the other absent. We hypothesized there
is a negative correlation between positivity bias and consensus since it seems counter-
intuitive the positivity bias and consensual reputation can be present conjointly. How
some agents judging themselves higher than the average can be agree on someone’s
value? Indeed, in the literature, gossip is at the same time considered as dangerous for
someone’s self-suffering from a bad reputation, and explained as a social way to con-
trol cheating (Foster, 2004) to protect norms. This means in practice positivity bias and
consensus should be negatively correlated. This can be locally the case in the Leviathan
model. But the model does not exclude intermediary situations which have been, even
often separately, diagnosed in surveys and experiments. The noise occurring during
discussion can also help reaching an agreement despite the universal preference for
oneself.
Overall, the definition of the structures diagnosed in (Deffuant et al., 2013) has to
be revised in the light of these results onto the gossip parameters effect.
8.5.3 Future works
Two types of future studies have to be considered: more studies of the Leviathan model;
an investigation by the social psychology of the proposals emerging from the study of
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the model.
We have seen how gossip participates from the emergence and the maintenance of a
structure. However, we can consider our population defines only one group of people.
In the literature, structures relate not only to one group but mainly on several groups and
how they interact each other, especially through stereotypes (which can be assimilated
to the reputation of a given group). This is a particular issue for the Leviathan model
which has to be investigated in the future. A possible solution is the modification of the
heuristic of talking. At first in the current Leviathan model, everyone talk to everyone
on average during one iteration and the interaction takes place in dyads. This is true
that accordingly to (Conein, 2011), people gossip more often in dyads. However, this
author also stress out some work showing gossip can occur during meeting composed
from up to five people. This would be probably very interesting to add such a situation
in the Leviathan model. We can also consider a different probability to talk or to meet
someone else for agents. It can be through the introduction of a structure of interactions
or of various communication apprehensions.
Regarding the social psychology, one of the main proposals of the model to inves-
tigate is probably the link between the strength of the gossip and the type of structure
of opinions at the group level. Experiencing to define if such a result can be grounded
empirically would be very interesting.
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Abstract
Text-mining analysis can describe evolutions of data, even big data,
but between two points many curves can join them depending on the dy-
namics of the process. If statistics approximation can produce error esti-
mation with tendencies, how modelling of dynamics opinion can produce
networks estimations from the data ? This paper studies this research is-
sue with the case study dealing with the controversy of abnormal death of
bees among French speaking journalists during a period of 13 years. Arti-
cles are tagged with three stances to explain the phenomenon, a uni-factor
cause, the use of pesticides, a multi-factor cause, including one other fac-
tor different than pesticides at least, or the absence of an understanding.
On this basis, evolutions of the respective proportions of each category
of agents are obtained. Assuming agents are either flexible or inflexible
journalists about their respective reports of the facts, their associated net-
works are extracted from the data applying Galam Unifying Frame (GUF)
of opinion dynamics. The variation of inflexible agents explaining the is-
sue either with unifactor reasons or multifactor causes, is a result of the
modelling. From those distributions the actual networks of agents can be
inferred.
Keywords: formal modelling, sociophysics, sociology, opinion dy-
namic, daily press, text-mining, renormalization group, precautionary prin-
ciple, bees colony collapse disorder.
9.1 Introduction
A good deal of publications has already been devoted to the theoretical study of pub-
lic opinion, especially within the framework of sociophysics (Castellano et al. 2009,
Galam 2008, 2012). This work analyzes the diffusion of two competing opinions whose
dynamics leads to the success or the disappearance of one of the opposite view. Dynam-
ics is a selection process seen as repeated local interactions between agents providing
a new comprehension of social phenomena (Galam 2002).
But not many real cases have been investigated using real empirical data. The
challenge is to compare descriptive data analysis with theoretical modelling. This paper
presents a case study with a subject dealing with controversial environmental risks. In
this case, public problems treatment in media makes the understanding of the public
opinion mechanisms a great challenge. In our context, application of the precautionary
principle is a sensitive issue. The precautionary principle states that if a given policy
is suspected of a possible harm to either the public or the environment, in the absence
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of a scientific consensus about its risk status, implementing that policy is questionable
and should be held on (French Constitution 2004, Galam 2005a).
Empirical data used for this paper deal with the abnormal bees’ death, also called
colony collapse disorder (CCD) in some countries including the US. This controversy is
emblematic of the question of risks connected to the burden of making eventual manda-
tory arbitrage to ban the use of some specific chemical products. Real implementing of
innovation leads to public debates which are inevitably driven by incomplete scientific
data. The question arises on how possible risks are translated (Callon 1986) into solid
(Tonnies 1922) facts during the ongoing associated public debate (Dewey 1927, Galam
2010)?
Our corpus is considering almost 1500 articles dealing with the topic of the ab-
normal deaths bees published in French newspapers during the period 1998-2010, i.e.,
thirteen years. With a text mining analysis3 each article is categorized with one of three
views about the possible explanation of this abnormal bees’ disappearing. The first cat-
egory gathers articles asserting the abnormal deaths is due to only one factor, the use
of pesticides. At the opposite, other articles argue that many factors combined together
produce the abnormal facts, it is thus a multi-factor cause. And a third category of
articles states that the abnormal deaths is still an enigma without clear explanation.
Then, data are confronted with modelling in order to question back the social mean-
ing of the dynamics. Our hypothesis asserts the evolution over the years of the im-
portance of support among journalists for each view can be modelled as the result of
interactions between journalists agents. Two kinds of agents are used in the model. In-
flexible agents, those who never change their mind, and flexible agents, those who can
change their mind (Galam and Jacobs 2007, Galam 2005b). The variations exhibited
by the data suggest that the number of inflexibles vary from year to year. Those vary-
ing numbers of inflexibles are inferred applying Galam Unifying Frame (GUF), also
denoted the Galam sequential probabilistic model of opinion dynamic or the majority
model. Applying the model to the empirical data built from a corpus of published ar-
ticles in newspapers provides a frame to go back to the data and question their social
meaning with the eventual social mechanisms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The problem is set in the second
section where the dynamics opinion is quantitatively evaluated with empirical data.
Third section highlights the newspaper level to show the inflexible or flexible agents
profile. GUF is adapted to the problem in section four to extract inflexible agents
proportions as a function of time in section five. The social meaning behind the data
is addressed in section six enlightening the determinant role of lobbying and other
externalities. The results are discussed in the last section.
9.2 Behind the dynamics there are many hypotheses
A boolean equation dealing with the abnormal death of bees in France during the pe-
riod 1998-2010 has led to extract a corpus of almost 1500 French articles from Lexis-
Nexis and Factiva databases. The collection of papers is taken from daily, weekly and
monthly French speaking press. The annual distribution of the number of articles is
shown in (Figure 9.1).
3An extensive text mining research program have been performed on the same corpus (Delanoe 2004,
2007, 2010) in order to extract the main terms that have a significant weight in the public debate. The text
mining method used in this paper benefits from this series of works since it only categorizes articles if it does
contain some specific terms at least.
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Figure 9.1: Number of articles published each year by French daily, weekly and
monthly press dealing with the bee deaths from 1998 till 2010. Over the thirteen years
the total amounts to 1467.
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A systematic textual analysis of all the collected papers (Delanoe 2004, 2007,
2010), shows that within the articles dealing with the question of the abnormal bee
deaths some pointed towards scientific results suggesting a single cause identified as
the use of pesticides (Chateauraynaud 2004, Delanoe 2004), while others were em-
phasizing other results suggesting the combination (Chiron and Hattenberger 2008) of
several different causes (Maxim and van der Sluiis 2010). A combination of words has
been established to categorize each view.
1. Articles containing words as “pesticides” or “insecticides” or “chemicals” and
without referencing others factors are categorized in the uni-factor class;
2. Articles containing at least one word in this list are put in the class of the multi-
factors cause:
• “Foulbrood” (it is a bacteria);
• “Nosema” or “Nosemose” (it is a mushroom);
• “Varroa” (it is a parasite);
• “Virus” (it represents mainly the Israel acute paralysis virus);
• “Predators” or “galleria mellonella” or “aethina tumida” or “Asian preda-
tory wasp”;
• “Monoculture” or “natural toxin of sunflower” (which refer to agricultural
practices);
• “Pollution” or “climate change” or “meteorology” (which represent the ex-
ternal or environmental causes);
• “Multi-factors” or “many factors”;
3. Articles containing sentences as below are assigned to the class claiming there
exists no understanding yet (sentences detected with qualitative reading):
• “While it would be impossible to formally accuse the pesticide being ex-
clusively responsible for the fall of the hive population”;
• “It is no element of new evidence of anything”;
• “All data analyzed does not criminalize formally and exclusively the treat-
ment of sunflower seeds”;
• “The pesticide was evaluated on two occasions over the last three years,
and we believe that there is no cause and effect relationship between our
product and the problems of orientation of bees”.
Semi-automatic textual analysis tools combined with human reading for validation
has enabled to tag 84% of the corpus articles, leaving 16% of the articles untagged.
Some articles do not infer any cause of the bees’ death since authors have been men-
tioning general facts only. In this specific case these articles remain untagged. We have
restricted the corpus to the tagged articles shown in Figure 9.2.
For the modelling, i.e. next figures, years will be numbered from T = 0 for 1998
to T = 12 for 2010. The corresponding proportions of articles for the uni-factor class
denoted by UT are respectively 0.500, 0.60, 0.677, 0.513, 0.627, 0.831, 0.769, 0.517,
0.540, 0.422, 0.544, 0.40, 0.255 with T = 0, 1, . . . , 12. A indicates the opinion of jour-
nalists who belong to the uni-factor class. Simultaneously, the opinion of journalists
belonging to either one of both other two classes, the multi-factors and the no-proof
ones, is noted B.
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Figure 9.2: Proportions of articles published each year by daily press dealing with uni-
factor, multi-factors or no-proof categories. 84% of the corpus, i.e. 1233 articles, have
been tagged.
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9.3 The newspapers publications in time highlight the
main profiles types
The corpus of selected articles is sourced from almost 60 different newspapers. Then
to model dynamics of opinion we need to check if journal contributions exhibit differ-
ent profiles. Looking at the contributions from “Le Monde” (Figure 9.3) we observe
large variations. Indeed, some years present 0% of the articles for either A or B as
respectively in 2001, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009. Such facts mean that during those years
all journalists were either all flexibles or flexibles with some inflexibles present only
on the opinion side which has been advocated at 100%. In other words a 0% support
for one opinion implies the absence of inflexibles on this side. Years for which the
dynamics did not reach 100% for one opinion, inflexibles may have been present on
both sides.
While 4 years 2001, 2006, 2007, 2008 are characterized by zero inflexibles for the
uni-factor cause, only 1 year, 2009, feature zero inflexibles for the multi-factors cause.
When the year contributions does not reach 100% and split over support of A and B,
we can infer about a possible existence of inflexibles on one or two sides like for 1998,
1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004.
The contributions from newspaper Sud Ouest (Figure 9.3) reveal the possible pres-
ence of inflexibles on each side every year. Contributions from newspaper “Le Figaro”
(Figure 9.3) exhibit as for “Le Monde” several years with 100% polarization, namely
1998, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010. These years are characterized by zero
inflexibles for the uni-factor cause (while for “LeMonde” it occurs for both sides). This
position was modified in 2000 and really reversed in 2002-2004, with a slight surge in
2006.
The results of Figure 9.3 hint at a key role played by inflexibles in the making of
the data of Figure 9.2. Such a fact would question the social meaning of those results.
Accordingly, it is of importance to extract the values of the proportions of inflexibles
agents present at each year. Specifically the successive brutal changes of trends as
exhibited by Figure 9.2 indicate a change of proportions of the inflexibles.
Since the goal is to build back the actors network from the dynamics, implement-
ing GUF model appears appropriate as it does not infer structures of network a priori.
Indeed, this model incorporates only the effect of inflexibles on the dynamics of opin-
ion among flexible agents (Galam 2010, 2002, Galam and Jacobs 2007, Galam 2005b).
Moreover, it has been shown that the size of the local updated groups does not modify
the main results since increasing the group size reduces the number of updates required
to reach the attractors (Galam 2002). To keep the equations analytically solvable, group
updates of size 3 have been used.
9.4 Using a model to reinterpret the problem
9.4.1 The framework of basic GUF which depends on the group
size distribution
The GUF model investigates the competition between two opposite opinions within
a population of inflexible and flexible agents(Galam 2005a, 2002). Each agent has
only one opinion. Rules of diffusion assert flexible agents can shift opinion. Indeed,
within a group of agents, a flexible agent gets the opinion which has the majority. Then
dynamics is implemented via repeated random meeting of agents within small groups
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Figure 9.3: Proportions of articles published each year by Le Monde (total of 67 tagged
articles), Sud Ouest (total of 209 tagged articles) and Figaro (total of 62 tagged arti-
cles) newspapers dealing with uni-factor and not-unifactors which includes both multi-
factors and no proof papers.
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of various sizes. For each distribution, agents’ opinions are locally updated according
to the respective local majorities in its own group. For even size groups in case of
equality, agents preserve their current opinions.
In real life people meet and discuss in groups of different sizes. However these
groups are usually small. In the case of journalists treated here, those meetings occur
within the social network of journalists in which they can interact. To account for this
reality the basic GUF can be extended to include a distribution of sizes leading to the
general update expression,
ut+1 =
LX
i=1
si{
iX
j=[ i2+1]
Ciju
j
t (1  ut)(i j) +
1
2
k(i)Cii
2
u
i
2
t (1  ut)
i
2 }, (9.1)
where ut and ut+1 denote the proportion of journalists in favor of A at times re-
spectively t and t+1 and v and w denote proportions of A and B inflexibles. L is
the size of the largest group, Cij ⌘ i!(i j)!j! , [ i2 + 1] ⌘ Integer Part of ( i2 + 1), and
k(i) ⌘ [ i2 ]  [ i 12 ] yielding V (i) = 1 for i even and V (i) = 0 for i odd. The propor-
tion of groups of size i is defined by the probability distribution si under the constraintPL
i=1 si = 1. Including groups of size one accounts for the fact that not all agents
discuss at the same time in local groups.
Although an infinite number of size distribution {vi} is possible in principle, it
happens that the dynamics is qualitatively unchanged with the two attractors uA = 1,
uB = 0 and the tipping point ut = 12 being invariant. The only difference is the number
of required iterations to reach either attractor. Larger groups contribute to accelerate
the polarization effect. Nevertheless, analytic solving of Eq. (9.1) is possible only up
to L = 4, otherwise for L > 4 numerical solving is required. On this basis, to keep
calculations simple and tractable we restrict the group sizes to 3 in this paper.
9.4.2 The heterogenous GUF mixing inflexible and flexible agents
The uni-factor distributions in Figure 9.2 reveal a series of brutal variations at years
2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008. According to the model ( Eq. 9.1), opinion
reaching the majority is even more dominating. This result is incoherent with the em-
pirical data evolutions. To counter this systematic increasing trend external parameters
must be integrated in order to enable a topological modification in dynamics.
It is worth to stress that, in GUFmodel, inflexibles do not have more powerful argu-
ments, they still have each one vote alike flexibles. They do obey one person one vote
in a group discussion. However once every agent in the local group has written, they
do not follow the local majority rule in case they are minority. In the present work we
consider a population which is a mixture of flexible and inflexible agents. The propor-
tions of inflexibles are external parameters while the respective proportions of flexibles
in favor of A or B are internal parameters driven by the dynamics of local discussions.
The possibility to make inflexibility an internal parameter has been studied in Martins
and Galam (2013) but is not introduced here. Accordingly, Eq. (9.1) becomes
ut+1 =  2u3t + (3 + v + w)u2t   2vut + v, (9.2)
where v and w denote proportions of A and B inflexibles. Associated dynamics has
been extensively studied in Galam and Jacobs (2007), Galam (2005b) where the various
cases of flow opinion diagram have been obtained as a function of all combined ranges
of values for v and w.
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9.4.3 Fitting the model to data
Proportions of inflexible agents can be modified every year as a result of the activation
of external pressures in favor of either one opinion. Then each year a flexible agent
may turn to an inflexible status and vice versa. During each year, inflexible agents
proportions are kept fixed for each successive update4.
Then dynamics of opinion is implemented in two steps. First, some fixed propor-
tions of inflexibles are given. And in a second step, n consecutive updates of flexibles
are implemented keeping unchanged the inflexible proportions. Then the proportions
of inflexibles are modified before n new updates are performed. This two steps dynam-
ics is implemented by modifying Eq. (9.2) into
uT,t+1 =  2u3T,t + (3 + vT + wT )u2T,t   2vTuT,t + vT , (9.3)
where uT,t and (1  uT,t) denote the proportions of journalists in favor of respec-
tively A and B during year T and intra-time t. The associated proportions of inflexibles
vT and wT are independent of the intra-time. They depend only on the year T . Given
uT,t, GUF determines uT,t+1 obtained after one update of opinions for fixed values of
vT and wT .
To account for the interplay between the two timescales we notice that since T =
0, ..., 12 for the years and t = 1, 2.., n for the intermediate intra-time within a year, we
have the congruence (T, n) = (T + 1, 0).
In addition, we note that only the fraction uT,t   vT is flexible, i.e., able to shift
opinion under convincing local arguments. We thus have uT,t   vT and 1   uT,t  
wT () uT,t  1  wT , which combine to,
vT  uT,t  1  wT , (9.4)
with the constraints 0  vT  1, 0  wT  1 and 0  vT + wT  1. A detailed
study of the properties of Eq. (9.3) has been performed in Galam (2010), Galam and
Jacobs (2007).
9.4.4 Implementing model to rediscover the data
It is worth to emphasize that we do not aim at reproducing the data exhibited in Figure
9.2. The methodology aims at evaluating the minimum values of both the respective
proportions of inflexibles vT and wT and the intra-time n, which are compatible with
the data for every pair of successive years. Given a pair of values UT and UT+1 we
determine the minimum values vT , wT and n, which starting from uT,0 = UT reach
uT,n = UT+1 with a precision of 10 3 after n successive iterations of Eq. (9.3). In
a second step, writing uT,n = uT+1,0 we evaluate the minimum values of vT+1 and
wT+1 which allow to get uT+1,n = UT+2 starting from uT+1,0.
More precisely, we start from u0,0 = U0 to evaluate v0 and w0 such that u0,n =
u1,0 = U1. Then we evaluate v1 and w1 such that u1,n = u2,0 = U2. And so on and
so forth up to the evaluation v11 and w11 such that u11,n = u12,0 = U12. Then, the
end of each period of iterations is the beginning of a new period of iterations with new
parameters.
4This constraint is necessary for modelling but questionable to meet real journalistic practices. Indeed,
why should we slice the social phenomenon by year and fix the behaviour accordingly? In further research,
the temporal parameter will be tested with different time slices.
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Year T vnT w
n
T uT,0 ! uT,n Nb  UT n
1998 0 0.091 0 0.500! 0.600 18 0.118 3
1999 1 0 0.080 0.600! 0.677 20 0.109 3
2000 2 0 0.285 0.677! 0.513 31 0.084 3
2001 3 0.081 0 0.513! 0.627 37 0.082 3
2002 4 0 0.019 0.627! 0.831 59 0.063 3
2003 5 0 0.169 0.831! 0.769 178 0.028 5
2004 6 0 0.225 0.769! 0.518 368 0.022 8
2005 7 0 0.015 0.518! 0.541 85 0.054 3
2006 8 0 0.169 0.541! 0.422 61 0.064 3
2007 9 0.209 0 0.422! 0.544 71 0.059 3
2008 10 0 0.121 0.544! 0.400 169 0.038 5
2009 11 0.033 0 0.400! 0.251 85 0.053 3
2010 12 0.251 51 0.061
Table 9.1: Inflexible proportions at each year to reach the following one covering 12
annual intervals.
To determine which value n to use, we notice that the number of articles for each
year period is distributed within 3 different groups with respectively less than 100 (10),
between 100 and 300 (2), and more than 300 (1) as seen in Table (9.1). For each
group we determine the minimum value of n which allows to implement uT,n = UT+1
starting from uT,0 for all cases of each group. We found respectively, n = 3, 5, 8 as
reported in Table (9.1).
From Table (9.1) it is seen that for any given year n, only one fitting parameter is
used since always either vT or wT is equal to zero. The variation of uT,n as a function
of successive iterations are shown in Figure 9.4. The error bars are also reported in the
Figure although GUF values of the series of uT,n recover perfectly the data values UT
for all the 13 years. Figure 9.5 exhibits the simultaneous variations of vT and wT as a
function of T .
9.5 Behind the data another sight on the networks
The picture drawn from the modelling leads to a reverse conclusion of what would
have been expected. Proportions of categorized articles follow different evolutions than
proportions of agents on each side. From empirical dynamics we are lead to question
how journalists interact in the public debate.
If in the first year proportions are equally distributed (U0 = 0.50) the uni-factor
agents appear to be more inflexibles on its side while none was present on the other
side. This result highlights the determinant advantage made by the first whistle-blowers
about a new controversy.
Once the controversy was launched, the multi-factor inflexible agents happened
while the uni-factor side turned down its pressure.
From high level of journalists against the use of pesticides, the industrial side
launched a significant pressure getting up to w2 ⇡ 0.285 inflexibles. The multi-factor
expected right opinion was then achieved.
But, with the threshold nature of the dynamics (Galam 2002, Delanoe 2010), the
next years brought back the uni-factor side to rather high values in 2002 and 2003 even
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Figure 9.4: Evolution of the proportion of journalists advocating the uni-factor cause
as a function of updates using Eq. (9.1) with 9 ⇥ 3 + 2 ⇥ 5 + 1 ⇥ 8 = 45 updates.
Circles show the overlap with the data calculated per year and vertical lines indicate
error approximation using the variance of a binomial generator.
if these values are lower than expected. Indeed, beekeepers’ view has been translated
in public media through political spokesmen during regional and European elections in
2004. Indeed, pesticides have been banned from sell that year.
With new scientific studies in 2005, the multi-factor side is relaunching the debate
in the media.
9.6 Conclusions
This case study shows how empirical data and theoretical modeling can produce a
heuristic framework to analyze a controversy. Starting from empirical data, the use of
a model has allowed to go back to the data to question their social meaning.
First a text-mining analysis of published articles has been performed in order to
categorize articles. Facts reports dealing with the causes of the critical phenomenon
have been used to nest the papers. The first category advocates the opinion that the
cause is uni-factor, namely the use of pesticides. The second category asserts multi-
factors cause or the absence of an identified cause.
Second, the evolution of each proportion of categorized articles is assumed to be
rebuilt with dynamics of interactions among journalists. Two types of agents are con-
sidered. Some never change their mind with a dispositional view: they are inflexible
agents. Some have a positional view since they may shift their opinion. The respective
proportions of agents follow a function of time and vary only on a year time scale.
Between each pair of consecutive years, the fraction of journalists in each class is in-
ferred from the distribution of opinions using GUF model of opinion diffusion (Galam
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Figure 9.5: Variation of inflexible proportions vT and wT as a function of year.
2005b). The evolution of respective proportions of inflexibles is thus obtained for each
year.
Third, those proportions of inflexibles extracted from the model, are turned back
towards the empirical data to question the interactions between agents. For example
we can question possible pressure on the journalists from the various involved parties.
The GUF model does not suppose any network a priori in order to question quan-
titative text mining evolutions with the results of the simulation. In that context, actors
networks can be questioned with scenarii which include external pressure, social struc-
ture and frame of the debate.
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Abstract
The simplest and best known models of interactions in classical me-
chanics are the ones which describe exchange of energy, of linear mo-
mentum or of electric charge between small macroscopic objects, such as
balls. I will show that the set of principles classically used to account for
what happens in Newton’s cradle does not really account for what happens
in Newton’s cradle and that, moreover, it predicts possible behaviors that
are never observable (this, obviously, is not an original contribution but
the demonstration is not so old and is generally ignored in school books
though it deserves being remembered, and will be useful for the purpose
of this paper).
Simpler even is the model generally used when dealing with signal and
its propagation; it is that model, however, that is almost universally used as
a model of human communication. We will see some of the deplorable and
piteous consequences of that carelessness on the way meaning is studied in
linguistics and on the possible results of such studies. I will suggest a more
serious, though more difficult, way to represent human communication
and will examine its consequences on the linguistic approaches to describe
the meaning of natural language expressions and account for the semantic
phenomena.
10.1 From ball to balls: carelessness as a generalized
intellectual system?
The simplest and best known models of interactions between material entities are the
ones which describe exchange of energy, of linear momentum or of electric charge
between small macroscopic objects, such as balls. Let us examine, for instance, the
typical scenario of Newton’s cradle, when only one of its balls is thrown, as illustrated
in Figure 10.1.
The classical description of the observable interactions can be summed up as fol-
lows:
“When the ball at one end is pulled aside and released it collides with the
remaining stationary balls and the ball at the other end of the row moves
off to reach what appears to be the same height from which the first ball
was released. All the other balls are apparently at rest.”
[Gauld 2006, p.597]
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Figure 10.1: A material realization of Newton’s cradle
A material realization of Newton’s cradle. 2
From this observation, many school books and didactic web pages (erroneously) con-
clude that “the effect of the collision simply consisted in the exchange of velocities
between both balls”3. Considering the situation in which more than one ball is pulled
and released allows to slightly better that conclusion, but, as we will see, not to correct
it. The cases with more than one ball can be described as follows:
If two balls are pulled aside and released, after the collision two balls
move off - again apparently to the same height - with the rest stationary.
Releasing three balls results in three balls moving off after the collision.
In those cases, clearly, velocity is not enough and school books are forced to introduce
the notion of momentum conservation and, for some of them, that of energy conserva-
tion.
More precisely, the ‘explanation’ goes like this:
Ball A (system A) which was separated from the other four (B, C, B0,
A0), after being released, meets the remaining balls (system [B, C, B0,
A0]), and transmits its momentum to the system [A, B, C, B0, A0]. In
the theoretical conditions of the experiment, it is assumed that there is no
loss of momentum or energy. System [A, B, C, B0, A0] then transmits,
energy and momentum to ball A0 (opposite of A), which separates in turn;
the system is thus in a position symmetrical to the initial situation, in which
A0 plays the role of A and vice versa.
However, this reasoning does not explain why A0 moves off alone (and, more gen-
erally, why the number of balls which move off after collision is equal to the number of
balls which provoked collision). Gauld (2006) reveals an interesting but rather startling
fact connected to this lack of explanation: none of the 40 scholar books he studied con-
siders that question as requiring an explanation...
“About one third of about 40 tertiary physics textbooks sampled contained
some reference to Newton’s Cradle [...] However, it is interesting to note
that, in spite of the apparent simplicity of the demonstration, the behaviour
of Newton’s Cradle is not adequately explained in these textbook presen-
tations and there may not even be a fully adequate explanation available
in the physics education literature.”
2This figure comes from http://bestgifever.com/?yes=
be6a165a2b5efd6d6e5e87362965fb6c, under free Creative Commons License. Author: Do-
minique Toussaint; date: 2006/08/08.
3 Translated from the French Wikipedia page on Newton’s Cradle: https://fr.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Pendule_de_Newton (still visible on February 25 2016).
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[Gauld (2006, p.598); my emphasis]
Gauld wryly adds, further on:
“One might excuse teaching which is ignorant of little known facts but
it is less easy to excuse facts about the apparatus which are more easy
to establish such as that the principles of conservation of momentum and
kinetic energy are not sufficient, in themselves, to explain the behaviour
of Newton’s Cradle.”
[ibid., p. 615]
And this enormous cheating (if we may so call what Gauld pointed out) was so, in 2006,
in spite of the fact that Herrmann and Schmälzle (1981) had shown that the use of the
two usual conservation principles (momentum and kinetic energy) is not sufficient to
describe the facts observed.
For instance, in the case of an initial impact with one ball (A), energy and momen-
tum conservation would not prevent that A bounced with a speed equal to one third of
the initial velocity, while A0 and B0 separate with a speed equal to two thirds of the
initial velocity of A.
Indeed, as Herrmann and Schmälzle (1981, p.762) develops:
“Imagine now the following final state: ball 1 moves to the left with v =
( 1/3)v0, balls 2 and 3 move to the right, both with the same speed v =
(2/3)v0. It is easy to confirm that the values of the kinetic energy [Ek] and
the momentum [P ] of this hypothetical final state are the same as those of
the initial state:
Ek = (l/2)m [(l/3)v0]
2 + 2(l/2)m [(2/3)v0]
2
= (1/2)mv20 ,
P = m[( 1/3)v0] + 2m(2/3)v0
= mv0.
Thus energy and momentum would be conserved. Nevertheless, the actual
experiment always evidences another outcome.”
The following fanciful illustration (Figure 10.2) gives an idea of the possible (but not
actual, of course) behavior of the cradle when applying only momentum and kinetic
energy conservation principles.
Since that behavior was never observed, there must be another constraint which the
cradle must satisfy.
Herrmann and Schmälzle (1981, pp. 763-764) argue that “In a non-dispersion-free
system, energy and momentum are distributed throughout the entire arrangement.”,
while what we observe is that the total energy and momentum of the incoming balls is
transferred to the same number of balls at the other end of the chain. They thus pro-
pose a simple explanation involving a third conservation principle, shock wave energy
conservation, allowing the kinetic energy transmitted byA to [A, B, C, B0, A0] to be
transferred without loss to A0, through the initial shock wave. This constraint allows
to take into account the propagation of the double perturbation wave due to the initial
shock, perturbations which travel across the system in each of the two directions, and
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Figure 10.2: Fanciful non-actual behavior of cradle (compatible with the classical ex-
planation).
move backwards after reaching the system ends, without attenuation, and therefore, at
the same speed. It is at the point where the two wave packets meet that the balls sep-
arate; this point must be symmetrical to the point of impact in order for the two wave
packets to travel the same distance before they meet. Figure 10.3 illustrates this point:
Extremely reassuring and fresh did I thus feel the proposal presented in 2010 by
a group of secondary school students to the French Physics Olympiad, and... primed
with the first prize. For they address that specific problem in a way that is both correct
and amusing, and propose a solution which is both amusing and... correct.
In 2010, Nicolas BELIAEFF, Romain HEIMLICH and Baptiste JEANIN, from the
Lycée Jean Eiffel (Dijon, France), formulate their conception of the problem in this
way:
“[Nous] nous sommes alors demandés comment la dernière bille, qui
n’a pas assisté au cours de physique, a pu savoir qu’elle devait conserver
énergie cinétique et quantité de mouvement.”
“[We] then wondered how the last ball, which did not follow the physics
class, could know that it was supposed to preserve both kinetic and mo-
mentum”
[Beliaeff et al. (2010)]
and they immediately propose a hypothetic answer, the validation of which is the
object of their exposition:
« Nous avons alors supposé que ces informations devaient être en-
voyées par la première bille et que le son ou la vibration due au choc
devait contenir ces informations. »
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Figure 10.3: Explanation using the (additional) dispersion-free constraint.
“We then made the hypothesis according to which this information was
sent by the first ball and that sound or vibration due to the initial shock
should contain this information”
[ibid.]
I cannot resist the temptation to show the way in which this hypothesis is discussed and
illustrated in their work, where ludic goes together with lucid, and ‘ludicity’ seems to
be a real warrant for lucidity... a brief sequence of schemata, shown in Figure 10.4, with
their comments, will be enough to give an idea and, I hope, the intellectual pleasure.
10.2 From balls to Human Being: the... impact of com-
munication
The standard communication model used for signal processing, since Shannon (1948)
and Shannon and Weaver (1949), can be summarized in the following proposition:
A sender encodes a message and emits the result of the encoding towards a
receiver, which perceives it in an environment possibly disturbed by other
transmissions (noise), and then performs the decoding.
That conception of signal transmission allowed to give an operational definition of
information: information, within signal study, is the inverse of noise4.
4 Several cynical theorists argue that that is the reason why the century turn, with its ubiquitous glorifi-
cation of public communication, has drowned information in an ocean of noise; in particular in the realm of
scientific research, where the commandment “Publish or perish!” engulfs genuine scientific information in a
tsunami of noxious waffle...
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Figure 10.4: Explanation of the process involved in Newton’s craddle using the hy-
pothesis ‘sound as a messenger’ (adapted from Beliaeff et al., 2010).
The communication model underlying that important work on signal was ‘sold’ to
linguistics, though it was intended only for signal5. Roman Jakobson (1960) did feel
the model was insufficient to account for human verbal communication but believed
that, with a few ‘patches’6, it could be used as a first approximation. A version of
Shannon and Weaver’s signal model, ‘patched’ by Jakobson and simplified ‘for di-
dactic purposes’ (henceforth: STD) is still constantly taught as the model of human
communication ‘discovered’ by Jakobson...
Paying attention to the structure of the Signal Treatment Diagram (STD), as it is
adapted for human communication (with ‘patches’ and ‘didactic’ simplification), one
easily realizes that it is even simpler than the one which does not work for Newton’s
cradle. Figure 10.5 illustrates the model in question.
For linguistic studies, the transmission process is not an object of study; on the
other hand neither the encoding and decoding processes, nor the original and ‘recon-
structed’ messages (illustrated here by compositions of , ,and ) are observable...
However, as any linguist is as good a speaker as any other speaker (which is certainly
true), most of the linguists (mistakenly) consider that the non-observability of the pro-
cesses, of the original message or of the ‘reconstructed’ message poses no problem:
from the output of the sender, the linguist ‘knows’ the message he/she (the sender) en-
coded; and, at the same time, ‘knows’ what the receiver will get when decoding the
5 It seems that the ‘transaction’ was done in spite of Shannon’s doubts, for whom the signal model is not
proper for anything else than signal.
6Cf. the six famous functions of languages he introduced in Jakobson (1960), and which are taught in
practically all the classes of linguistics in France.
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Figure 10.5: STD - an adaptation of the signal model to human linguistic communica-
tion
transmission and ‘reconstructing’ the message7. The discussion of this magic belief is
not the subject of this paper8 and I sufficiently suggested what I think of it (for some,
even too much...): I only intend to show, here, that (independently of its magic touch)
the model in question, STD, is a caricatural simplification of the one that does not work
for Newton’s cradle and, as such, is not likely to work for more complex interactions,
such as human linguistic communication.
If we want to merge the description of what happens in Newton’s cradle and the
description of what, according to STD, happens in human linguistic communication,
we get something that may look like Figure 10.6:
Figure 10.6: A cradle-like approach to the signal-like model of human communication.
where the impact of ball S corresponds to the transmission of the encoded message
through the three balls in the middle, and the separation of ball R corresponds to the
result of decoding the received encoded message. However, when observing the cradle,
the separation of ballR is observable (and the properties of that separation -momentum
7 This would seem absurd to any other researchers and, probably, to any other human being; but not for
most linguists.
8 For elements of that discussion, see, for instance, Raccah (2005), Raccah (2011a), or Raccah (2011b, pp.
154-161); those who read Russian can find in Raccah (2011c) a few proposals for a linguistic experimental
approach to semantics.
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and amplitude- are measurable), while, when observing human communication from
the point of view of STD, as we saw it in the preceding paragraph, whatR understands,
which corresponds to the separation of the ball, is not observable. In addition, in the
cradle, what caused the impact is also observable and its properties measurable, while,
in the signal approach to human communication, again, what precedes the emission of
the encoded message is not observable (let alone measurable).
To make a short story short, the scheme of human communication based on the
signal model (STD) does not predict anything empirically observable: it cannot, thus,
account for anything that would not be believed in advance (in particular, it does not
say anything about how meaning or whatmeaning is constructed by the recipient); and,
of course, it is immunized against scientific refutation.
In the next section, I will discuss several properties a model for human communica-
tion should show and, as a conclusion, I will propose a model of linguistic interaction
which does show these properties and does not suffer from the weaknesses of STD.
10.3 From human being to human being: the... impact
on communication
Regardless of nonsensical but abundant literature bad uses of good but limited models
produce, there are
(i) Observable entities which are transmitted from S to R in a human communication
between them (excluding meanings, intentions or messages), and
(ii) Possible observable reactions by R (excluding what R understood), which may
allow an observer to produce hypotheses about how R understood S’s commu-
nicative move.
Moreover,
(iii) a sufficiently large set of interaction instances necessarily gives the cues which
allow to grasp the semantic rules of a human language; this is so because any
dunce can acquire, and does acquire, a human language in 18-24 months, being
exposed only to speech and human attitudes.
In addition, an acceptable conception of human communication has to take into account
other problems that could not even be conceived within STD:
1. In human linguistic communication, the meaning of what the ‘sender’ is about
to say is accessible to no one (not even him(her)self) before (s)he speaks.9
2. If sound is transmitted indeed (like in the school students conception of the cra-
dle), meaning is not: it is constructed by the ‘receiver’ (in particular, on the basis
of the stimulations that sound occasioned).
3. Understanding a discourse (or any utterance of a human language sequence) does
not involve encoding or decoding10
4. Understanding a discourse (or any utterance of a human language sequence) is
an irrepressible and unconscious activity11.
9 Cf. Raccah (2008), pp. 72-75.
10See Rastier (1995), Raccah (1998), and/or Grillo (2003).
11See Bruxelles and Raccah (1992).
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If we go on exploring what is beyond the sole signal, it is clear that what S transmits to
R (sound), (a) S too perceives it, (b) R (sometimes) reacts to it, (c) S too (sometimes)
reacts to it, (d) S reacts to what she/he perceived of R’s reaction, etc. The picture,
thus, looks much more like the playful approach of the cradle, as presented by the
high school students (with something running in both direction) than like the static
simplification of the ‘linguistic’ model based on the signal model. Figure 10.7 is an
attempt to include these considerations into Figure 10.6:
Figure 10.7: Figure 10.6 with feed back loop
The difficulty we underlined in the last section, the fact that reactions are not neces-
sarily directly observable (in particular, what is understood byR is not directly observ-
able), is not solved but, here, it is not hidden: R’s reaction is present in the schema, and
the experimentalist semanticist must design experiments which will allow to indirectly
observe these reactions. The inclusion of the sort of feed-back loop in the presenta-
tion of what happens in communication allows to avoid two incredible mistakes, due
to STD, which are quite often present in the implicit background of semantic work:
1. Discourse meaning, that the semanticist indirectly observes, and that will help
him/her describe sentence meaning, is not the one (s)he him(her)self built, but
one (s)he can show that this is what the receiver constructed: the last one requires
arguments, while the first is based solely on intuition.
2. In order to be in the position to make (and argue) the hypothesis that the ‘re-
ceiver’ built utterance meaning S for discourse D, in the situation i, it is nec-
essary to take into account the reactions of said ‘receiver’, and make abductive
testable hypotheses about discourse meaning, which could explain these reac-
tions.
Verbal reactions of R are not to be favored: they require interpretation by the seman-
ticist, and thus introduce subjectivity in his/her observation. In the lack of better em-
pirical material, one can be happy with them for a first approximation. However, this
subjectivity regards the same area of research that we want to scientifically explore:
there might soon be biases and conflicts of interest...
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10.4 As a conclusion: a proposal for a model of human
communication
We saw that the conception of human communication, STD, implicitly or explicitly
used by most linguists all over the world is a simplified version of the model used for
the treatment of signal. We also saw that that model is a simpler model of interac-
tions with respect to the one mistakenly used to account for what happens in Newton’s
cradle: in addition to momentum and kinetic energy conservation, another principle is
needed, namely what I called the shock wave energy conservation principle. I showed
that the communication model STD, derived from the signal model, could make no
empirical prediction, and I pointed out that several of its implicit assumptions are er-
roneous. I suggested that, modifying those assumptions implied a radical change in
the conception of human communication, and adding an analogue of the shock wave
conservation principle (which allows to take feedback into account) could yield to a
much more interesting conception of human communication.
If I convinced the reader, I could be satisfied, even though one might argue that
criticizing is easier than proposing... Luckily enough, I do have something to propose,
which stems from all that critical work: a conception of human communication using
language, which proceeds from a more general Communication Activity Representa-
tion conception (CAR). One of the advantages of this conception (from the point of
view of the present paper) is that it does use the reflection developed here about New-
ton’s cradle and the contrast between what is observable (for instance, the separation
of the last ball) and what we use in order to account for it (principles), which is not
observable. Another advantage (which might appear, at first, as an inconvenient) is
that, once the proposal is understood, it seems to be so evident that it becomes difficult
to envisage it as a real original conception of communication. This characteristic is an
advantage because any move that is done to defend the idea that the said conception
is too obvious to be a real original proposal is, ipso facto, an evidence in favor of that
conception...
The proposal, called the Manipulatory Conception of Human Communication Us-
ing Language (in short, MCC) is presented in Figure 10.8:
Figure 10.8: Illustration of the manipulatory conception of human communication us-
ing language.
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The sounds emitted by S do not carry meaning, but act on R to make R construct a
specific meaning for S’s utterance. The meaningRwill create is, as we said, influenced
by S’s utterance, but also depends on R’s knowledge and beliefs: what S produces
(S’s utterance) functions as a set of instructions which R carries out or implement,
and which have the effect of making him/her build this specific sense. R’s internal
process is not conscious: obviously, R may build a conscious a posteriori picture of
‘what happened’ in his/her mind, but the understanding process is not accessible while
it takes place. The process itself is not directly observable: no one can access such
internal processes (and, as we just saw, not even the person in which it takes place),
but, sometimes, the outcome of the process provokes observable facts, which can be
used to formulate abductive hypotheses about some aspects of the process. The process
of meaning construction is also irresistible: the state of being a speaker of some natural
language forces to understand any understandable utterance using that language.
For instance, about one half of the Anglophone American citizens might feel un-
comfortable when hearing the following utterance:
John Doe is a Republican but he is honest
This is so because the hearers cannot understand the utterance if they do not -at least
provisionally, during the time of the process - accept that there is some kind of opposi-
tion between being a Republican and being honest. Interestingly enough, the other half
(if we except the few semanticists that might belong to it) usually do not even notice
that they have to accept such a point of view on Republicans: the semantic instruction
acts unconsciously and irresistibly until it eventually leads to a point of view which is
inconsistent with the hearer’s. When this contradiction does not occur, there is no rea-
son for the hearer to be conscious of all the points of view (s)he had to accept in order
to understand. When the contradiction does occur, the hearer often feels aggressed: for
good reasons since (s)he has been forced to accept (even provisionally) a point of view
which (s)he does not share.
What has just been said about the oral modality is relevant, with very little changes,
for written material. This might surprise because oral and written material differ in na-
ture: each time one reads a written segment, (s)he produces a new utterance, different
from one produced by another reading, and which is usually treated as new oral ma-
terial (a sort of inner voice). However biologically different might be the initial effect
of real sound input from the more abstract effect of a reading, one of the very inter-
esting properties of human language processing is that, at the level of complexity of
semantic treatment, they should not, and cannot, be differentiated: as far as meaning
assignment for natural language expressions is concerned, no distinction is to be made
between inner voice and outer voice. This astonishing property, which is characteristic
of a separate scientific field for the study of language, is certainly related to the level
of abstraction at which the complex processes of understanding take place; it does de-
serve more investigation, but this aspect of the question is both outside the domain of
researches on language as such, and outside the reach of the present work: we will have
to limit ourselves to signal the question.
Although MCC is too general to be a model, it may yield to sound models of
human communication, grasped through its interactive aspect (as we saw in section 2,
this is not true about the conception based on STD): in MCC, there is an observable
input (sound or written material) and there may be observable outputs (reactions), in
such a way that the non directly observable intermediates (meanings, representations,
points of view, beliefs, etc.) can be indirectly observed, in a way analogous to how
momentum, for instance, can be indirectly observed. The relationship between the
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added value of MCC and the correct account for Newton’s cradle is the fact that, in
MCC, S knows whether his/her action on R succeeded by interpreting R’s reactions:
the global effect of the interaction lies thus on the meeting point between the two
actions packets.
Clearly STD and MCC are two incompatible competitive CARs. Now why should
you buy the new CAR I propose? The first reason is, obviously, because your old CAR
is out of order... More seriously, STD blocks the evolution of the accounts of human
communication and of human language semantics because the oversimplified concepts
it uses presuppose, as we have just seen, facts about communication and about language
that we now know wrong. It may have been useful when the tracks leading to findings
about human languages were narrow; but the map of knowledge on this subject has
evolved since that time and you should not use your old CAR in the expressways that
are available for scientifically exploring this territory.
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Abstract
Being an educator or teacher has become a very exacting job. This
study explores the complexity of these professions (Perrenoud, 1999).
This complexity can generate suffering and even lead teachers to aban-
don the profession, especially in socially and economically deprived ar-
eas (Ria, 2009). The root cause of some of this complexity comes from
interactions with young people who are often violent and unpredictable.
Thus the activity of social-sport educators is particularly interesting to
study because unstable behaviors and reactions are amplified. The aim
is to demonstrate that the intervention itself is complex. This comprehen-
sive approach could provide content for the training of future educators.
University-based training that includes the complex content found in the
social sport intervention may be an interesting target. The future educators
would thus be better prepared for real-life professional activity. Modeliza-
tion tests provide an analysis tool for the daily hazards of the profession.
We explore the nature of interactions, their characterization and the events
that lead to instability. Contradictions and alternatives are also explored as
well as the ways educators respond to these situations.
11.1 Introduction and context
Intervening with problematic young people in the area of training and education cur-
rently appears difficult and unforeseeable (Johannès, 2013). For professionals, un-
certainty and the lack of motivation can generate suffering on the job, which results
in educators quitting the job and a high turnover rate. Interaction with a public with
special needs (young school drop-outs, with social and/or family difficulties, deprived
inner-cities sometimes under judicial warrant) cannot be envisaged without a rigorous
professionalism of the social-sport educators (SSE). Our exploratory study attempts –
through modeling - to clarify the complexity of the various interactions during sport
interventions. We advance the hypothesis that the environment composed of the situa-
tions where the educators intervene could be considered a complex system.
11.2 Sport social interactions, a complex system
We consider that the interventional situation, subject of our study, is a complex system
(Bonami et al., 1996; Clergue, 1997; LeMoigne, 2002; Morin, 2005). In each situation,
we have the actors, the stakes, the obstacles, the resources, the tools and the temporality
which give a dramatic dimension during a crisis and for the results. In a paper, Lave
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Figure 11.1: Representation of a complex system
1988, p.150) proposed two dimensions to describe the environment. The “Arena",
which is the objective aspect, permanent of the situation and the “Setting", which = is
the singular, subjective dimensions of the situation, the point of view of a actor. In this
paper, we focus on the “arena".
Figure 11.1 illustrates the complex nature of interventional situation.
Our study takes into account the role of the SSE exposed to a complex environ-
ment. During the decision making process, the SSE composes with contextual con-
straints, available resources (his/her level of expertise) and his/her conception of the
appropriate reaction (moral and educative values). The educator must also employ self-
preservation when confronted with the pressures in this complex environment (Granon
and Changeux, 2011). The educator has a balancing role, maintaining the link that will
enable the situation to remain viable.
11.3 Question for the training course
How to train and prepare to act in a difficult context? The training of educators can
only rely on the predictive model: even a very thorough and rigorous planning of the
activity cannot evacuate hazards and uncertainties. The development of routines – even
numerous ones - will be insufficient in absorbing daily issues (Barrère, 2002; Tardif et
Lessard, 2000). A professional training, which prescribes predefined solutions, will not
allow the educator to adapt ideally to incidents and hazards. In order to deal efficiently
with disruptions, the active strategy must be adapted and transformed (Gelignier, 1979).
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Figure 11.2: Transformed activity
Figure 11.2 shows that the intention of the intervention is an arrow pointing towards
the planned activity. Some ‘noises’, disturbances disorganize the activity. The actor
must simply change his activity (adapted activity) or redefine his activity completely
(transformed activity).
“The action depends on the complexity, that is to say, hazard, chance, initiative, de-
cision. . . "(Morin, 1990, 2005) Training within a complex environment and including
complex tools might be a solution. How can a training module provide a real complex
educational situation? How can the student educator be confronted with and understand
the risks, dysfunctions, surprises linked to the context? How and with what limitations
can this complexity be used for professional development?
11.4 Typical environments which generate tensions and
complexity
The law for freedom and autonomy of the French universities (“LRU" in French) of
August 2007 redefines the public service missions for higher-level teaching (or uni-
versity level teaching) by including the orientation and professional insertion of the
students. Diplomas must now be in phase with the needs (Gayraud et al., 2011).
Clergue (1997) suggests to educate "with and by complexity". The “mobilization
of complex educational situations: that is situations where the causes tangle and ac-
cumulate like in reality and so reinforce the motivation of the student by transforming
the immediate failure into reasons for inventing new solutions” (. . . ). “Every time new
needs emerge from his or her environment, the student progresses” (Clergue, 1997
p.14). In this article, we propose to adapt this view to SSE training, which means to
account for interactions between the different actors.
The analysis of interactions is at the center of our study. The definition of the word
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interaction is the action of entering a situation with the intention of influencing on
how it plays out or to engage an action, an authority, to play a role in the situation,
to act deliberately. The French etymology of the verb “intervenir “ dated in 1363
(“intervener”, “interagir » in French langage) explains that it means to “entrevenir” ie
“to go out and meet other people” (Bloch and Von Wartburg, 1986). Also, intervention
(dated 1322), a word borrowed for the latin entevenire, is considered in the legal area
to be a ‘mediation’. De Montmollin (1977 pp. 20-21) defines social interactions as the
sum of effects that result from the use of words or the actions of others on individual
answers to one’s environment. In this definition, reciprocity is discussed within the
answer of the individual to the social environment.
11.5 Theoretical frame: a systematic approach, com-
plex and situated actions
Professional didactic theories (Samurçay and Pastré, 2004) and the situated action
(Suchman, 1987) are mobilized in order to chart the exercise of the SSE profession.
It is necessary to examine the activity in a given situation, in a familiar environment
in order to diagnose the needs for the training. The activity and technical registries
(Martinand, 1994; Glomeron, 2001) provide us with an analytical activity grid with the
limitations and effects.
The activity is not detachable from the context in which it has occurred and is the
proof of the adherence of the actor to his environment The complex approach sheds
light on the actor’s decision process. The precise moment that marks the arrival of
the disturbances signals the start of the actor’s capacity to adapt (Bénaïoun-Ramirez,
2013).
In order to clarify our postulate, it is possible to introduce into the training the
complexity of the real life situations. This apprenticeship in complexity (Clergue,
1997) seems possible if the reality of the interactions is correctly and systematically
interpreted. This is why it is necessary to fully understand the interactions in real-life
situations and in their evolutions. We seek the appearance of the release mechanisms
and analyze them. We identify the breaks, intermittences and changes which arise from
disorders in the situation. In other words, we ask the question: what is the state of the
system?
Our hypothesis is that the analysis of the situation, its dynamics, the disturbances
and the reorganizations that occur in response could allow a better understanding of
the adaptation and the regulation of the SSE’s competencies. The transformations are
proof of the professional apprenticeship of the future educators.
11.5.1 Methodology
The activity in reference is the socio-sports intervention. The physical activity is orga-
nized by the SSE in such a way that the level of performance is not the only objective.
Sport here is a tool, an object, a social practice, a way to allow these young people,
which lack social and relationship skills, to progress. The SSE is constantly aware of
the need to deal with these vulnerabilities during sport activities. The SSE’s educa-
tional choices are guided by this end point. In the complex, educational interaction
situation, priorities are thus defined. For the actor (SSE) the social-sport intervention
is characterized as a complex system, as represented in Figure 11.3.
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Figure 11.3: Social-sport intervention as a complex system
Our real-life study led us to make observations in those social areas targeted by the
training (Martinand, 1994). These areas are legal youth protection centers, detention
centers, children centers, local associations and regional government bodies. The pro-
fessional activity of 5 educators during 10 sport sessions is the basis for this study.The
observation grid used for the data collection includes the following guide points:
• The elements being interacted
• Type of interactions
• Luck, incident
• Mark of destabilization of actor (attitude, visible emotive expression)
• Alternative decisions: paradox, contradictions to be resolved
• Decision made on the action
• Effect on the action
The educators being observed filled in their own worksheets. Their notes related to the
ongoing intervention or were filled in a while afterwards. They were used in the mod-
eling of the complex systems: the components, the links identified, the interactions and
events of the actions, etc. The interviews with the 10 educators provided further notes
for the worksheets; During each interview, 2 or 3 significant situations were discussed.
The critical moments such as destabilization, incidents or hazards (Glomeron, 2001)
were chosen to observe the professional ability of the SSE in action. From the actor’s
point of view, these critical moments reveal a specific part of the system that should be
modeled and so, we obtained an instantaneous modeling at the desired time. This is
valid to the analysis of interactions, evolutions and the parts of the targeted system .
The analysis is based on the data collected. The components are identified. The
interaction network is constructed. The disorders are characterized. The alternatives
and decisions of the actor are presented. The evolution of the system is identified.
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Figure 11.4: Intervention, a complex system
11.5.2 Results
We were able to analyze the modeled interventional situations and to identify the mo-
ments, triggers that led to destabilization. The analysis of the interactions and the
evolution of this complex system supplies elements about the abilities used in the form
of an “organized improvisation” (Perrenoud, 1999). This provides professionals with
the capacity to make decisions rapidly:
• Type of interactions and the “trigger”events
• Contradictions and alternatives that have to be managed
• Characterization of the interactions
• Technical actions types in interactions
Our study illustrates the different phases of decision-making during a volley ball
session. The components are depicted in Figure 11.4 by points while their active in-
teractions are shown as lines. The components are important elements for the actor
(observed or evoked). The system is an open one and certain components are linked to
outward elements. For example, the equipments can be shared with another actor. The
local project can be linked with other projects. The “citizens’ agenda” is at the heart
of the projects objectives. It is linked to other aspects for the young i.e. good health.
Figure 11.4 includes components that are related to and which are important for the
actor. The actor appears in the heart of the action. We can observe interactions with
the various components of the situation.
Let’s apply this model to sports through the example of Volley ball.
Figure 11.5 represents the different phases of decision-making during a Volley ball
session:
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Figure 11.5: Altercations in sports: volleyball example
1. In red the main interactions. SSE focuses his/her attention on the activity of 2
young people. There is a risk of a sudden altercation between them
2. The central elements of the interaction represented with the large circles
3. SSE increases his/her attention on this interaction : focus
4. The public becomes tense. The initial situation is now perturbed. The relation-
ship installed up to this point is broken. This is a key moment for the evolution
of the system
It thus becomes necessary to reorganize the structure of the situation in order to keep
moving on.
We identify this as a decisive moment in the decision making process. The SSE has
to rely on educative tools systems. A choice must be made between:
1. Maintaining the progress of the session and staying in conformity with what was
planned. Risk: could be contagious and increasingly disturbing
2. Stopping the progress of the entire group in order to deal with the two perturbing
elements
3. Reorganizing then resuming the activity.
The observational answer is the following one: the situation is reorganized in its normal
context and the incident replayed. This incident becomes the basis for a new activity.
It can be said that some elements of the system are inhibited, others liberated. The
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Figure 11.6: Conflit regulations and inhibitions
Figure 11.7: Different analytical levels of the SSE activity
strategy consists in changing the direction of a given situation without stopping it. A
secondary complexity emerges, shown in Figure 11.6.
The objective of this first study is to describe and explain this complex system with
its interactions, issues and schedule reorganizations. While observing a social sport ex-
ercise orientated towards a fragile public, several analytical levels of the SSE activity
can be perceived, which can combine and influence each others, as shown in Figure
11.7. However, while this analytic division is easy to understand, it does not function
so well when applied to the decision making process. Even for a local level decision,
the SSE must take into account the interactions between the different levels. Appro-
priate decisions must be made within a systematic and multi-layered network. In order
to illustrate this, we have attempted a multi-layered approach, as presented in Figure
11.8. Even if the links between the levels are taken into consideration, the analytical
approach does not adequately reflect reality. These different levels are constantly and
simultaneously inter acting. We comment on the repetitive structure at the different
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Figure 11.8: Intervention analysis layers
levels. “We can characterize the complexity such as the emergence of different levels
within the same system’ (Clergue, 1997, p. 18). Thinking should systematically be
organized from micro to macro and vice versa.
One method could be to focus on one level. However, when concentrating on the
macro level, we would ignore elements from the micro level that might affect the macro
level. Thus in our comprehensive method we must analyze the system entirely. A
structuring axis exists that organizes all levels so that they coherently perform. This
axis represents the endpoint of the SSE’ profession i.e. the ability to educate and rein-
tegrate the young minors. We perceive the different levels to be coherent. The micro
level is the situation proposed by the educator. The “meso” level is the group of activ-
ities with an objective leading to transformation for the young (a sport project). The
macro level is the educative project for the young (individual and group). In the pre-
vious example, the incident observed at a micro level (altercation between two of the
young people) is the beginning of the activity rebuilding by the SSE who keeps in mind
the educational objectives while concentrating on some of the young people. The abil-
ity of the SSE is reflected in the capacity to face and manage these incidents. His/Her
decision takes into account several factors as discussed below. He/She may intervene
and maintain an equilibrium while protecting himself / herself. No renouncement of
values and bearing in mind the feasibility and compatibility of the educative target. In
this work, we focus on the “trigger" moments. These are the moments when a change
of direction, disorder, destabilization but also creative adaption appear. “we are always
tempted to control through order but disorder allows for creative activity” (Le Moigne,
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Figure 11.9: Modeled complex system
Table 11.1: Opposite feeling an SSE has to face
Commitment - Pleasure vs compliance - constraint
Opposition - individualism vs cooperation - Shared
Urgency - immediate - pulse vs long term
Contingency - uncertainty vs adaptation planning - anticipation
take care of one person vs assume collective project
1999).
11.6 Typical events
We have identified temporal and functional markers of the decision-making process.
These "triggers" generate a need for adjustment, adaptation, decision making, action
in context. The triggers identified in this study are the following: altercation - conflict;
resistance to the action - inertia - refusal to share - fold; Non-compliance - inappropriate
action; risk taking (for self and / or others); questioning of authority; form of "anomie"
(foiling rules - social disorder). We also found different types and mode of interactions:
verbal and non-verbal modes (gestures, eye contact), close to the point of conflict or
with distance (inter-individual distance).
Human interactions in the sports situation comply with the nature of the actions
described in the life of a modeled complex system, shown in Figure 11.9.
In fact, the actor manages the contradictions and paradoxes depending on how he
experiences opposite feelings presented in Table 11.1.
In making a decision, the SSE is exposed to contradictions and antagonisms. This
is another element to consider in training. Clergue (1997, p.131) wonders whether
"learning, which is essentially a nonlinear dynamic phenomenon, could not also find
these state changes involving profound changes?" We believe that these bifurcations
are elements favoring change and adaptation.
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11.7 Action registers, registers of technicality
The action in these situations requires some technical interactions. They are technical
(Combarnous, 1984) when three interacting elements are present: a technical ratio-
nality in process, the actor taking a role, a specialization, and the use of machinery
(equipment, appliances). This technicality is implemented in different registers of ac-
tion (Martinand, 1994). More precisely, four technical action registers can be used:
The register of control is represented by the professionals. The register of partici-
pation is the ability to play a guided role; for example a beginner, novice. The register
of reading and interpretation is the ability to "read" the practice, to identify indicators.
The register of modification implies innovation, transformation, invention.
This should be kept in mind while building the training session. However, the
results of the characterization of registers (Glomeron, 2001) show that a training that
insists on control of the action is not the most relevant, this register being not sufficient.
The SSE action is often composed of several registers. To this end, extracts from
interviews speak by themselves: The register of control: “However, it is a sport that
I have practiced for a long time at the club and I felt at ease, probably too much so.
Finally, I was not able to handle the situation”.
That is a good example of control and planning that is not efficient.
The register of participation: “Young people do not want to participate. However,
afterwards with the speaker, I gained confidence. I saw that I could regularly intervene
with young people, even to change their positions”.
The register of reading and interpretation. “Even when I’m not near the action I
constantly monitor and listen. As soon as I feel it, I can intervene very quickly. That is
what is most important to me”.
The register of modification: “We have changed roles and I made concessions
regarding compliance to the rules. If I don’t act as is, the whole group will disagree
with me. On the contrary, they were ok with my decisions. As they have really made an
effort, I think next time I will be able to come back to the real rules”.
In teaching physical practice, a continuous and strict control of rules and technicals
is not relevant because of uncertainty and difficult settings. The tool used, i.e. the sport,
even when perfectly mastered by the teacher, does not absorb hazards generated by an
audience of young offenders, within the socio-sporting interventions. The same study
shows that technocratic rigor can block the overall project. A too rigid strategy can
inhibit planned action, stop the operation. The efficiency of the SSE to maintain the vi-
ability of the system depends on its ability to manage different registers of technicality.
11.8 Discussion
Some principles of action appear repeatedly in these cases and these contrasting situa-
tions and are summarizes in Figure 11.10. This is the reason why professional’s actions
are often “ do-it-yourself actions", and appear to come from “controled improvisation”
(Perrenoud, 1983). This “ controled improvisation" is a contextualization, a possibility
of action in a personal adaptation to the situation. It is based on constructed, organized
but flexible principles.
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Figure 11.10: Common principles of action
11.8.1 Modes of action and decision-making
The management of uncertainty in professional situations requires the ability to think at
several technical levels. The SSE must be able to adapt himself to the environment and
has to be flexible. It also seems that this kind of flexibility helps to keep some "clarity"
and ability to "think" adaptation. This is the reason why the analysis of decision-
making is done at different levels of the system (micro, "meso" and macro) and in
various time frames.
11.8.2 How to train in the complexity of the interactions
We were able to identify the criteria of "authenticity" and relevance of the situations
that will expose students to the complexity of reality. Some examples are listed below:
• Confront the students with professional problems;
• Allow triggers, bifurcations, emergence;
• Enforce the treatment of contradictions and decision making;
• Need the commitment of the actor;
• Provoke reactions, emotions to be managed;
• Put the player in a dynamic adaptation;
• Avoid blocking or permanent withdrawal;
• Seek collective commitment (support, resources, complementarity);
• Solicit qualities of "hyper-responsiveness" and upper vigilance;
• Develop the acceptance of test and error;
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11.9 Conclusions
Through this study, we have verified our hypothesis : the complex approach provides
valuable elements for training. Therefore we can say that the SSE can be confronted
to the complexity of reality in workshops. It showed major benefits for their training.
Situation modeling, or interaction modeling in a multi-levels approach provide keys for
training. In training, the system of interactions in sports clearly shows the importance
of the work in an environment made of complexity. It is useful to expose future educa-
tors to these environments so they can learn the many factors influencing the sequences
of actions.
The multilevel modeling reveal the need for joint actions who incorporate the con-
cerns of other professionals. Once shared between professionals, the structuring axis
gives coherence to all the actions of the various actors, and fits into decision-making at
this level.
11.9.1 To open up new horizons
Beyond this study, this is a new challenge for training the SSE : to accept, integrate
uncertainty in initial training. Thus, the professional specialized in difficult publics
will be able to adapt. This uncertainty, that is wished and mobilized by the trainers,
can contribute to building large skills to overcome the difficult environments.
By analyzing the activity of professionals, action logics can be characterized with
some degree of “authenticity”. These modeling actions can contribute to the situations
of training and help to become aware of the complexity of the reality. To intensify this
point of view, Rogalski and Leplat (2011, p.24) show “the importance of the variability
of situations and disruptions in (the acquisition of) basic skills”. For the future, we
hope to validate the findings of this study in two different manners: by testing them
with more cases, and with different contexts. We may want to transpose to other work
environments facing the same issues, that is to say intervention in schools. We can also
think about the existence of the typical profiles of the actors and/or the existence of the
preferential registers of action which show a trend the more important flexibility and
adaptability in emergencies in a complex system.
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Abstract
Teachers’ speech is a professional gesture based on a certain design
idea of the profession ethic and a certain way of seeing pupils. This is
especially true for assessment, firstly because it’s a powerful indicator of
the teacher’s professional identity, and secondly because it has a powerful
impact on pupils, the image of themselves and therefore the resources they
have to make progress. School issues seem important.
We wish to analyse the interactions in class, words that teachers use
to address to their pupils, to highlight a number of linguistic elements to
define the positions of teachers, knowing that these positions have conse-
quences in terms of learning, in terms of language but also cognitively.
The research presented is based on the analysis of five marking ses-
sions conducted by five different teachers third grade of primary school. It
seeks to highlight some pragmatic and linguistic elements, to build a first
categorization of teachers’ postures to model interactions.
12.1 Introduction
The vast amount of research focusing on the movement of speech at school all agree on
one point: the teacher speaks a lot, and the student mostly listens. The teacher speech
is estimated from 60 to 80 % in an oral classroom context (Dolz & Schneuwly, 1998;
Bucheton, 2009; Mercier-Brunel & Jorro, 2009). The remaining time is then shared
between pupils, depending on their abilities and on their status in class (Sirota, 1988).
These linguistic dimensions, as well as anchoring identities and the values and plans
that are affiliated to them, are too often left implicit and related to the teacher’s skills
and charisma (Bucheton, 2008).
Our aim is to analyze the language used by teachers when talking to their pupils,
in order to highlight a certain number of linguistic elements (De Nuchèze, 2001) and
to suggest modelization of interactions in class, knowing that these interactions have
repercussions on learning, as regards to a linguistic but also a cognitive aspect (Guerin,
2011). School-related issues seem to be considerable.
12.2 To think speech in class
12.2.1 From the institution’s point of view
Since the early 20th century, curriculums have significantly evolved in regard to the role
of oral communication in class, expressing the fact (or not) that school used to consider
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that it was part of its duty to teach pupils how to communicate orally. Studying the last
hundred years alone, it appears that the teaching of French in the 1923 and 1938 cur-
riculums was aiming at “a beautiful language and a beautiful literature”, as well as a
strengthening of national unity. The 1971-1972 curriculums appear to be exceptions,
for they define oral according to oral exchanges deriving from "real experience sit-
uations, or game situations", highlighting a kind of speech authenticity. The 1985
curriculum backtracks on this progress and lapses into a form concern, to the detriment
of substance. In 2002, 2007 and 2008, official instructions gradually placed oral at the
service of disciplinary fields - within the framework of the triptych speak/read/write,
where the speech of pupils had to be useful and obey precise school models. The com-
mon core of competences leads teachers to split off between an oral taught in a syntaxic
aim (competence 1), and an oral instructed in a discursive purpose (competence 5 and
6), "as if, from all eternity there had been language first, and then the ways of using
it" (François, 1998).
12.2.2 About research
Research contributions to oral in class have also significantly evolved. In the 1970s,
researchers like H. Romian and the Groupe Langue Orale tried to develop the prob-
lematic of oral at school. In the 1980s, several linguists worked to renew the approach
of verbal exchange, by no longer considering oral as a degraded written form (Peytard,
1970), but as a specific object (Culioli, 1983) inducing another way to mean (Blanche-
Benveniste & Jeanjean, 1987; Gadet, 1989). Analytical tools were created (Kerbrat-
Orecchioni; 1986, 1990), and corpus analyses were made (Bange, 1987; Cosnier &
Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1987).
However, educational sciences really started focusing on pupils’ speech in the
1990s. For example Nonnon’s numerous works whose analysis has continually evolved,
from verbal interaction (1986 & 1990) to discursive behaviour (2001). She studied
closely the existing links between speech and cognition. Halté and the CRDF team
from the University of Metz also analyzed classroom interactions based on the hypoth-
esis of a language activity constituent of learning, and observed that “oral was less
taken into account” (Halté, 2006). The Geneva Schneuwly team built a paradigmatic
classification of didactic situations relating to oral, and suggested a series of peda-
gogic devices (Dolz & Schneuwly, 1998), as interview and radio programs. These
ones are based on Piaget and Vygotski ’s language development theories, as well as
on Bakhtin’s secondary speech genres. Finally, there are also the INRP works, with
its two main research teams: one of them based on the corpus analyses collected in
classroom, and suggesting various conclusions (Grandaty & Turco, 2001), the other
addressed to teachers in order to show them the importance of working on oral skills in
the classroom, in the final aim of offering them sessions, as well as offering them some
thoughts on discovery learning, assessment and remediation (Garcia-Debanc & Plane,
2004).
All of this research enabled, among other things, to show that it is in the course
of actual exchanges - i.e. with actual issues, other than those implied by answering a
teacher’s questions about the current lesson, or by mechanically repeating a sentence
- the development of language know-how is at stake, and that the latter has real con-
sequences on the developing of knowledge in general, as well as on language mastery,
but also on the way of comprehending the world.
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12.3 Teacher’s speech
12.3.1 Evaluative speech
We are interested in the analysis of teachers’ speech regarding its relatively stable as-
pects, and because it influences pupils’ positioning.
The first point is about finding the element of this speech which calls out to the
listener’s singularity regarding his referential, emotive and conative functions at the
same time. Indeed, we decided to focus on this subject since “the individual is recog-
nizable by its elocutions which can be qualified as evaluative” (Ricoeur, 1990), and the
evaluative utterances are ubiquitous in classroom situations.
There is no doubt that this evaluative speech has a strong influence, whether be-
cause academic functioning implies a dialect relationship between assessment by teach-
ers and the leaner’s self-regulating process (Allal, 2007), or because academic judg-
ment has undeniable psychological consequences on pupils (Barlow, 1992; Bressoux
& Pansu, 2005).
Actually, evaluative utterances seem to be heterogeneous in the classroom’s daily
context with rather immediate consequences but varied forms, from the closure or ver-
dict, to an index, evocative or inchoate appearance (Jorro, 2003). The question of
the teacher’s efficiency seems to hinge on this kind of feedback on pupils’ action, de-
pending on their contingency, targeting and corrective dimension in case of a student’s
mistake (Carhay, 2007).
12.3.2 Definition of the selected linguistic indicators
Based on what was stated above, we took an interest in the nature of contingency of
evaluative feedbacks and the way of approaching it. The first studied indicators in the
teacher’s speech are the types of statements corresponding, according to Benveniste
(1966), to “three fundamental behaviours of speaking and acting through speech”: the
assertive, the interrogative and the imperative (injunctive).
These types then raise the question of certainty (Ducrot & Schaeffer, 1995), intro-
ducing three modalities: the possibility/capacity or apodictic truth - alethic modality -,
what the teacher faces during the exchange or what he or she is sure of because it falls
within his knowledge in the field - epistemic modality, and what he or she allows and
what he or she imposes - deontic modality.
But other than these aspects that could be defined as illocutionary, there are in-
dicators referring to perlocutionary values present in the utterances, that is to say the
perlocutionary effect intended and/or reached by the teacher’s speech, in terms of de-
mand, persuasion, induction and guidance, according to which effect is observed in the
behaviour, the beliefs, the feelings (Vermersch, 2007) or the cognitive processes of the
pupils respectively.
From there, we have established a first series of elements that aim towards a pre-
categorization of the teachers’ evaluative utterances studied here and presented in Table
12.1.
12.3.3 Complementary enunciative indicators
One of the interesting aspects of evaluative utterances lies in the strong enunciative
dimension that cannot be perceived by the previous pre-categorization that is more di-
rected towards other functions of language. We thus suggest returning to look at some
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Table 12.1: Categorization of teacher’s evaluative uttertances
Indicators concerning the
teacher’s utterances
Types
Assertion
Question
Injunction
Modalities
Alethic (apodictic vs hypothetical)
Epistemic (knowledge vs supposition)
Deontic (right vs duty)
Demand (order, request)
Perlocutionary Persuasion (argumentation, demonstration)
values Induction (manipulation, rhetoric)
Guidance (support, inquiry)
of Kerbrat-Orecchioni’s works in which she tries to explore the traces of the utterer’s
subjectivity in his or her words using what she calls subjectivèmes (subjective markers)
(Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2006). To do so, she relies on the affective and evaluative dimen-
sions - in qualitative and quantitative terms and she notices amongst others three types
of indicators.
Deictic markers make it possible to place the action on a self-centered spatial-
temporal level. We will study personal pronouns, subjects or complements that make
it possible to place the process in terms of its author and its object. Here we will focus
on a pragmatic dimension, especially in the context of exchange situations in the class-
room, that is to say the type of address and the way the teacher creates a link with the
group. The differences are noticeable between a general and a targeted you is: “You
didn’t learn that lesson” addressed to the whole class or just some of the pupils? Sim-
ilarly, is the use of we in “Do we agree?” purely rhetorical or does it really speaks to
the pupils? Amongst the deictic markers, there are also spatial demonstratives which
are often responsible for the difficulties pupils have when decoding: in “This isn’t cor-
rect” or “You made a mistake here”, the reference is often about a sum of elements that
pupils have difficulties distinguishing. Temporal demonstratives also raise a problem:
“What did I tell you last week?” does not help the pupils who know precisely what
they will learn and who establish links with the previous lessons - which is rarely the
case with pupils in difficulty to whom these questions are often addressed.
Affective markers are another kind of subjectivèmes that mark an emotional com-
mitment from the speaker towards what he or she is referring to. It should be noted that
if certain types of speech claim they proscribe these kinds of terms, notably because
they aspire to a form of neutrality, they remain in fact very present in evaluative syn-
thesis - “Disappointing results” - and in dialogues - “I really like your text”, “Your test
turned out terrible”. The matter is less about the evaluated object strictly speaking than
it is about what it provoked in the assessor, while a competent assessor goes unnoticed
(Jorro, 2000).
Non-axiological evaluatives have a qualifying aspect in respect to a certain scale.
They rely on a double norm inside the object and specific to the speaker. In other
words, the use of an evaluative adjective is related to the idea that the speaker has of
the evaluative norm. For instance, “There are too many mistakes” typically refers to the
acceptable amount of mistakes that can be made while doing a given task, according to
the assessor.
Finally, axiological markers bring a value judgment to the evaluative utterance and
pupils rarely put enough space between performance and capacity. It is thus common
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that pupils go from “Your maths test was bad” to “I am bad at maths”. One can wonder
if a “It is very poor”, thrown out while giving back a test, is in fact addressed to the per-
formance or to the pupil? (Barlow, 1992). The field observation shows the importance
of the axiologicals in the teachers’ evaluative utterances, often supported by non verbal
actions - a hand on the shoulder versus arms crossed, an open and smiling face versus
eyes lifted towards the ceiling. “Congratulations” and “well done” are not as clear as
they seem either: if they refer to a good action, the question is then good for whom?
For a teacher that has set himself or herself objectives, good might refer to everything
that helps him or her reach them (Mercier-Brunel & Jorro, 2009). Now, not all these
objectives are oriented towards the quality of the learning.
12.4 Application to a corpus
12.4.1 Research site
The data was collected in 2008 in four CE2 classes (3rd grade) from the same school in
order to minimize the institution effect (consequences of the sociological context). The
pupils were between 7 and 10 years old - most of them were 8. It was decided to work
at this level because the Official Instructions are more precise regarding (oral practices)
within various frameworks and they impose a precise definition of school subjects (for
instance history, geography and science belong to a field called “world discovery”).
The school is located in a rather privileged neighbourhood in the centre of Nice.
Half of the pupils have a rather wealthy background - children of middle management
and liberal professions -, the other half come from more modest or even precarious
environments - social housing or emergency shelters can be found in the same area
where the school is located. Two thirds of the more modest families belong to the
working class and are of foreign origin.
These four classes have 26 to 28 pupils, which is a lot for primary school. On
average, the school has classes of 25.5 pupils. As the school is not in a deprived area,
this is a standard rate for a city as important as Nice.
12.4.2 Data collection process
The five filmed sessions all followed identical protocols: a 20-minute correcting ses-
sion after lunch. The corrected exercises had to correspond to the classes’ daily work.
However, the duration of each session differs for practical reasons - breaks, teachers’
wishes - and for consistency - longer or shorter activities, faster-working or slower-
working pupils. The five sessions below were recorded between the end of October
and the end of November, 2008.
The profile of each teacher is quite different and summarized in Table 12.2. Chris-
tine was filmed during a 34-minutes group correcting session. For a grammar exercise,
the pupils had to find individually “what the pronoun referred to”.
Mathieu was filmed for 44 minutes during which time he and his class corrected
several exercises related to types of sentences and conjugation of the verbs ‘have’, ‘be’
and ‘go’ in the present.
Geneviève corrected exercises on the value of numbers and the various figures
composing numbers following decimal systems. Her session lasted 31 minutes.
Viviane corrected mathematics for 36 minutes: in the various exercises, pupils had
to find a specific number in a list following given instructions such as parity or the
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Table 12.2: Teacher’s profile
Christine Geneviève Léa Mathieu Viviane
Age 45 52 29 35 48
Experience as a teacher 17 years 10 years 5 years 12 years 17 years
Experience teaching CE2
(3rd grade)
13 years 4 years 4 years 4 years 11 years
Number of pupils 26 27 26 27 26
figures composing it.
Léa corrected three geometry exercises for 22 minutes. The pupils had to find right
angles in various geometric shapes, using a set square.
12.5 Categorization of the teacher’s discourses
Although each teacher cannot be defined as using a single type, modal construction or
subjectivème, we noticed some unexpected combinations, sometimes with alternations
between two combinations.
During the first part of her session, Christine is characterized by her use of several
injunctions, a few highly inductive questions and more and more axiological markers.
This seems to put a correcting routine into place, each questioned pupil being firmly
guided to give answers in a specific order. This discourse has been identified as “rou-
tine creating”.
Teacher (T): (to Anouar) So, have we to read the one ?
Anouar: No
T: No we haven’t / it will be for doing exercice you’re right / good / we ?
A little while after that, Christine starts to speak less but gets into longer dialogues
with the pupils she is questioning (reaching 4 to 6 Q&A with a single pupil). Her
questions become more about guiding than inducing an answer (i.e. the pupils can no
longer guess the answer because of the question, but they know where to look), the
affective subjective markers are more numerous and the personal pronouns are in the
singular.
T: She / the teacher / it’s feminine / and so ? / it was good what you’ve just tell before
Angelo: She is alone
T: So you’ve chosen ? /
Angelo: The / the / singular
T: Right / very good / thanks
She also seems to focus on a selection of pupils, guiding them both to find the
answer and to secure them emotionally using a supervising discourse.
Genevieve alternates two types of combinations during the entire session. The first
one is based on injunctions and a few highly inductive assertions, a lot of axiological
markers and deontic modal constructions. Her discourse is about “imposing a routine”.
Contrary to Christine, this routine is previously created instead of being co-built during
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the sessions.
T: So / how many one hundred euros bills would you give / for nine hundred and twenty
nine ?
Emie: Nine
T: Nine / how many ten euros bills / Steven / for nine hundred and twenty nine ?
Steven : Two
T: Two / and how many one euro coin will you give ?
The second combination is essentially made of highly inductive questions (the
pupils guess the answer half the time), numerous deictic markers indicating the key
elements to solve the problem and alternations between personal pronouns in the sin-
gular (student being questioned) and in the plural (class being questioned).
T: So / who doesn’t agree ? / (to interrogated pupil) how do you read that / the number
you wrote ? / where have you to place the decade ?
Margot: Six hundred and one
T: (to Solène) Wait / she realize she was wrong
Her discourse is about “taking charge of the procedure”.
Léa, the youngest teacher, seems to be using a single combination made of in-
junctions (personal pronouns in the singular and deontic modal constructions) and in-
terrogations (personal pronouns in the plural and epistemic modal constructions). Her
speech is only slightly inductive and contains just a few affective and axiological mark-
ers.
T: Elyes / how do you put your template ?
Elyes: Well like this
T: You put the corner / on the angle’s corner / you put a side / on the figure’s side
It seems like she wants to firmly regulate the pupils’ position individually and their
procedures collectively using a normalizing discourse.
Mathieu is the one who uses the highest number of assertions, with many alethic
and epistemic modal construction aimed to guide. His feedbacks are not very explicit,
which means there are few subjective assessment markers and many inductions.
T: Yes rather it’s an order / it could be an advice / depending of the context [. . . ]
T: Yes it’s right / it’s right they resound / how could I explain / there are verbs / which
are / euh / which you didn’t use / with every person / so / it’s tricky
He seems to present himself as owning the knowledge, using an apodictic dis-
course. Then, as he is pressed for time by the end of the session, he uses more evalua-
tive axiological markers, inductive injunctions and a lot less guidance, therefore opting
for a session leading discourse.
Viviane started her session with many highly inductive questions, a few injunctions
and very short assessment markers. She focuses on the pupils’ theoretical knowledge
about which she asks for explanations through an epistemic discourse. Later on, her
speech becomes shorter, the pronouns in the singular are replaced by plural and she
focuses more on the rest of the class than on the pupil who is correcting to validate or
invalidate the answers. Her questions are very slightly inductive and can sometimes
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guide but are mostly neutral.
T: I’m odd / so it’s 63 / do you agree with him / others ? [. . . ]
T: Kevin doesn’t / who is wrong ? / could you explain to me where it come from ? one
of the two who are wrong ?
It becomes difficult for the pupils to know what she wants and if their answers are
right, and they have to build their approach with the class rather than with the teacher.
Her discourse is based on postponed assessment.
12.6 Synthesis and perpespectives
This categorization of teachers’ evaluative speeches, that we chose not to develop any
further, enables us to rebuild a certain pedagogical intentionality and find a way to in-
volve the pupils through the words of the teachers. Consequently, we can see positions
developing, with a withdrawal in supervision encouraging the pupils’ investment with
Viviane, securing and targeting for Christine, turned towards leadership with Mathieu
and towards correcting with Léa and Geneviève.
These various discourses allow the pupils to be part of the exchange in different
ways. For instance, we have noticed that pupils tend to simply answer the ques-
tions with Mathieu or Léa, while they try to verbalize their intellectual approach with
Geneviève or Viviane. In the first case, the method is pre-established, but in the second
the method is created on the spot. Furthermore, we have noticed that the secure feeling
felt with Christine allows inferences that are not always relevant to the exercise but
interesting for the understanding of the thought process.
The data exposed here is part of a wider set of results and shows why a linguistic
categorization of the teachers’ evaluative discourse is necessary to reveal its effects on
the implication of pupils in the class exchanges, which we know to be at the basis of
school education. In relation to this subject, we only refer to the socio-constructivist
works in didactics done on mathematics and French. This data is therefore an interest-
ing tool for research as well as training - teachers can understand the impact of their
evaluative comments on their pupils’ education.
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Abstract
The reform of teacher training called in French "masterisation" implies a
reflection on teaching disciplinary situations during the initial training and
leads to a new analytical focuses on the interactions between the teacher
and his student’s framework. The question of complexity is an essential
issue and we are confronted to a real problem of didactics. "Building
Teachable" raises the question of training situations proposed to students,
allowing them to encounter a part of the reality of their future occupa-
tion. The disciplinary orientation used is that of "situated action". This
approach will be complemented by the theoretical framework of symbolic
interactionism and by a proxemic analysis. Seven students of 5th year
supervise a gymnastics lesson. This lesson is completely filmed and pro-
vides support to analyze the activity of the trainee teacher. Three registers
of analysis will be used for this exploratory study: (1) planning lessons,
(2) the video, (3) collective post activity discussions. The results show
three major points: (1) trainee teachers have built a planned design “teach-
able”, (2) teachable is an unfinished construction, (3) trainee teachers build
strategies to control some variables of the "education" system. Changing
the posture of the student in a self-organized situation generates a dynamic
engagement. The workshop of professional practice is a tool to build the
"teachable" in a training framework that integrates complexity.
13.1 Introduction
In his letter from October 5 2010 (see Appendix 13.8), the Minister in charge of Higher
Education and Research wished that the initial training teacher education would be fur-
ther developed, more particularly by insisting on how this reform could be implemented
in higher education institutions. The importance of teacher training for any nation does
not need to be reminded. Similarly, it would be an illusion to believe that this training
could follow an immutable pattern which we alone could define contents and modali-
ties. Society is evolving and changing, so it is essential that teacher training integrates
these changes (Lessard, 2000). Moreover, international experience clearly shows that
all nations are also involved in the recurring process of reform of initial training without
an ideal solution to make consensus among all stakeholders (Jolion, 2011). Therefore
reforms are not to be questioned.
Moreover it seems a pity that, although the competitive exam (to become a teacher)
is a necessity, no one has imagined a system which would allow to measure the num-
ber of students, the relative flux of the various sectors, the monitoring student profiles
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whether in degrees preparing for the exam or without preparing.
This feeling of disconnection between competitive exam and teaching is unani-
mously felt and criticized by students when they prepare themselves to become pri-
mary school teachers or secondary school teachers (Jolion, 2011). This point will be
widely commented upon as it is the major pitfall of this reform. Contest requirements
sometimes seem distant from what is required as a teacher. Teaching is interacting
with students. Teaching is transmitting knowledge and making sure that students learn
something. The competitive examination does not prepare for this interaction.
The aim of the reform is to improve the training of future teachers and enable them
to acquire a greater vocational qualification.
Teaching is not an art but a profession (Mérieu, 1989) that can be learned and the
practice must be accompanied. Who can doubt that today’s pupils, living in a culture of
immediacy, who are both at the center of the world and more isolated than ever, require
a renewed pedagogy that cannot be reduced only to the individual charisma?
The "masterisation" involves changes in the implementation of teaching and in the
reflection skills to be acquired. A new analytical framework is born around interactions
as the basis for the training of future teachers. It’s all about innovation and helping fu-
tures physical education teachers use problem-solving skills to figure learning situation
out on their own. The question of complexity (Clergue 1997, Morin, 2005) is an es-
sential issue and we are confronted to a real problem of didactics. The framework of
complexity highlights the fact that is not only a sufficient conceptual idea, but it calls
for major developments towards the analysis of the activity in a training situation: what
we call here the construction of "Teachable". "Building Teachable" raises the question
of training situations proposed to students (spatial and temporal organization, interac-
tion with pupils, choice of teaching contents, provide feed-back to students), allowing
them to encounter a part of the reality of their future occupation (Blanchart-Laville,
1998). Figure 13.1 represents this analytical framework.
The complexity lies in the interaction between the implementation of training sit-
uations, didactic obstacles arising, the institutional framework and the construction of
professional skills.
In their face-to-face relations in the public arena human beings are engaged in scan-
ning or reading each other and, in turn, presenting themselves through externalization
so that they are read in appropriate ways by others who are scanning them. Frame
analysis reveals the complexity of social activities and it brings out the arbitrary na-
ture of any fixed, social-domain or activity-based dichotomy between what is "staged"
and what is "real". The teaching profession shows the presence of a complex system.
This system is built by interactions through a proxemic space , ritualized and temporal
(Baeza, 2012).
Symbolic interactionism is a micro-level perspective which focuses on how daily
interactions create and maintain social order. Social interaction generates the order that
changes adaptively to internal and external constraints, resources, and power. Complex
adaptive transformation focuses on the self-organizational behavior of complex, dy-
namic systems, and the interaction of such systems with each other. “Complex systems
have a self-organizational process that emerges out of the nature of the properties of
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Figure 13.1: Analysis model of physical education teacher training.
their component parts” (Siegel, 2003).
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the establishment of self-organized sit-
uations generates among students, future Physical Education teachers, a real dynamic
of change. Self-organized situation allows to built the “teachable”.
13.2 Framework
The disciplinary orientation used is that of "situated action" (Suchman, 1987) that un-
derlies the idea that any action is highly dependent on material and social circumstances
in which it takes place. The actions are still socially and physically situated and the sit-
uation is essential to the interpretation of the action. Suchman (1987) insists on the
changing complexity of situations and on the "opportunistic" reactivity of the actors to
environmental contingencies.
This approach will be complemented by the theoretical framework of symbolic
interactionism. Interactionism and especially the paradigm developed by Goffman
(1974) focuses on the rituals of interaction and face to face interaction. From the dif-
ferent types of rituals proposed by Goffman, it is possible to transpose in a constraining
school context:
- “Presentation Ritual”: Our behaviour enables our pupils to perceive how we
consider them and how we will deal with them in the next classes. The distance
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between the teacher and his pupils reveals the presence of this ritual. In order to
belong to the space of the group, the teacher must come in.
- “Confirmation Ritual”: Conveying an image of ourselves to others as well as
emphasizing the attention we pay to others. The teacher has some obligations
(pedagogical and institutional). For that purpose, he uses pedagogical and didac-
tic strategies and tools.
- “Reparation Ritual”: It takes place when some incidents may damage the ped-
agogical relation. It is all the more important when the teacher wants to build
a dynamic by meeting the expectations of pupils and making the group work.
When people are together, unexpected events may occur that can break the ini-
tial balance within that group. Under those circumstances, the teacher will have
to restore the balance in order to maintain his authority.
Goffman (1974) has assumed that this maintenance activity constantly occurs in ordi-
nary interactions since it is the foundation of encounters. Thus the word « ritual » is
used because this activity -though very simple- represents the effort we make in order
to give a symbolic image to others, i.e, pupils.
Communication is an activity regulated by rules and set standards for collective in-
teraction. Finally, we will complete the theoretical framework by a proxemic analysis.
Proxemics (Hall, 1966), or the study of the perception and use of space by humans,
is defined as the physical distance established between the people caught in an inter-
action, an exchange of communication. Hall discusses the structure of conditioning
experience by studying the culture and the cultural dimension in a vast communication
network with multiple levels. Four interpersonal distances are highlighted and pre-
sented in Figure 13.2: the intimate distance (7-45 cm), personal distance (45 to 125
cm), social distance (from 1.25 to 3.60 m) and public distance (from 3.60 to 7.50 m).
13.3 Hypothesis
The construct of “teachable” implies a new perspective from the trainers. The inter-
action between the trainer, the student, knowledge and context is a process to study.
We need to emphasize what it escapes the constraints of interaction (environmental
constraints, communicational constraints) rather than the constraints themselves (the
interaction order) (Goffman, 1974). We make the hypothesis that observation of prox-
emics phenomena (Hall, 1966) to interactions rituals is likely to enhance a didactic
approach in the training of future teachers. The proxemic phenomena result in the
measurement of distances between actors. These distances reflect the nature of rituals
and their contents are shown in Figure 13.3.
This model shows a new form of complexity. Students, knowledge, context of
training and trainers are interwoven. These four categories operate together and are in
direct interaction.
13.4 The situation of intervention
The trainee teacher is subject to fixed constraints in a self-organized situation of train-
ing. The environment will be used for situation of professional practice (see Fig-
ure 13.4).
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Figure 13.2: Proxemic’s distance (Hall, 1971).
The aim is to present a lesson from a theme imposed by the trainer. It is considered
that these requirements operate as didactics variables (Robin, 2012). The context plays
the cognitive artifact role: envisage the action as a self-organized coupling involves
considering the context, and its properties, such as offering "resources for action" avail-
able to the actor according to his intentions (Norman, 1993).
13.5 Population
Seven students of 5th year supervise a gymnastics lesson. This lesson is completely
filmed and provides support to analyze the activity of the trainee teacher.
13.6 Methodology
Three registers of analysis will be used for this exploratory study: (1) planning lessons
for understanding how the trainee teacher structures self-organized situations, (2) the
video to read the activity of the trainee teacher in situ. The collection of field data will
be analyzed from a proxemic analysis grid, (3) the collective post activity discussions
to understand the analysis made by the trainee teacher on its action in situation.
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Figure 13.3: New model of physical education training teacher.
Here we only consider the "space" that will be analyzed from the point of view of
proxemics studying the signifying structure of human space. We observe the proxemic
distances established between the actors during interactions in gymnastics lessons in
physical education.
13.7 Results and discussion
13.7.1 Space in the planning
Planning allow to see that as workspaces located and organized according to profes-
sional prerogatives (spatial organization, temporal organization, methods of grouping
students, implementation of several learning situations). Space is controlled by the
student. The use of media, the materialization workspaces before the beginning of
learning is reflected. Each student group is confronted with a specific learning situa-
tion with media to consolidate the instructions given by the teacher-student. The space
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Figure 13.4: Self-organized situation of teaching.
is arranged to constrain specific motor skills.
13.7.2 Space in the lesson
The results are presented in Figure 13.5. Regarding the ritual of presentation, the dis-
tance is 2.50 meter for 100% of the population. This social distance permits to deliver
general instructions for lesson.
Relating to ritual of confirmation, we can observe: 29% use private distance, 57%
personal distance and 14% social distance. These distances differ depending on the
interaction between pupils and teachers.
Concerning ritual of reparation, two types of distance appear: 86% use personal
distance and 14% social distance. When there is a contract breaking-off, teacher prefers
to keep the distance in interactions with students.
13.7.3 Space in collective debriefing
The feedback highlights three key points:
- The workshops are located in the workspace,
- Students are divided among the workshops,
- The workshops are organized according to the activity and needs of the pupils.
The results show three major points:
1. Trainee teachers have built a planned design “teachable” taking into account the
institutional, pedagogical and didactic requirements.
217
Figure 13.5: Space in the gymnastic lesson (Video results).
2. Teachable is an unfinished construction because institutional, pedagogical and
didactic requirements are realized in interaction with students. Requirements im-
plementation raises a problem for the trainee teacher. He must learn to manage
the complexity of the act of teaching, to think of the properties of the transmis-
sion process. It is implementation of “teachable” that remains to be built.
3. Trainee teachers build strategies to control some variables of the "education"
system. What seems to raise a problem is the instability that could result from
the interaction between the variables (institutional, teaching and learning). The
“teachable” is accompanied by a change in posture and acceptance of some kind
of disorder.
13.8 Conclusion and perspectives
Changing the posture of the student in a self-organized situation generates a dynamic
engagement. The interaction between trainee teacher, pupils, knowledge and the trainer
generates the construction of a balance, a "middle ground" between adaptation to the
constraint of the task and stability built in self-organized situation.
The workshop of professional practice is a tool to build the "teachable" in a train-
ing framework that integrates complexity. By adopting a pedagogy of simulation, the
workshop turns into a self-organized situation where we will put forward the necessary
cooperation of the actors; the goal is to build and bring out a changing reality through
interconnected variables (institutional, pedagogical and didactic) that create or oppose
change. This cooperative game is indicative of the process of interaction (Figure 13.6).
This new reference is a true interaction model in complex system.
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Figure 13.6: Professional situation, a real organized-situation.
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Abstract
This contribution is part of a finding based upon research, crossed by
a social, economic question: how to improve teaching in University, when
this institution has to form professionals with a great challenge to achieve.
They have to teach to everyone, everywhere, in a economic crisis context,
and a heated French National Education debate. Teachers, educators have
to be efficient as soon as possible, need to work in networks, must create
new solutions. This contribution focuses on social sports educators (SSE),
which takes care of offenders, or people who can’t stand school, or young
people whose family failed to educate them. For developing the efficiency
in such a professional context special workshops simulate the dimensions
of these jobs, during the initial formation. In these workshops, future edu-
cators experience tensions, discomforts and dilemmas and by the fact seem
to improve their professional identity construction. They could increase
their adaptation abilities when faced with complex situations. Two frame-
works provide the opportunity to report this development of adaptation
into these workshops: cognitive anthropology (Suchman, 1987) and the
course-of-action (Theureau, 2004). The discomfort and dilemmas seem to
be parameters of control in the initial formation process.
14.1 Introduction
This contribution is related to a university training course for a job we named "social-
sport educators". These professionals work in complex environment, primarily be-
cause the public, which they take care of, accumulates many problems: social, psy-
chological and medical needs, with intricate dimensions. To overcome these needs,
socio-sports educators support these people through sports and arts practices. The ped-
agogy has to fit very finely to this unsteady public. Many factors come into account in
the daily decisions of these professionals, so they are exposed to extreme stress, asso-
ciated with these particular areas in which they are involved. These special "schools"
accommodate young people, who present different levels of social and physical de-
privation Consequently, these educators often act in emergency, at the crossroads of
various influences. Actually, they must constantly evaluate the priorities, according to
their own sensibilities, to their own experiences too. They have to admit that the only
certainty they might have is that nothing can be entirely planned in advance. They must
admit they will have to create solutions that nobody could teach to them. To manage
such complex situations, newcomers in education have to develop competences. For
example, "the capacities of problem-solving, risk taking, trust in collaborative process,
ability to cope with change and commitment to continuous improvement as organiza-
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tion" (Hargreaves, 2003, p.3) are necessary qualities to teach, educate in the society
21st century.. In fact, they have to take into account a major parameter of the situation
they are involved in: themselves. Here we speak about their own feelings, their own
sensations that will have a major impact on the decision process, especially in the start
of their career. The complexity of situation, all interactions between many parameters,
the unpredictability of these contexts are some of the characteristics of what some well-
known scientists such as Edgar Morin (1999), Didier Delignières (2009), Jean Louis
Le Moigne (1999) call "complex systems". In this contribution we focus on the im-
pact of discomfort and the hazard in the simulated teaching process, and we examine
how these troubling sensations seem to participate in the development of qualities of
adaptation, which could be a kind of “elegance in action” (Berthoz, 2009).
University of Orléans forms professional educators who intervene through sports
with "fragile" publics in institutions professionally harsh (Homes for people with so-
cial problems, homes for young offenders, prisons). These audiences are known to
practice the concept of "teaching misunderstanding" (Garnier, 2003), inducing the
speaker, the teacher, the adoption of "survival strategies"(Woods, 1990, p.96). In the
professional context, the socio-sports educator adopts a state of alertness that allows
for the correct and competent reaction when confronted with these moments of rup-
ture. All day long, they are under pressure to take decisions, and must stay efficient to
manage tensions: it’s a matter of sustainable career, often at a risk to their own health.
This paper is part of an "action research" within the scope of a bachelor’s degree
called “Professional Licence in Development and Mediation by Sport” (LP DSMS).
To do this, in their training courses, students develop professional practices with orga-
nized, interventional working groups included in the training unit. Under agreed part-
nerships between the University and the Institutions, these working groups, or work-
shops expose students “in a controlled manner" with a public having singular charac-
teristics (social disruption, school leavers, under court order). These working groups
are authentic moments of training as they preserve the uncertainty, the randomness
of the professional domain and emotionally involve the student. These workshops are
“complex training situations” (Clergue, 1997), or “encouraged action spaces” (Durand,
2008) therefore requiring adaptive / development human processes.
It’s about being able to adapt professional acts according to potential, to the con-
straints of the situation and to reasonable and possible objectives. We then talk about
moments of expertise and consider the possibilities of simplifying complex situations.
More specifically on terminology, we will speak of "Simplexity", a concept introduced
by neuroscientist and physiologist Berthoz in 2009. The use of Simplexity does not im-
ply reducing the dimensions of a given situation and thus hiding it’s complexity, but
rather insists on the importance of prioritizing taking into account situation’s current
capabilities. The trainer should not over simplify in order to preserve, but "confront
and consolidate” and so trigger qualitative changes to professional expertise, to achieve
a kind of “elegance in action” (Berthoz, 2009)
“Simplexity is a way of living with the world. It favors elegance over dullness, intel-
ligence over formal logic, subtlety over rigidness, diplomacy over authority. Simplexity
is Florentine; it anticipates rather than reacts, suggests laws and interpretive grids, is
forbearing. It is adaptative rather than normative or prescriptive, probabilitics rather
than deterministic. It takes into account the perceiving body as well as consciousness,
and it considers context. Simplexity is intentional.” (Berthoz, 2012, p.209)
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14.2 Frameworks, object, model
The work of social-sports instructor is conceived as a “situated action”. In this sense,
we mobilize the framework of Cognitive Anthropology (Suchman, 1987) We also
choose the theoretical and methodological framework of the course-of-action (Theureau,
2004, 2006) because we will look at the work of the student training, engaged in a
teaching situation that is "significant for him, i.e. "presentable, relatable and which
can be commented by him at any time, under favorable conditions
This self-confrontation, a kind of re-enactment through material traces (for this
study, video traces) of the teaching activity gives access to what Theureau calls “pre-
reflective consciousness” and testifies of the presence of a “structural coupling”. The
dynamical "structural-coupling" according to Durand’s study in 2008 is the assymetric
report established between the actor (he calls a system) and his environment. "This
coupling both builds and changes the structure of the system", we could say the SSE
structure in our study, in a relationship we could characterize as asymmetric.
Moreover, "this coupling is asymmetrical insofar as it is the system that defines
what, in its environment disturbs him, that is to say, in fact, what is relevant and mean-
ingful to him. This "structural coupling" creates a perspective, that of the system (the
SSE), which changes every moment according to its (his) dynamic and disturbances
coming from the environment. “ (Durand, ibidem, p. 107)
This theoretical and methodological framework is based on the assumption of au-
topoiesis of living systems (Maturana and Varela, 1980).
The course also provides recent discoveries in neurophysiology on the action, per-
ception and decision (including Berthoz, 1997, 2002; Damasio, 2010).
14.2.1 Assumptions
For the moment, two hypotheses have been established in this part of our research
project. These two hypotheses need to be supported by a more extensive data research.
Hypothesis 1: we assume that the hazard and discomfort experienced by the
intervener in the case of a local socio-sporting action in complex situations gen-
erates emotions, sensations with "magnifying effects" (Ria et al., 2001).
Hypothesis 2: we assume that these emotions mark changes in quality levels in
the process of development / learning of student training (Gal-Petitfaux et al.,
2010)
14.2.2 Participants and methods of data collection
Students animate and manage sports workshops with a sensitive public, at 4 sequences
per student in the six-month course, each one for a duration of 40 minutes. All the
sequences are filmed. Each student then participates in a self-confrontation inter-
view recorded from the video of the day’s session, helped by the trainer, according
to Theureau’s method.
Two training assessments are prepared: one at mid-training and the other one at the
end of the course. During these assessments prepared in advance with a guide provided,
sequences and self-confrontation interviews are discussed from elements that make
sense to the student who is able to self-assess his own competency. Audio recordings
are made on this occasion for verbatim transcription.
Two classes of students have adjusted this protocol.
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In this study, we will mobilize the self-confrontation interviews of two students
(Justine and Hélène) and their two individualized training balances conducted on De-
cember 21, 2012 and April 17, 2013. At this point of our discussion, some information
about the experience of these students could enable us to better appreciate the collected
data.
When Justine integrated LP DSMS, she had already completed with difficulty a
degree, as a sports intervention educator for standard schools. Due to her lack of
confidence and her deep recurring difficulties in the face-to-face teaching, she was a
candidate to enter into LP DSMS with the objective of extending her expertise. She is
a basketball coach, activity for which she feels legitimate.
Hélène has a degree in STAPS, , we could explain by "Sciences and Technological
training course in Sports and Physical Education"; she is a gym coach, activity for
which she thinks she is very competent. The qualities she self-claims: methodical,
organized, perfectionist. Hélène always appears in interviews and appraisals as very
voluntary and engaged in the analysis of her performance and its evolution.
These data, before training, and during training and at different stages of the train-
ing process, allows us to mention here a “course of life” (Theureau, 2004).
We have to notice that These two future SSE were particularly comfortable with
this kind of qualitive method, even though they have been inclined to speak about
discomfort during their teaching time.
14.3 Data
A. Justine - extract from balance training, April 17, 2013, and re-evocation of the 4th
workshop in intervention practice.
Justine (J): The trigger that I had, it was with the video analysis (...) really evoking
what worked, didn’t work (...) why I was like that (...) it gave me confidence for the
following sessions (...)
Trainer (T): "It didn’t destabilize you, it gave you confidence?"...
J: No, no ... The first video session before going there, I was not great, huh ...
because I was stressed, I was apprehensive, well like first practice session actually...
But I told myself alright... need to take advice...
T: Had you finally started systematically taking into account your positive points?
J: Oh yes, well, yeah right ... I’m very pessimistic about myself ... now I said, I
am pleased with myself, I made some progress... I’m out of there... there are positive
things... (...) The third year was the total collapse [she is evoking here the previous
training]... I said: Am I made for this?
T: Now What?
J: Now, that’s fine. (...) I know what I’m like; it’s not just a matter of pedagogy.
Then, referring to her fourth intervention this year in basketball
J: Yes, I enjoyed myself. (...) In all these years of college, this is the session in
which I enjoyed the most (...) it happens late maybe (...) I was with them (...). I felt
useful...
B. Hélène - extract from balance training April 17, 2013 and re-evocation of the
first workshop on October 24 2012.
Hélène: I’m not the same person in a club and on Wednesday [at workshops in-
tervention]... The stress of there being a public makes a change for me [young minors
under mandate of justice] (...) I am less afraid... I manage myself... I do not like being
out of my routines
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Trainer: why?
H: ... it replays my position, it hurts me... discord, it is like an attack.
T: You are a perfectionist?
H: I’m too demanding with others and myself ... I did not realize ... All of life is
like that, it is a facade.
I must go out of gym... be shaken... Being reactive, Adapt, that’s the problem I
have in my internship ... Even in everyday life, by the way... in my intervention I do it,
but it does not please me (...)
I do not remember the positives
14.4 Results and discussions
14.4.1 Justine
Justine freely evokes a “course-of-life” (Theureau, 2004), that is to say the conjunction
of several originally separate “course-of-action”. At this point of her explanations,
Justine speaks about singular moments of her activity during all the training, those of
the elements, which became significant and conscious .She re-evokes the difficulties
felt; she analyzes a chaotic and painful journey. She evokes, by naming it, the video as
the source of a click under stress feelings, like a transition to another type of behavior,
or feelings, self-awareness (“I was with them”, “I felt useful”), relating to the stage of
a dynamic identity.
“Professional identity can be considered as a complex and multidimensional phe-
nomenon incorporating a historic process of building, filled of questions , of losses
and re-appropriations, that lead to forms of identity reconstructions which help people
building a coherent world, and to give it sense . Feelings of membership, involvement,
recognition are parts of a dynamic that integrates strategies and adaptations to the
context, to the discipline, to the others, and this in relation with the potential of the
actor (many facets related to the diversity of the actor), sometimes questioned by the
events”
At this point, we enter in a " logic of subjectivation " the actor is committed to
maintain the feeling of being the author of his own life and begins to put at a distance
, if necessary , his role or previous positions. His identity is formed (trans- formed) by
its tension with the surrounding world, causing it to evolve constantly “ (T. Roux-Perez,
2011, p.146)
Considering Justine’s point of view, here we could be at a tipping point between
the feeling of being just a follower student, and the feeling of becoming useful as a
professional SSE. Becoming useful, that major aim she mentioned when she joined
course. She seems to switch of identity. Before that tipping point clearly identified,
she did not consider herself competent, doubted her career choice. This workshop and
maintenance, are elements that seem to trigger awareness, a more benevolent self-look.
After discomfort, doubt, and pessimism comes pleasure, a more positive self-image,
confidence gain, and feeling of being useful.
14.4.2 Hélène
Immediately, Hélène evokes fear of losing face experienced by newcomers. She feels
threatened. Thus she re-evokes a workshop that mobilized her in an extreme way emo-
tionally, did not sleep well the night before. She identifies the stress generated by the
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public as a constraint, which leads her to deviate from her routine as a gymnastics
coach. Planner and anticipatory, she veers towards a more open attitude to the environ-
ment, even if it remains unpleasant for her. She also reviews that as a perfectionist, she
does not focus enough on the positive aspects of her intervention. Hélène transforms
her power of action, even if the process is just engaged and needs to be confirmed.
For these two students, interventions workshops, true "authentic learning situa-
tions" (Clergue, 1997) are an opportunity to "revelations".
"Learning is what helps to make sense and the meaning emerges from the inter-
action of subjects with a world of objects and subjects according to their basic needs
and desires. This implies recognition of complexity of things that carries themselves,
like a paradox, this doomed to remain unsatisfied need to have control of everything."
(Clergue, 1997, p.143).
According to the sense of this quotation, these two “SSE” are emotionally involved
in the workshops that they re-live with the help of the video sessions. They doubt
of their abilities to face the context. But step-by-step, they use precise and personal
words to characterize what they do, what they think, what they feel during these expe-
riences of teaching according to their own perception of the environment ("structural
coupling"). Because of these workshops, they take advantage of the nature of the sit-
uation ("authentic learning situations”) to switch to a new self-knowledge in action,
toward a new professional identity, a kind of solution ("revelation") for overcoming
the complexity they were afraid of before.
Clergue then cites the thought of Y. Barel "Is complex at the same time what
threaten or destabilize, and what can cope with this situation. Complexity is the prob-
lem and the solution of the problem." (Amiot et al., 1993).
This increasing knowledge could be a solution to reengage the confidence. To
overcome complex professional situations, the SSE’s self-confidence could generate
a dynamic that inspires new compliant solutions, far from stereotyped routines. In
reality, these routines work as self-benchmarks (when Helene speaks about her job in
association) from past experience, but not as solutions adapted to the present which
are much more sensitive. These routines could operate as a sort of a sort of barrier
when faced with a specific context, and the feeling of discomfort might operate as a
emotional alert that suggests to the “SSE” to give up the planned action and to take into
account other dimensions of the present context. To a certain extent, we could speak
about a kind of emotional invitation in favour of the re-examination of the "structural
coupling". We evoke here the sensitive question of discomfort level perceived, which
seems to work as an adaptation variable in order to adapt to the teaching context.
Both “SSE” come to training with accrued routines but also questions about their
competency. Paradoxically, it is in discomfort and stress, facing the reactions of a
public in a state of social or family exclusion that they gain relevance and knowledge
of themselves. They clearly identify a tipping point in their training courses, because
the training situation keeps all the complexity required for the emergence of random
triggers: unpredictable reactions, defiant attitudes, disobedience. These hazards cause
emotions that are "complex and ongoing process of adaptation to the environment.
In this respect, the action of teachers is guided by these sensitive signals allowing to
perceive things and to act in the classroom" (Ria and Visioli, 2010, p.14), linked with
their capacity to adapt, their sensitivity to context in order to keep in balance a didactic
and extremely tenuous contract.
Thus, emotions when training are essential to enable skills development, and can
hardly arise outside of authentic learning situations:
"The relation feeling-knowledge is at the heart of professional development: emo-
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tions are purveyors of knowledge and the relevance given to them depends on sensitive
elements conferring a peculiar emotionally marked meaning (e.g. waiting for a pleas-
ant situation or rather unpleasant related to past experiences."(Ria and Visioli, 2010,
p.14).
The cases of Hélène and Justine perfectly fit in the hypotheses announced, and are
consistent with the results of the research cited. These intervention workshops and
associated training tools seem to encourage the development of qualitative adaptation
with the involvement of emotions due to the complexity of the environment rebuilt at
the University, as part of a professional training.
In this study, the dynamic adaptation process observed in workshops, in other words
the “complex training situations” (Clergue, 1997), or the “encouraging action spaces”
(Durand, 2008) looks like a described process in the framework of the dynamic systems
approach to motor coordination and training, and considering motor skill acquisition
as a dynamical process with transition (Haken, 1985).
In our research, we focus on the hazard and discomfort that play a role as contraints
- ressources for acquiring gains in development and adaptation and which could be
conceived as parameters of control (Nourrit et al., 2003). With this effect "contraints
- ressources", the SSE puts aside the stereotyped routines developed in other contexts
(basket, gymnastic clubs), as a phase transition. This may be the means of accelerating
the development of adaptation to sensitive professional contexts in the initial training
course.
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Abstract
Energy prices and environmental policies influence more than ever em-
ployment trends across the world. The purpose of this paper is to develop
a strategy to enhance the employability of French graduates in a field that is
both a key driver and a significant target of these new trends, namely Earth
Sciences. The aim is to provide French universities with a predictive tool
to adjust efficiently their skills’ supply capacity with the demand forecasts
at the European level. This task is treated as a tracking problem from the
viewpoint of the control theory. The reference trajectory is obtained via a
labour market forecasting model. For the first time, an econometric model
and a predictive control strategy are combined. Simulations illustrate the
feasibility and potentials of the proposed approach.
15.1 Introduction
In the past two decades, energy consumption, sustainable development and environ-
mental protection have become priorities of energy policies in most countries (Kyoto
Protocol, Grenelle environment in France, Carbon plan in the United Kingdom, 20-20-
20 targets in the European Union). The transition to renewable energies is leading to
many changes in the economy as a whole, in labour markets’ structure and dynamics,
in societal behavior, and in research and education. Among the study and research
disciplines the most affected by these changes is Earth Sciences (ES). ES includes the
study of atmosphere, hydrosphere, oceans and biosphere as well as solid Earth. ES
can help meet major challenges faced by the society and the environment, such as the
management of mineral resources (green mining) with its direct impact on consump-
tion and labor. For instance, rare-earth minerals (REM) are increasingly used for the
production of high-tech items such as smart phones, laptops but also in magnets for
wind turbines, hybrid-car batteries, etc. After a misleading forecasting of its own con-
sumption needs, the U.S. lost its leading producer position in favour of China and is
now constrained to import at a very high price the goods it used to produce domesti-
cally. As a consequence of the closure of the mining extractions in the 1990s, the U.S.
also decreased its investments in the training of solid ES scientists. While it now faces
the need to re-open its REM mining sites to satisfy an increasing demand for high-tech
goods, it suffers from a deficit in qualified Earth System scientists. A similar deficit
affects Australia and Canada.
With its technical and scientific competences, its historical assets and its first-class
actors in the field of ES, France aims at becoming a worldwide leader in the ES training.
In 2011, the French Ministry of Higher Education nominated the project VOLTAIRE
as a LABEX (Laboratory of excellence). Among the tasks of this project is the con-
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struct of an anticipation tool to ensure the employability of Earth System scientists
trained in French universities. The CIPEGE center (Centre International de Prospec-
tive pour l’Emploi en Géosciences et Environnement - International Center for the
Strategic Foresight of Employment in Earth and Environmental Sciences) was created
to handle this task. In the sequel, the anticipation tool will be called the CIPEGE tool.
This paper presents the innovative forecasting strategy adopted to develop the CIPEGE
tool.
The CIPEGE tool builds upon several methods to handle the complexity of the
system it aims at predicting. As will be explained in this paper, the system is com-
posed of several elements measured at different levels of units of analysis (individual,
institutional, national, international), each with a non-negligeable internal structure.
The elements are linked by non-linear interactions. The system is exposed to external
factors at different scales and there exists a retroaction of collective behaviors upon
individual behaviors. This means that the elements will collectively modify their envi-
ronment, which in turn will constrain them and modify their possible behavior. Hence,
the behavior of the global system can only be predicted by knowing the properties and
behavior of each element and the properties of the interactions that link the elements.
Therefore, the CIPEGE tool combines economics (macro- and micro-econometric
modeling) and control process strategies (model predictive control). The targeted em-
ployability of French ES graduates is estimated using a labour market matching ap-
proach, controlling for European macroeconomic trends. The measured and forecasted
employability are then derived from a microeconometric multinomial-conditional logit
approach. The task of this study is then to ensure that the forecasted employabil-
ity tracks the reference trajectory of employability for the French graduates in ES.
This objective can be viewed as a tracking problem from a control theory perspec-
tive. Among the existing advanced control laws, Model Predictive Control (MPC) is
a control strategy well-adapted to deal with tracking problems (Alessio and Bemporad
2009, Camacho and Bordons 2007). The success of MPC in several industrial sectors
is due to the easy way to formulate the control objective in the time domain and also
to the ability to handle constraints (Qin and Badgwell 2003). A wide variety of appli-
cations has been reported in the literature but no application in economics exists to our
knowledge. MPC is based on the direct use of an explicit model to predict the future
behavior of a process. This model plays a crucial role in the MPC strategy. In our case,
the econometric model is used to forecast the behavior of the process (the flow of ES
graduates in France) over a finite prediction horizon. In the context of this study, the
term "prediction" actually refers to an "anticipation" or "forecast".
The main advantage of this strategy lies in the structure of the MPC approach,
which enables us to link in a systematic and continuous way all the elements compos-
ing the employability of young ES graduates. This structure allows for the definition of
different time horizons (at the contrary of classic econometrics) and for the correction
of the trajectory continuously thanks to the feedback mechanism of the MPC approach.
Another advantage is the fact that this strategy can take into account both estimation
errors and modeling errors to correct the reference value at each run. This two-step
error correction procedure constitutes a valuable tool towards more robust estimates.
Moreover, the MPC approach determines the control inputs exogenously in such a way
that it is applied simultaneously to the process and the model. In an econometric model,
the effect of the exogenous control input is usually estimated inside the model and is
considered as endogenous to the process. For the first time, the control inputs are de-
fined exogenously and policy makers can test an unlimited range of interventions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the def-
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inition of the employability retained for the CIPEGE tool and the model applied to
estimate the employability of reference for French ES graduates. Section 3 deals with
the principle of Model Predictive Control and details the control structure used. Section
4 addresses the way of combining the econometric model used to measure the process
of employability and the predictive control approach. Then, in section 5, different sim-
ulations serve at testing the feasibility of the control strategy. In the last section, we
synthesize our preliminary results and draw the perspectives of the proposed approach.
15.2 Employability
Measuring employability of graduates is a controversial issue due to the difficulty to
apply a straightforward definition (Gazier 1998, McQuaid and Lindsay 2005, Arjona
Perez et al. 2010). Employability is a complex and multi-faceted concept. Therefore,
either because of a lack of compatibility between dimensions or a lack of data, a holistic
measure of employability has so far been recognized to be impossible. Employability
measures are instead reduced to the most pertinent dimensions for the study at hand.
15.2.1 Definitions
In McQuaid and Lindsay (2005), the authors highlight the existence of two alternative
perspectives in the employability debate. One focuses only on the individual’s char-
acteristics and skills, referring to the individual’s potential to obtain a job. The other
perspective takes into account external factors (e.g. labor market institutions, socio-
economic status) that influence a person’s probability of getting into a job, of moving
between jobs or of improving his or her job. In De Grip et al. (2004), these factors are
called "effectuation conditions", i.e. the conditions under which workers can effectuate
their employability. In addition, the literature also considers the aspects of the time lag
between leaving education and employment (Boateng et al. 2011), the degree of skills
matched between one’s educational background and his or her occupation, and the type
of contractual arrangement (full-time vs. part-time; permanent vs. temporary) (Arjona
Perez et al. 2010).
Employability is about having the capability to gain initial employment, maintain
employment and obtain new employment if required (Cedefop 2008). In other words,
the employability of a graduate is the predisposition of the graduate to exhibit the
attributes that employers consider necessary for the effective functioning of their or-
ganization (Harvey et al. 1998). Hence, employability is a combination of capacity
and willingness to be and to remain attractive for the labor market, for instance, by
anticipating changes in tasks and work environment and reacting on them (De Grip
et al. 2004). For a given person, employability depends on the knowledge, skills and
attitudes he/she possesses, the way he/she uses those assets and presents them to em-
ployers (Hillage and Pollard 1998).
In the context of the CIPEGE tool, we define employability as the capacity of a
French Earth Sciences graduate to be employed at a fulfilling job that enables him/her
to make use of the skills acquired during the training, given the evolution of the demand
of the relevant sectors of activity at the European level.
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15.2.2 Energy prices, environmental policies and employment trends
In a recent report for the European Commission’s Employment Directorate General,
Cambridge Econometrics (2011) has conducted an in-depth analysis of the employ-
ment consequences of the implementation of policies to achieve the key European
environmental targets of a 20 percent cut in emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020
(compared to 1990 levels), an increase in the share of renewable energy to 20 percent,
and the objective of a 20 percent cut in energy consumption (i.e. the so-called "20-
20-20 targets"). The findings from that project suggest that after an initial cost to the
European Union (EU), the implementation of the EU 20-20-20 targets will lead to a
modest positive outcome for GDP growth and employment over the longer term, in-
creasing by around 1-1.15 percent (in net terms) by 2020.
However, when looking at specific industries, these impacts prove to be much dif-
ferentiated, with some sectors, such as iron, steel, cement and petroleum, experiencing
a decrease in employment; and sectors, such as renewables, construction and transport,
experiencing a growth in jobs by 2020. The occupations with potential benefits from a
low-carbon transition were identified to be Research and Development, manufacturing
and installation or engineering, operation and maintenance, management, administra-
tion and sales.
The shift towards a greater reliance upon renewable energies will create a demand
for engineering and technical skills related to generating electricity from wind, ma-
rine and solar sources. The forecasts of employment from the Energy-Environment-
Economy model of Europe (E3ME), developed by Cambridge Econometrics, suggest a
greater demand for professional, associate professional, and (to a slightly lesser extent)
skilled trade workers. Still, these analyses do not go into detail on the implications for
specific areas such as science, technology, engineering and mathematics (for further
details on that topic see, for instance, Wilson et al. (2010)).
Further evidence suggests that the shift towards renewable energies may result in
an increasing demand for specific types of engineers and technicians who are not only
highly qualified and skilled in their general disciplines, such as electronics engineering,
but can also apply their skills within a renewable or green policy environment. Hence,
there is likely to be an increasing demand for a form of hybrid skill (the general engi-
neering or technical discipline, plus specific knowledge or experience of renewables)
(Cambridge Econometrics 2011, p.172).
Moreover, there is also an increasing demand for more renewable-specific skills
related to hydrology, hydraulics, aerodynamics, ornithology, environmental impact as-
sessment, etc. Both the hybrid and renewable specific skills need to be deployed in a
number of functions, including RnD, design, operations and maintenance. Although
the number of workers required to fill these jobs might be relatively small, they are
critical to the success of the renewable sector.
The problem that currently arises in Europe is that there will be potentially more
and more markets that will display insufficient capacity to fulfill the demand for these
new technologies because of a deficiency of human capital capacity. For example, if
Europe is not able to establish economically viable wind turbine or solar panel manu-
facturing capacity prior to the maturity of the technology and its uptake by users, there
is a high risk that non-EU producers will take over the market once established. This
would clearly have a negative impact on the overall employment potentials within Eu-
rope. Another similar example could be given of innovation in the environmental and
eco-technology sector.
Among all European Member States, the United Kingdom (UK) is the only one
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currently investing in upskilling at tertiary level to meet the new "green" occupation
needs. The main focus of the UK is on the upskilling of tertiary engineering qualifica-
tions in energy, especially in installation and maintenance of low-carbon technologies
and customer service skills. Another UK training focus is on tertiary qualifications in
commodity trader and broker, with the development of practical skills on the function-
ing of the carbon market and understanding of trading tools. Other EU Member States
are instead focusing on the green upskilling of the workforce at the vocational level
(e.g., Denmark, Estonia, France and Germany) (GHK Consulting 2010).
15.2.3 Modeling
Let yFj denote the number of employed individuals in France who are graduated in
Earth Sciences at degree level j, with j 2 {3, 5, 8}, such that j = 3 to a 3-year degree
(i.e. Bachelor degree); j = 5 to a 5-year degree (i.e. Master degree) and j = 8 to an
8-year degree (i.e. Ph.D. degree).
For a given degree level j, the number of ES graduates employed at time t is:
yFj (t) = S
F
j (t)  unFj (t) (15.1)
where SFj is the stock of ES skills on the French market and unFj is the stock of unem-
ployed ES graduates in France.
We model the employment of French ES graduates as a matching function, as sug-
gested by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), to describe the formation of new relation-
ships (’matches’) from unmatched individuals of the appropriate types. In our case,
we are interested in the formation of matches, at European level, between the number
of unemployed ES j-level graduates and the number of job vacancies in ES domains
at j-level. In other terms, we are interested in the European demand for workers with
ES skills at each j-level. We assume our matching function to have the following
Cobb-Douglas form:
mEUj (t) = M(unj(t), vj(t)) = µ(unj(t))
a(vj(t))
b (15.2)
where mEUj (t) is the number of new matches created at current time t on the Euro-
pean market, and µ, a and b are positive constants. While unj is now the stock of
unemployed ES graduates in Europe, vj(t) is the number of job vacancies in ES field
at degree level j. The matching function is increasing, concave, and homogeneous of
degree 1. As reviewed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), the Cobb-Douglas form
of the matching function can be justified by empirical evidence of constant returns to
scale, i.e. a+b ⇡ 1. If the fraction of workers separating from a firm per period of time
(due to firing, quits, and so forth) is  , then the change in employment from one period
to the next is calculated by adding the formation of new matches and subtracting the
separation of old matches. Combining equations (15.1) and (15.2) yields the following
representation of the dynamics of employment over time:
yFj (t+ 1) = m
EU
j (t) + (1   )yFj (t) = µ(unj(t))a(vj(t))b + (1   )yFj (t) (15.3)
The evolution of unemployment is given by
˙unj =  (1  unj) mEUj (unj , vj) (15.4)
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Under the assumption that the matching technology3 exhibits constant returns, this
equation has a unique stable steady solution for every vacancy rate v:
unj =  /(  +m
EU
j (vj/unj , 1)) =  /(  +  (✓)) (15.5)
where ✓ = vj/unj signals market tightness and  (✓) = mEUj (vj/unj , 1) represents
the unemployment spell hazard. Drawing equation (15.5) in a vacancy-unemployment
space generates a Beveridge curve, i.e. a negative relation between vacancies and un-
employment that is convex to the origin by the properties of the matching function (for
details see Pissarides and Mortensen 1999).
Empirical evidence shows that the job destruction flow,  , is not constant, espe-
cially over business cycle frequencies (Davis et al. 1996). Following Pissarides and
Mortensen (1999), we therefore allow future job productivity p to vary according to
the relative value (in terms of required competences) x of the product or service. Be-
cause x 2 [0, 1], px can take more than two values4.
When an unemployed worker and an employer with a vacancy meet, wage bargain-
ing takes place. The outcome is a wage w(x) that divides the quasi-rents associated
with a match between worker and employer, according to the value of x. The value
of a filled job is a function of the future job productivity, the bargained wage and the
probability of destruction of the job. Job creation takes place if all rents from new va-
cancy creation are exhausted, i.e. if vj = 0. A job is destroyed only if its idiosyncratic
productivity falls below a critical level rs (equilibrium reservation productivity), i.e. if
x < rs.
15.2.4 Empirical specifications
Except for the matching function, all parameters of the targeted employability are es-
timated, for the years 1990 to 2011, using the annual Employment Survey microdata
collected by INSEE (the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies).
The matching function mEUj is estimated using an extended version of the E3ME
model to forecast skills supply and demand in Europe (Wilson et al. 2010). Thanks to
the structure of the E3ME,mEUj captures the influence of international environmental
and economic shocks on the demand for skills in Earth Sciences.
Figure 15.1 shows the linkages between the three modules (Energy, Environment
and Economy) of the E3ME. Exogenous factors are shown on the outside edge of the
chart as inputs into each component. For the European Union (EU) economy, these
factors are economic activity and prices in non-EU world areas and economic policy
(including tax rates, growth in government expenditures, interest rates and exchange
rates). For the energy system, the outside factors are the world oil prices and en-
ergy policy (including regulation of energy industries). For the environment module,
exogenous factors include policies such as reduction in SO2 emissions by means of
end-of-pipe filters from large combustion plants. The linkages between the modules
are shown explicitly by the arrows that indicate which values are transmitted between
components. The economic module is solved as an integrated EU regional model,
3A matching technology, like a production technology, is a description of the relation between inputs,
search and recruiting activity, and the output of the matching process, the flow rate at which unemployed
worker and vacant jobs form new job-worker matches (Pissarides and Mortensen 1999).
4According to Pissarides and Mortensen (1999), Mortensen (1994), Cole and Rogerson (1996), the fact
of regarding p as a stochastic process characterizing an aggregate shock is consistent with the time series
characteristics of job creation and job destruction series reported by Davis et al. (1996).
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Figure 15.1: The three dimensions of the E3ME: energy, environment and economy
(Source: Cambridge Econometrics 2011, p.212)
disaggregated at industry and country level. The labor market is treated with sets of
equations for employment demand, labor supply, average earnings and hours worked.
The equations for labor demand, wages and hours worked are estimated and solved for
42 economic sectors (industries), defined at the 2-digit level of the European statistical
classification of economic activities (NACE). Labor participation rates are disaggre-
gated by gender and five-year age bands, and multiplied by Eurostat population data to
obtain labor supply.
Employment is modeled using national accounts data, as a total headcount number
for each industry and region. This stock is a function of the evolution of unemploy-
ment and job vacancies (depending on industry output, wages, hours worked and tech-
nological progress) and of global (worldwide) changes in environmental policies and
in energy prices and consumption. The industry output is assumed to have a positive
effect on employment, while the effect of higher wages and longer working hours is
assumed to be negative. The effects of technical progress are ambiguous, as investment
may create or replace labor, depending on the sector of activity.
The E3ME model has been extended to include detailed analyses of the skills’ de-
mand and supply, as measured by occupation and qualification. Three levels of qualifi-
cation were defined, namely low (ISCED 0-2), medium (ISCED 3-4) and high (ISCED
5-6). This extended version computes the stock of labor demand by sector, occupation
and educational level.
We run the extended E3ME to generate, for the overall European market, the stock
of labor demand at the highest level of qualifications (i.e. ISCED 5-6) by sector and
level of occupation. Using the annual INSEE Employment Survey (1990-2011), we
identify matrices of sectors and occupations that employ workers with a j-level ES
degree in France. We merge the E3ME output with the individual data from INSEE
on the basis of these matrices and derive the number of demanded ES workers with
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j-level skills, mEUj . The current employment of ES graduates in France, yFj (t), is es-
timated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, for each level of degree, using
the INSEE microdata, controlling for the age, the gender and the sector of activity. The
job destruction flow,  , is also estimated from the INSEE data. The estimated current
matching on the European market is then integrated into equation (15.3), alongside the
current employment level in France ((1  )yFj (t)), to estimate the number of employed
j-level ES graduates in France in the next period.
15.3 Model Predictive Control (MPC)
This section addresses the principle of MPC and the control structure considered in this
study is detailed.
15.3.1 Principle
MPC is a mature control strategy. Initially developed for linear systems in the 1970s,
MPC had extensively been studied for nonlinear systems with constraints and success-
fully been applied in numerous industrial domains (Alessio and Bemporad 2009, Qin
and Badgwell 2003). The MPC strategy is based on the receding horizon principle
and is formulated as solving on-line a nonlinear optimization problem (Camacho and
Bordons 2007). The basic concepts of MPC are the explicit use of a model to predict
the process behavior over a finite prediction horizonNp and the minimization of a cost
function with respect to a sequence of Nc controls where Nc is the control horizon.
At the current instant t (see Figure 15.2), the process output is measured and the MPC
algorithm computes a sequence of Nc control inputs by minimizing the tracking er-
ror (difference between the reference trajectory and the predicted model output) over
Np. Only the first element of the obtained optimal control sequence is really applied
to the process. At the next sampling time (see Figure 15.3), the finite prediction hori-
zon moves a step forward, the measurements are updated and the whole procedure is
repeated.
Reference trajectory 
t t+Nc 
t (current time) t+Np 
Max 
Min 
e(t) 
measurement 
Control sequence 
Prediction horizon (Np) 
Control horizon (Nc) 
Predicted model output 
Applied control 
Figure 15.2: Principle of MPC at the current time t
241
Reference trajectory 
t+1 t+Nc+1 
t+1 (current time) t+Np+1 
Max 
Min 
e(t+1) 
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Control sequence 
Prediction horizon(Np) 
Control horizon (Nc) 
Predicted model output 
Applied control 
Figure 15.3: Principle of MPC at the current time t+ 1
15.3.2 Internal Model Control (IMC) structure
Predictions based on data are inevitably subject to disturbances and modeling errors.
To gain in robustness, the well-known Internal Model Control (IMC) structure (see
Figure 15.4) is considered in this approach.
The process (the physical system) is described by its mathematical model. The
control inputs u are simultaneously applied to the process and the model. The differ-
ence between the process output yp and the predicted model output ym provides an
error signal e. This signal embeds disturbances and modeling errors and constitutes
the feedback information impacting on the reference trajectory yref . The feedback in-
formation is taken into account in an original way rarely used in economics. Due to
the sampled data acquisition, a discrete-time formulation is considered where t is the
current time iteration.
Figure 15.4: Internal model control structure
According to Fig. 4, we can write:
yd(t) = yref (t)  e(t)
yd(t) = yref (t)  (yp(t)  ym(t))
yd(t)  ym(t) = yref (t)  yp(t).
(15.6)
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The tracking of the reference trajectory yref by the process output yp is equivalent to
the tracking of the desired trajectory yd by the model output ym.
Remark: the feedback signal e can be filtered to avoid sudden changes due to
measurement noises. A low-pass filter suits well in practice.
15.4 Econometric model-based predictive control
This section addresses the way of combining the econometric model and the MPC ap-
proach. The common points to all predictive strategies are discussed according to the
control objective: the improvement of French students’ employability in the field of ES.
15.4.1 The reference trajectory
The reference trajectory corresponds to the expected behavior of the process. In our
case, the reference trajectory yref to be tracked corresponds to the employability of
French ES graduates. This reference has been determined off-line by estimating equa-
tions (15.1), (15.2) and (15.3) using E3ME outputs and French microdata (INSEE
Employment Survey). The following figure (see Figure 15.5) presents the reference
trajectory for the employability in France of ES graduates at Master-degree level, i.e.
at level j = 5, for the period 2003-2025, taking into account labour market shifts at
the European level. While the goodness-of-fit of the reference trajectory for the period
2003-2012 could be tested with observed values of the output variable, the trajectory
beyond 2012 was drawn as a linear extrapolation of the previous period. In economics,
because of the high degree of unpredictability of individual behaviors, fitted values are
likely to variate within a 90 percent confidence interval.
The significant drop in employability observed between 2003 and 2007, followed
by a significant increase between 2007 and 2012, is mainly due to the changes in the
graduation system imposed by the European Bologna Process. In 2004-2005, most
European Member States, including France, launched a harmonization process of its
tertiary degrees to converge towards a three-level system composed by the Bachelor,
the Master and the Doctoral degrees. All intermediary degrees were progressively can-
celled from the tertiary systems. In France, this new structure has replaced the previ-
ous five-level structure (DEUG-Licence-Maîtrise-DEA/DESS-Doctorat). The former
Maîtrise degree corresponds to a Master I level and the former DEA/DESS degree to
a Master II. At the time of the implementation of the Bologna Process, French labor
markets were more interested in hiring young graduates with a four-year university
degree than with a five-year university degree (reflected in the drop in Figure 15.5).
With the shift towards the BA-MA-PhD structure, the vacant positions initially aimed
at four-year graduates got progressively opened to MA graduates, in addition to the va-
cant positions traditionally aimed at five-year graduates, which explains the significant
increase in MA employability after 2007.
15.4.2 The model of prediction
As we have already mentioned, the model is the keystone of the predictive control ap-
proach since it anticipates the behavior of the process in the future and makes possible
a successful tracking of the reference trajectory. The more faithful the model is to the
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Figure 15.5: Reference trajectory for the employability in ES at master degree level
process, the better the model prediction.
The model, based on an econometric model, is assumed to be dynamically repre-
sentative of the employability dynamics and to take into account the uncertain dynam-
ics of the human factor thanks to probabilities. The three outputs of the model are the
predicted employability at the three different levels j = 3, 5, 8 (respectively bachelor
degree, master degree, Ph.D degree). For the moment, the more relevant input con-
sidered is the number of students enrolled in ES training. It is worth mentioning the
specificities of the model. First, employability evolves differently depending on the
level. There are therefore three dynamics to be identified, one for each of the three
degree levels. Secondly, the control inputs act on the model with a different time lag
(delay). For instance, the effect on employability levels of the number of first-year stu-
dents in ES university programmes at current time t will be measurable in 3 years for
Bachelor graduates, in 5 years for Master graduates and in 8 years for Ph.D. graduates.
The different delays must be handled in the model in a specific way. Finally, for a given
student cohort, probabilities are considered to take into account the enrollment rate in
ES, the completion rate, the retention rate, etc. The model of employability is written
in discrete-time and can be synthesized by the following non-linear equations:⇢
x(t+ 1) = f(x(t), u(t  i)), i = 0..7
ym(t) = h(x(t)).
(15.7)
The modeled employability ym estimates the number of students that will complete
each degree-level annually by multiplying the number of students enrolled at the be-
ginning of each degree period (u(t   i)) and the probability of pursuite of studies in
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ES. The probability for a student i to choose to pursue an ES degree is estimated using
a multinomial/conditional logit approach (McFadden 1974). At the beginning of each
study period, a student can choose between three alternatives: to pursue his/her studies
in ES at the upper level, to repeat the same level or to leave ES studies. This approach
assumes that an individual chooses his/her training path, among different alternatives,
in order to maximize his/her utility.
15.4.3 The cost function
The cost function, also named optimization criterium, is usually a quadratic function of
the tracking error. As already mentioned, thanks to the IMC structure (see Figure 15.6),
the tracking of the reference trajectory yref by the process output yp is equivalent to
the tracking of the desired trajectory yd by the model output ym. The tracking error is
consequently written as:
etra(t) = yd(t)  ym(t). (15.8)
At each sampling time, the process output is measured and compared to the predicted
model output, defining the error signal e(t) = yp(t)   ym(t) at the current time. The
error e(k), k 2 [t + 1, t + Np] is assumed to be constant over the prediction horizon
and equal to the measurement e(t). This error signal is updated at each measurement.
Since the reference yref is assumed to be known over the whole working horizon, the
desired trajectory can be computed:
yd(k) = yref (k)  e(k), k 2 [t+ 1, t+Np]. (15.9)
The cost function can be written in discrete-time as:
J(u) =
Pt+Np
k=t+1 etra(k)
TQ(k)etra(k) + u(k   1)TR  u(k   1) (15.10)
where Q and R are symmetric definite positive matrices and u(k   1) = u(k   1) 
u(k   2) .
Remark: the term  u(k   1)TR  u(k   1) allows to provide a smooth variation
of the control variables by penalizing sudden changes.
15.4.4 The solving optimization method
The cost function J is to be minimized with respect to a future sequence of control
inputs noted eu. The mathematical formulation of MPC is then given by the following
optimization problem:
mineu J(u). (15.11)
The control sequence eu = {u(t), u(t + 1), ..., u(t + Nc), ..., u(t + Np   1)} is
composed of Nc different controls where Nc is the control horizon (Nc < Np). From
u(t+Nc+1) to u(t+Np 1), the inputs are constant and equal to u(t+Nc). Although
the prediction and optimization steps are performed over the prediction horizon, only
the value of the input for the current time u(t) is used and applied to the process.
Given its formulation in an optimization problem, MPC is well suited to take into
account constraints. In practice, processes are generally subject to constraints on states,
inputs or outputs which can easily and explicitly be added to the optimization problem
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(15.11). It is the most effective way to satisfy all kinds of constraints. Many con-
strained optimization routines are available in software libraries to solve constrained
optimization problems.
15.5 Simulations
All the presented simulations are performed with Matlab software. The constrained
optimization problem is solved by using the Matlab function fmincon. This chapter
only reports the results of the employability forecast at the level j = 5 (i.e Master
degree).
15.5.1 Data and modeling
The internal model uses data from a student tracking survey collected by the Students’
Life Observatory (OVE), which describes the transition trajectories of Master gradu-
ates 3 years after graduation, by degree field; university administrative records of the
number of intakes and graduates, per year; and complementary data from the report by
Varet (2008).
The data collected are represented in Figure 15.6. The red line represents the mea-
sured employability. The blue line in the upper graph is the reference employability
and the blue line in the lower graph is the observed number of enrolled students. As
explained in section 15.4.1, the reference trajectory is calculated using INSEE and
E3ME data. The inputs (i.e. number of students enrolled in ES training) are obtained
from the OVE data and the administrative data. Thanks to an identification procedure,
we obtained a model of employability that simulates the process with a relative error
of only 9.33% (see Figure 15.7). The non-linearity of the trajectory of the measured
employability reflects the significant increase in the number of employed ES graduates
with a Master degree between 2008 and 2009 caused by the Bologna reform of 2004.
As explained in section 15.4.1, that reform harmonized the university degrees across
Europe into a three-level structure (Bachelor-Master-PhD), which opened further job
perspectives for Master students that tended earlier to suffer the labor competition from
four-year graduates.
Over the period 2004-2012, the three main sectors of activities employing ES Mas-
ter graduates were education, professional services and public administration and de-
fence. While ES graduates used to have a relatively high probability of being employed
in the sector of mechanical engineering before 2008; with the crisis, their chances of
employment have decreased in that sector. Instead, we observe an increase in the num-
ber of employed ES graduates in the service sector, largely correlated to a global infla-
tion in consultancy jobs and fixed-term contracts since 2008 (Cutuli and Guetto 2013,
Oliver 2012, O’Connor 2013).
15.5.2 Predictive control
The econometric model-based predictive control described in section 15.4 has been
implemented. We consider the econometric model identified below. The simulation
was performed under the following conditions: Np = 5, Nc = 4, R = [10; 0.1] and
Q(k) = Q(1)k withQ(1) = 2. The future tracking errors are more and more weighted
in order to give importance to the final objective, i.e. the desired employability at the
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Figure 15.6: Data collected: reference employability (in blue) and measured employa-
bility (in red) in ES at master degree level (upper graph); number of enrolled students
(lower graph)
Figure 15.7: Simulated model of the employability in ES at master degree level
end of the prediction horizon, and this, at each sampling time. The reference employ-
ability is still obtained applying the model described in section 15.2.3, using INSEE
and E3ME data. Several simulations were carried out according to different horizons
of control and prediction. The prediction horizon Np = 5 seems to be the best com-
promise between the tracking accuracy, the intrinsic dynamic (the current control will
impact the employability of Master degree graduates in at least five years) and the
stability of the controlled system.
From Figure 15.8, we can see that the process output tracks the reference trajectory
by remaining within the range of uncertainty. On the other hand, the number of students
enrolled seems more relevant and gives a valuable information to policy makers to
anticipate universities’ future adjustments in human and physical resources. If more
students’ intakes are needed to reach the desired employability levels, then universities
will need to ensure that they have the capacity to welcome and train efficiently this
large influx of students.
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Figure 15.8: Forecasted employability in ES at master degree level: 2012-2023
Overall, these simulations show that the application of such a predictive control
strategy to economic issues is feasible and can lead to potentially useful results from a
social, educational and economic point of view.
15.6 Conclusions
This paper presented an innovative tool to predict the employability of French grad-
uates in Earth Sciences. Rather than formulating the control objective as a classic
computational general equilibrium (CGE) problem, it has been formulated as an opti-
mization problem to take into account the complexity of the system it embeds. For the
first time, Model Predictive Control was combined with an econometric model of em-
ployability. The MPC enables to take into account disturbances and modeling errors
through an internal model control structure, which complements efficiently the error
correction model (ECM) implemented in the econometric model used to generate the
reference trajectory, at the sectoral and occupational level.
The potential political implications of the CIPEGE tool are four-fold. First, the dis-
aggregated reference trajectory of the CIPEGE tool can inform about the future labor
market’s demand by sector of activity, by type of occupation and by level of degree. Al-
though the detailed results of the model developed to generate the reference trajectory
are not presented in this chapter, here are some examples of the descriptive capacity of
the CIPEGE tool. At the horizon 2020, the CIPEGE tool anticipates a drop in the de-
mand for higher education skills in the industry of coal and in the oil and gas sector. In
the case of the industry of basic metals, it anticipates instead a smooth increase in the
demand for higher education skills. Such a detailed mapping of the skills’ demand is
strategic for policy makers to anticipate the needs in terms of education provision. The
second potential political implication of the CIPEGE tool is the capacity of its reference
trajectory to capture the impact of different shocks at the energetic and environmental
levels on the demand for skills. Third, combining the econometrics approach and the
MPC yields a predictive tool where the control inputs are held exogenous to the op-
timization process, which makes it possible to test for an unlimited range of possible
interventions (e.g., intake rates, specialization modules, international experience). The
calculated control inputs can then serve as potential action-tools for policy makers. Fi-
nally, because this approach is very flexible, it can easily be adapted to other disciplines
(e.g., chemistry, medicine) but also to other countries.
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Hence, the statistical capacity (in terms of error control), the economic relevance
(in terms of macroeconomic scope and exogeneous nature of the control inputs) and
the unlimited potentialities for application expansions of the CIPEGE tool, makes it an
attractive and valuable decision tool for universities and policy makers.
As with any approach of predictive control, the model is the cornerstone of the
strategy and needs to be clearly identified from consistent data. At this early stage of
the project, the statistical robustness of the results obtained from different simulations
is very encouraging. However, given the lack of points of observation at hand, any
economic and political interpretation of these early results would be irrelevant and ad-
venturous. Additional data will, not only improve the model and the tracking accuracy
of the reference employability, but also provide sufficient information to draw pertinent
economic conclusions and political recommendations. So far, what comes out from our
simulations is the key role that the attractiveness of the ES programs seems to play to
ensure sufficient enrollment rates and adequate completion rates. One possible option
could be an increase in the investments devoted to the communication of the CIPEGE
tool results to the main stakeholders (i.e., Higher Education Ministry, universities, stu-
dents and industries).
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Abstract
The article’s aim is to show how the modelization of market interac-
tions could be greatly improved by taking into account some of the param-
eters which have proved to be crucial to the understanding of the relation
between language and information. Namely their performative, attentional
and sequential dimensions. After describing these dimensions and pre-
senting the shortcomings of theoretical assumptions which ignore them,
it turns to the modelization of autonomous performative prices under a
constraint of scarcity of attention and sequentiality (vs centralized and si-
multaneous fixation of constative prices under no constraint of attention).
It is then shown that such a modelization should start with accounting for
the performative capacity of individuals to set their own prices, and thus
with the fact that this capacity is primarily constrained by the curve of
reaction (IDC) to his/her proposals, and then by the possibility to merge
this information with one’s own knowledge of the cost and capacity con-
straints, allowing the formation of a decision curve (OFC) describing all
the equally realistic/realizable options among which the price must be cho-
sen. It is then shown that this framework allows to describe in a unitary
way price formation and performative prices in extremely variable inter-
actional settings but must be complemented by considering the role and
importance of macroeconomic eviction in the upstream determination of
IDC, illustrating once again the fact that, ultimately, adopting an interac-
tionally realistic approach only implies to reconsider the ordering of the
constraints at stake.
16.1 Introduction
From ethology, the science of animal and human behavior (and a branch of biology) to
pragmatics, a science which studies the constraints that govern verbal interactions (and
a branch of linguistics) to the sociologies of interactions, half a century of empirical
scrutiny and theoretical studies of interactions will be the background of what follows,
even if only some aspects of its main outcomes will be considered.
Similarly, from Cournot’s first mathematical theory of price formation to general
equilibrium and game theory, the study of market interactions within economics also
has a long history, with the specificity of not embracing directly an « interactionist »
- and hence neither individualistic nor holistic - stance, as is always the case in the
above-mentioned disciplines.
Given this double background, our ultimate goal will be to consider and discuss
three issues.
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The first issue concerns the way the modelization of the complexity of market in-
teractions could be transformed by taking into account some of the parameters which
have proved, within interactionist frameworks, to be crucial to a correct understand-
ing of the relation between language, communication and information. We shall in
particular discuss the way the performative, attentional and sequential dimension of
interactions may prove useful or necessary when it comes to the description of market
interactions
The second issue concerns what is arguably the most original aspect of the way in-
teractions have been approached within economic questioning - namely by also ques-
tioning the "interactions between interactions” - could the other way round transform
the way “individual/local”2 interactions are to be described, notably by forcing the
analyst to clarify the way such interdependencies could be modelized.
Our last issue will be to discuss somehow programmatically the way it could be-
come possible to build models of market interactions which would both fully admit
the ultimate autonomy of micro-micro interactions and acknowledge the non-less real
interdependency between them.
As for the first objective, we shall first recall the reasons which have led to a pro-
found transformation of the study of language and languages after the late 60s, when
linguists started to take seriously into account the enunciative3 and interactional dimen-
sion of language and specifically the fact that there is nothing in languages that was not
primarily in an interlocutive and interactive setting and thus that has not been shaped
by interactional constraints. We shall then question the heuristic value of what has been
learnt in this process and wonder if the discovery of the strongly interactional nature
of utterances could prove insightful for the study of market interactions. Specifically,
due to the limitation of space here, we shall limit ourselves to the discussion of three
of the features and constraints which could arguably be considered as both inherent to
all human interactions and important in the study of market interactions, namely their
performative, attentional and sequential dimension.
We shall also ask ourselves whether any global or local representation of market in-
teractions may ignore or neglect these dimensions, bearing in mind that when it comes
to the role of language in the description of market interactions, it is the case that one
must consider:
i. the use of language (including in computerized and algorithmized form) in the
very process of market price setting;
ii. the fact that prices themselves are linguistic utterances (and trading utterances);
iii. the use of language (including in mathematical form) in the model itself;
iv. the fact that the interpretation associated to these models is itself language based;
v. the fact that all those layers are actually interdependent, which makes it impossi-
ble to make a specific assumption concerning one layer, without making implicit
assumptions about other layers.
2 Interactionist approaches tend to consider individual interactions as the fundamental ground of analyti-
cal work.
3 The concept of énonciation describes the fact for something to be said (uttered). It has proven to
be the case (see Nemo, 1999) that because of the existence of pragmatic constraints on the fact of saying
something, the interpretation of the utterance is deeply altered by its enunciation. It also describes the fact
that this dimension of language actually shapes all linguistic realities.
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Our answer to this question will be to claim that the relationship between language
and what is commonly called information appears to be such that the notion of infor-
mation just cannot be defined and modelized outside and independently of language
interactions. And also claim that this is a chance when it comes to the modelization of
market interactions, because it allows and forces to integrate parameters which cannot
reasonably be overlooked.
As for clarifying what point iv) concretely means, we may provide a clear-cut ex-
ample of this interpretational layer in the interpretation of the supply curve in partial
equilibrium models, which nowadays is routinely interpreted and taught as the mere
aggregation of the suppliers answers to the question “which quantity would you offer
at such or such price ?”, whereas in Marshall’s work it was actually obtained by asking
a very different question, namely “what price would be necessary for you to offer such
or such quantity ?”. Meanwhile, it must further be noticed that those interpretations
would be either inconsistent or contradicting if the interpretation of the question itself
was not actually “which quantity would you offer at such or such price, if you were
sure to sell this quantity?”4 and “what price would be necessary for you to offer such
or such quantity, if you were sure to sell this quantity? ”. Otherwise, in both cases,
it could be predicted that the only consistent answers to the question would and could
only be “it depends on how much I can sell at this price”. As a consequence; it may
be proven to be the case that the curves of supply and demand cannot in reality co-
exist and be presented together in a single model, and that they must be considered as
“incompossible”, to use a logical terminology. One would indeed have to presuppose5
that all participants, when they answer both questions will assume that no price will
ever be adopted which doesn’t allow supply to be met by the corresponding demand.
But in that case, it would both be the case that the existence of a market equilibrium
would be a premise of the model and not its conclusion, and that the mere existence
of the demand curve would imply that the participants assumption is ill-founded and
based on incorrect and poor information.
16.2 Performativity, price modeling and market inter-
actions
Starting with performativity, which concerns what is called the direction of fit between
the words and the world and which opposes constative utterances6 (in which the world
precedes the words, which must adjust to it7) and performative ones (in which words
4 The very same presupposition is also present in the interpretation of the Marshallian variant of the
question.
5 At all steps of the construction of the partial equilibrium model, the same assumption is made, for
instance when it comes to quantify the expected income of an individual supplier, the parameter used (i.e.
a “price x quantity” multiplication) makes sense only if it is assumed that the quantity at stake will be sold,
otherwise the information provided by the demand curve can only be described as illusory or irrational.
6 The distinction between constative and performative utterances in pragmatics is a legacy of John Austin
book “how to do things with words" (1962). It opposes utterances which simply describe something which
exist prior to the utterance itself, and utterances with a potential to create the reality which they are talking
about. A single sentence such as « the session is opened » may thus be used as a constative utterance,
for instance when uttered by a journalist who is just reporting the fact that the session is open, and as a
performative utterance when uttered by the chairman. Who is, literally, opening the séance by declaring that
it is open.
7 Constative utterances are thus either true or false depending on whether what is said is consistent with
a preexisting world.
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come first and it is the world which has adjust to them8), it may be recalled (Nemo,
1995) that while there is no doubt whatsoever that in reality:
- prices are utterances;
- prices are performative utterances and not constative ones, which strictly forbids
to consider them as true or false in the logical sense of the term;
- prices do not describe a pre-existing and non interactional object that could be
called "value" or anything that could be measured;
- a price is actually something “to take or leave”, and thus is a reality only insofar
as it is accepted by someone;
- prices are therefore not entities which could be concerned or associated with the
logical principle of non-contradiction;
the main models used to account for price formation routinely take for granted the
opposite assumptions, namely :
- the idea that prices are propositions (in the logical sense of the term);
- the idea that market prices are not only propositions but true propositions;
- the idea that market prices form a system (which can be modelized as a sys-
tem of equations) in which they have to satisfy the logical principle of non-
contradiction, with the extraordinary outcome of allowing to name “general equi-
librium” what is actually nothing else that the logical principle of non-contradiction,
and to call “price-taking” what is nothing else that the negation of performativity.
This negation of performativity has moreover been extensively axiomatized over time
by a set of assumptions and prohibitions which make it to some degree unthinkable.
The most radical form of eradication of the performative dimensions of prices ap-
pears to be the possibly involuntary consequence of the formulation of the question
which has shaped all price theory, namely Cournot’s foundational questioning of the
effect of the number of suppliers on the fixation of price, and the way it was answered,
namely by considering successively a market with one supplier (monopoly), with full
performative capacity to set the price, a market with two or a small number suppliers
(duopoly or oligopoly), with a relative capacity to influence the price etc. and finally
the so-called perfectly competitive market with plenty of small suppliers unable to have
any influence on price-fixation which are considered as price-takers and are thus devoid
of any performative price-setting capacity.
It appears however (Nemo, 1994, 1995) that Cournot’s questioning and line of
reasoning, is flawed by the fact of being based on the tacit (and uncontrolled) presup-
position that the number of suppliers in a market may be considered constant, when it
cannot. Given that this presupposition requires in order to be acceptable nothing less
than to assume the price level to be completely unable to affect or modify the number
of suppliers present on the market. It turns out that because the opposite is true in a
true (Darwinian) market, the number of suppliers which are able to stay in the market
8 Performative utterances are thus said (Austin, How to do things with words? 1962) to be either happy or
unhappy depending on whether what is said becomes a reality following being said, or not. While constative
utterances have as mentioned truth-conditional values and are true or false, performative utterances are de-
scribed in terms of conditions of felicity and are said to be either felicitous/(happy) or unfelicitous/(unhappy).
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decrease steadily with price level, such traditionally unthinkable realities as a perfectly
competitive monopoly may occur, in which at a (low) price, only one supplier will be
present on the market, while at higher prices more suppliers would be present. It also
turns out that performativity is essential for the description of such truly competitive
markets, and that performativity cannot be reduced to the desire to fix high prices but
must actually be considered actually as a mean (and weapon) to exclude competitors
from the market. Cournot’s approach and all its legacy in mainstream economics may
thus be characterized as leading to ignore what is possibly the core nature of market
competitiveness: the capacity to remain in a market when prices are going down. As a
consequence, “price-taking” models (and so-called perfect competition) are associated
with a non-Darwinian notion of competition which actually excludes any competition
of any kind between competitors.
A second way of ignoring performativity and pragmatics all together concerns the
status of the information/declaration provided by market participants, about which it is
either simply assumed that interactants will never lie when asked to provide informa-
tion about their market intentions, even if lying would in fact be arguably profitable, or
simply assumed that they will be forced to “stick to their words”, without considering
that it is not possible to name information what is in fact a performative commitment
(and thus nothing less than a verbal contract).
An even more problematic aspect of General Equilibrium theory is to actually pro-
hibit any two individuals (or groups)9 to reach any direct performative agreement out-
side of a general equilibrium. This prohibition being the consequence of the model
incapacity to recognize any autonomy and self sufficiency to local interactions
A major issue and challenge in the modelization of market interactions is thus to
fully admit and integrate the performative dimension of prices as an indisputable and
important reality, without being led to consider local interactions as independent one
of another, since they are not.
16.3 Attentional constraints on interaction
Together with ethologists, psychologists and pragmatists, we may first admit that any
human interaction requires attention from the people involved, and that attention at an
individual level is a scarce resource which is limited both quantitatively and qualita-
tively, humans being unable to pay attention to many things at the same time, let alone
to everything.
We may further admit to be true that all humans need attention from other humans,
and that this need to get and receive attention from others, and to have their exis-
tence and value recognized, is a reality which is at the heart of the human condition10
(Todorov, 1995) to the point of contradicting and countering selfishness11.
Once combined, it follows firstly from these two sets of assumptions that since all
human life involves an allocation of scarce attentional time, not only between produc-
tion, consumption and trade, but also between economic activity and non-economic
activity, any postulation of unlimited attention and overestimation of the (attentional)
capacity to process information in a given time should be banned in the modelization
9 For a postulation of the opposite, see the "islands" of Edmund. Phelps (1969, 1970)
10 And is as mentioned by Todorov, virtually insatiable.
11 More precisely, it can be shown that many if not most of the behaviors associated with so-called selfish-
ness may be proven to ultimately be aimed at social recognition and competition for recognition. The same
could be proven also and to the same extent for altruistic behavior.
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of interactions. They also imply that it is not possible to describe human behavior in
purely individualistic terms, let alone to equate rationality with the maximization of in-
dividual interest, once acknowledged the fact that the satisfaction something represents
for someone will be ultimately dependent (and this to a large extent) on its attentional
value at a collective/social level in human interactions. So that as long as individu-
als are sensitive to the way they and their choices are considered, choices cannot be
solipsistic.
Miles away from such an attentional understanding of the nature of information and
interactional information, it is important to realize that what has been called "perfect
information" in economic theory may (and in fact must) be considered as an “absolute
informational chaos” once attentional constraints are taken into account. Because of
the limited ability of individual information processing due to the limited character of
attention12. Because of the fact that being bombarded with irrelevant information will
automatically lead to the non-treatment of the information in question, and by interac-
tion suspension. And finally because information circulation cannot but be limited to
relevant information and be dependent on the pragmatic constraints on relevance.
As importantly, it may be said that any modelization of interactions which postu-
lates for a population of n individuals that everyone is related to everyone, and that
everyone is aware of everything, does not describe nor a possible world nor an ideal
world, but on the contrary an impossible world and an absolute chaos. “Islands”, if
they are to be modelized at all, should not be conceived as imperfect fragment or a
larger reality but as reasonable aggregates in the first place.
Firstly, because it implies that because the mere existence of any offer - be it to
sell/supply or to buy/demand - requires an allocation of attention by a hearer, struggling
for such attention is no less important in economy, to use an euphemism, than it is in
other areas;
Secondly and most importantly, because the organization of mercantile exchanges
in markets, trade fairs, shows, etc. is already based on this logic of visibility and
minimization of attentional costs.
And finally because efficient communication and information requires attentional
coordination, which, when it concerns large groups of individuals, may emerge only in
collectively organized forms.
This implies thus for each interactant to constantly adjust to his interlocutors and
select the relevant interlocutors. And also that it is not possible to consider interaction
and information as separated issues, the existence and maintenance of interaction being
dependent on attention and relevance and the mere existence of information presuppos-
ing interaction.13
It also means that capacities to win the battle for attention and relevance, such as
empathy and mind-reading, are crucial properties of individuals. As are crucial the
capacity to know, to guess, to influence and to manipulate the attention of others and
through doing this their choices. With the result that choices, ultimately, form an atten-
tional system, whose interactional and social nature cannot be ignored or minimized:
people for instance do not only buy goods for what they are, but to a considerable
12 The idea associated with so-called perfect information being that everyone should be informed of ev-
erything is in this respect both quantitatively impossible in purely cognitive terms and irrational since most
of this information will be devoid of any interest for the receptors. Scarcity of attentional resources imposes
rational information to always be goal-oriented, which makes knowledge about goals themselves a crucial
form of information.
13 In a certain sense, one cannot separate information from its interactional attentional dimension more
than it would be possible to separate genetic code from its DNA materiality. Extra-interactional information
simply does not exist.
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extent through the way these goods are seen and valued by others. And in such a
context, postulating only psychologically solipsistic agents with the sole capacity of
maximizing solipsistic wellness appears thus arguably as disputable as ignoring the
interdependency of markets.
Attentional constraints thus are a parameter which cannot be ignored in the descrip-
tion of market interactions, be it when they are considered as a whole, because they
quantitatively limit the global flow of information, or at the level of each individual,
because they considerably constrain his/her economic and non-economic behavior.
16.4 Sequentiality and market interactions
Another fundamental characteristics of any interaction from a social or language-oriented
perspective, is sequentiality, i.e. not only the fact that everybody’s actions are also re-
actions to previous actions - and also reactions to reactions, etc. - but also the fact
that they are ordered chronologically and that such scheduling is indeed crucial to the
analysis of market interactions and its outcome.
Considering the apparently trivial fact that a mercantile interaction can begin with
either an offer or a demand, both of which may be associated with a price or not, and
that this first step either leads to an effective exchange or doesn’t, not mentioning pos-
sible bargaining process in between, it is worth wondering whether this sequentiality
may be completely ignored in the analysis of what is going on - for instance by trying
to model the meeting of supply and demand as a non-sequential event in which two
"forces" would meet exactly as simultaneous physical forces (Mirowski, 1989) - or
whether we should instead take seriously the time gap between supply and demand (or
vice versa) into account.
Given that there are numerous reasons to adopt the least view, we shall only be able
here to spell out some of them.
What has to be remembered first is the fact that for an individual with no possible
knowledge of all current interactions, the concrete form taken by the reactions to their
offers or demands is the primary and more reliable source of information available,
and that this reaction is to a large extent a function of what in pragmatics is called
common ground, in other words any form of shared knowledge about previous market
exchanges.
An illustration of the first aspect of the question is that if the performative nature of
prices implies to accept the idea that exchanges moves (offers or demands) have to be
ratified, it is both the case that the sequential nature of ratification allows it to convey
a crucial information, and that describing verbal exchanges that do not result in a
commercial exchange is at least as important for the description of market economic
interactions that describing those who do.
An illustration of the second aspect of this question is that - while the gap between
offer and demand and vice-versa is typically associated with both considering previous
and alternative offers, so that for instance the more important the transaction the bigger
the time gap between a proposal and its acceptance will typically take - information is
time and time is money and this in both temporal direction14;
14 To give but one ordinary example, one may consider this excerpt from a New-York Times article entitled
“In a Seller’s Market, Every Minute Counts” (Higgins, 2013) : The rules of engagement for buying an
apartment in the city have changed. Negotiation, brokers say, is no longer part of the equation. Forget about
taking time to mull over your decision. Serious buyers need to be prepared to pounce.
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As for the markets whose appearance is one of absolute simultaneity (and thus
should be considered as counter-examples to the importance of sequentiality), it can be
shown that computerized markets for example, far from making a case for the possi-
bility to theoretically ignore sequentiality, are on the contrary the clearest proof ot the
opposite, with huge profits relying on the capacity to have a quicker reaction than other
interactants, to the point of replacing humans in the decision process by algorithms, to
gain edges in sequential competition.
As for the interlocutive and linguistic aspects of economic interactions, it must be
emphasized that the actual diversity of the communicative form they may take (e.g.
ad, poster, price tag, price-list, catalog, price quotation, individual bargaining, auction,
“criée”, auctioneer, organized market, computerized market, etc.) is embedded in the
organization of sequentiality, typically by institutionalizing a time frame to regulate
individual interventions. All of which need not be considered as irrelevant or negli-
gible when it comes to accounting for price formation or for the parameterization of
interactions.
Firstly, because of the fact that these communicative forms do not only co-exist
and compete one with another, but are actually quite often deeply dependent one with
another. So that the idea for instance that market theory should consider such or such
interactional and linguistic form of market exchanges - for instance those which rules
the wheat market in Chicago - as in any sense prototypical or ideal-typical of a market,
is empirically falsified by the fact that a market such as the wheat market is only the
emerged part of an interactional iceberg in which market interactions take the most
varied linguistic forms. Similarly, because the very idea of a prototypical or ideal-
typical market is associated with the idea that some markets would be a better incar-
nation/exemplar of markets in general than others, it must be abandoned. Economics
may study the competition between the various interactional forms of market inter-
actions, but it cannot axiomatize such or such institutionalized form as the best or
standard form of the market, for markets have existed for thousand of years under the
most varied form, and, more importantly, are strongly and structurally dependent one
from another: the Chicago wheat market cannot be opposed to retail trade for instance,
whose linguistic/informational and interactional organization is radically different, be-
cause the two interactional frames are in fact elements of a single continuum.
Secondly because this diversity should not be considered as an obstacle to the de-
scription of market interactions in a unified way, since it is both possible, once taken
into account our three parameters, to consider them contrastively and to spell out in-
variants.
Thirdly because there is nothing odd with the constant coexistence of new and old
forms and patterns of interaction - ranging from the most technologically advanced
ones such as algorithmized markets or politically motivated ones to immemorial forms
such as face to face bargaining - being in constant creation and institutionalization.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, it is also the case that because among other things in-
dividual interactions have their own time frame15, they are forcefully related to a mem-
ory of previous interactions (and of their outcomes) which is called common ground
15 Which to some degree may become institutionalized in collectively accepted forms. The term market
itself originally describes a traditional form of collective coordination and in that sense, instead of presup-
posing the existence of a market, or instead of presupposing the existence of thousands of markets, it is
important to understand that what is labeled market is nothing else than a form of collective organization
of economic interactions shaped by the scarcity of attentional constraints and the necessity to enhance all
participants visibility and accessibility. In a certain sense, such or such market was initially little else than a
meeting.
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and which is for instance compulsory to be able to answer such basic questions as
“which quantity would you buy at price P ?”. Pretending to ignore this reality, for
example by affecting to ignore that the information provided by the demand curve -
and which serves in the model as a premise to a representation of exchanges which
claims to describe interdependency in terms of absolute simultaneity - simply cannot
be obtained16 without a knowledge of previous prices17, is not an option but a fraud.
Meanwhile taking on this reality, and acknowledging the fact that it is inherent to the
informational reality whose modelization is at stake, could allow to understand that in-
dividuals may only position themselves in relation with a system of reference (and by
assuming in their answers that this system of reference is shared by their interlocutors)
and that whatever they say can only be interpreted in relation to this assumption; infor-
mation is complex by nature and embedded in common ground. Whisking away the
premises of the premises of a model is not a scientific option, nor is the modelization of
these informational premises possible by simply relying on the intuitive interpretation
of question/answers pairs of ordinary people without explicating its content..
16.5 Interactional autonomy and interdependencies in
the modelization of market exchanges
So far we have shown that when dealing with interactions, it is not possible to merely
“postulate” and presuppose their existence without taking into account the constraints
and parameters which define them and allows them to exist. We have also shown that
because any modelization is build on a linguistic frame18, it inevitably has its blind
spots that can literally render “unthinkable” many realities whose existence is beyond
doubt19. It is thus time now both to introduce a more positive perspective and to show
that widening our understanding of what interactions are, and notably acknowledging
both the strongly interactional and interlocutive nature of interactions and its linguistic
dimension, may be done without renouncing to the modelization of the interdepen-
dencies between interactions, which is arguably the most interesting contribution of
economics to their analysis.
Decades after the most explicit discussion (Kaldor, 1972) of the contradiction be-
tween Equilibrium theory’s claim to be a model of a decentralized market and its formal
reality as an extremely centralized market in which interdependencies are strongly and,
as far as information is concerned, counter-factually overstated, we are still looking for
16 Without the existence of this common ground, the only answers one could receive to a question such as
“which quantity would you buy for price p ?” would be questions such as “what can you buy for price p ?”,
etc.
17 It is worth noting that one cannot ask someone to forget this knowledge in his/her answers, with the
consequence that no common-ground free information can ever be produced.
18 The formal dimension of models doesn’t alter this reality, both because each of their elements has its
own linguistic interpretation and because models are framed by the issue they try to address, Meanwhile
because this issue is a question, it is forcefully linguistically and dependent on non explicit assumptions
(presuppositions). As we could see with Cournot’s assumption that the number of supplier in a market
may be considered constant and independent on price-level. And as can also be illustrated by the partial
equilibrium interpretations of the supply curve which were described above. It is indeed undisputable, both
that formalization cannot dissolve presuppositional issues (first identified by Frege himself) and that scientific
utterances, because they are answers to questions, inherit most of their semantic frames from the linguistic
framing of the questions.
19 In that sense, it must be understood that models cannot be considered as mere simplifications or ideal-
izations of reality, for they are indeed semantic filters which determine what is worth considering or not, and
in that sense may actually be “wrong” when they ignore dimensions of reality which cannot be overlooked.
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a model that would be able to combine relative autonomy and relative interdependence,
and we know from experience that attempting to approach this issue by trying to intro-
duce some autonomy in equilibrium interdependence - as was repeatedly attempted in
the last 45 years by somehow trying to disaggregate general equilibrium, and to avoid
a Walrasian “commissaire-priseur”20 are due to fail if an interaction-based conception
of interdependency is not spelled out.
When it comes to the co-existence of interactional autonomy and interdependence
between interactions, it is indeed important to realize that the modelization of interde-
pendency should not require neither a centralized market nor so-called perfect infor-
mation (and its pre-condition, the absolute interdependency of all interactions one with
another), But once acknowledged the facts i) that attention is scarce and thus that the
number of interactions is forcefully and strongly limited21; ii) that selling or buying is
a decision and that as a performative act they must therefore be considered as axiomat-
ically free and unpredictable; iii) information is accessible only through interactions
and thus limited and enhanced by individual capacity to enter interactions, it is possi-
ble to completely reconsider the way we see and understand market interdependencies
and market information, and to realize that in interactions, autonomy and interdepen-
dency come as the two sides of a single coin, interdependency being “embedded” in
autonomy and vice-versa22.
To provide a concrete illustration of this reality, one may consider for instance
the modelization of demand in an attentionally constrained market ultimately defined
by performative autonomy. Departing from the idea that aggregated demands would
meet aggregated supplies producing an equilibrium market price which the individual
interactants would have to accept as a fatality they cannot escape, we may consider that
at the level of the individual interactant, demand23 is basically nothing but the name of
either the reaction which an interactant encounters when he/she proposes something, or
his/her reaction to a proposition which another interactant has made.And consequently
that describing economic encounters and understanding economic interdependencies
impose:
- to consider the individual offer/demand exchange as the primary form and pre-
condition of economic decisions in a merchant society;
- to describe a decentralized and non-institutionalized market as ultimately based
on a set of “individual demand curves” (IDCs from now on24, representing all
the credible responses to his/her offers that an individual may observe or expect,
20 In mainstream market theory, the fixation of a market price is described as a process involving a com-
missioner whose role is to gather information for the determination of the equilibrium price. The term
used is French “commissaire-priseur” in which priseur means litteraly “pric-er” (which would translate as
“price-maker” in English).
21 Even admitting a twitter-like connection between all interactants, in other words even assuming the
possibility for an information to be shared by all, it follows from the scarcity of attention that only a limited
number of topics (and information) could be widely shared, and that perfect attention on one subject would
forcefully mean imperfect or no attention to others. Modelizing the allocation of attention is thus a pre-
condition of any modelization of exchanges.
22 Among other things, because performative prices are autonomous decisions which are interactionally
constrained.
23 A point which must be clarified is that equality between demand and supply may both be said to be
an analytic truth as a consequence of the fact that all effective exchange is simultaneously an offer and a
demand, and to be problematic if at a given price not all demand or supply is satisfied.
24 IDCs thus are distinct here from what is called an individual demand curve in neoclassical theory, the
individual being the supplier/offerer and the IDC resulting from the aggregation of each demander demand
to him/her.
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a curve of reaction) forming a set of coexisting but not aggregated25 demand
curves.
Further admitting that theses curves have a temporal dimension, which is variable, and
that they are the main and often only source of information available to the initiator
of the interaction, we may define “perfect information” at interactant level as the exact
knowledge of the form of theses curves and “imperfect information” at interactant level
as ignorance or uncertainty of the form of these curves.
Being aware of the fact that the outcomes of the trading process is determined
equally by the individual demand curve and the “offerer”26constraints and reactions to
this curve, it is important to understand that the reactions which an individual demand
curve synthesizes are in fact reactions not only to a specific offer but to all existing
alternatives to that offer.
It follows from this that no matter how autonomous an interaction later is when it
comes to economic decisions and actual exchanges, it must be understood that the very
form of a demand curve is the trace of its current state of relatedness between the
on-going interactions and all other interactions, and that consequently “islands” are
not truly “islands” because autonomy does not mean independence.
It follows from this that there is no such thing as a purely local interaction, once
understood that each interaction is indeed connected to the global interactional web
through the form of the IDC demand curve. It also follows that because each au-
tonomous decision potentially affects the later form of possibly all other demand curves,
be it marginally, we may further realize that the detailed/interactional form of the de-
mand curves allows the offerer to gain direct information and also to make interpreta-
tional inferences, providing him/her in both cases to a precise mapping of the current
situation. This being a consequence of the difference between “aggregative demand” -
which provides only access to the global quantity which is demanded at such or such
price - and « interactional/detailed demand » which also provides a more precise infor-
mation about “who want what at what price” as we shall see now.
16.5.1 Interactional complexity of IDCs
The fact that what has been labeled here “individual demand curve” is simultaneously
deeply interactional is clearly its most interesting feature. It must be indeed stressed
out that the IDC is individual only from the perspective of an individual offerer F1: it
aggregates in fact a set of reactions for each distinct individual D1, D1, etc which are
in interaction27 with F1. and which we shall label DDCs (demander demand curve) to
avoid any confusion. Since these DDCs are interpersonal reaction functions, it must
further be stressed out as mentioned that the IDC provides F1 with much more precise
information than the purely quantitative figure that classical demand curves used to
provide. For each price, S1 will indeed know which quantity (s)he could sell if (s)he
25 In a decentralized market, and in a situation of strictly balanced competition, it may be assumed that in-
dividual IDCs for a commodity are, at each price, obtained by the division of the quantity which is demanded
globally by the number of suppliers which are present at that price.
26 « Offerer » here could not be replaced by « supplier » because this last word presupposes an exchange
which is not certain at that stage and may never occur. Far from any false symmetry between the two sides
of the market, it must be stressed out that the ultimate decision always belong to the offerer, who even tough
he/she may be cornered and left with little choice, is the only one with the performative power of making the
transfer true, or to transfer this power to his/her interlocutor(s).
27 It must be stressed out indeed that each IDC aggregates a variable number of interactors, and a variable
set of interactors, due to the attentional constraint which strictly forbid all offerers to be in interaction with
everyone.
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wanted to, but (s)he will also know individually each interlocutor’s price sensitivity
so that the information which is available is both much more precise and much more
relevant than the aggregated information postulated in classical price theory.
As for this last point, it must be remarked that the problem of knowing which
degree of sincerity can be attributed to each DDC is not a parameter which the model
has to decide for, for it can vary. But what can be said about it is that there are some
interactional rules about it and they are interestingly asymmetrical: A basic fact about
a DDC is that saying something as “I would buy such quantity if it was offered at such
price” is an utterance with a commissive value. This means, in other words, that it
constitutes a commitment from the individual demander, and should be considered as
a pre-contract28. Not only because commitment to the truth of what is said is a general
commitment in human conversation (e.g. Grice’s Maxim of quality), but because it
concerns the credibility and the reputation of the individual demander involved whose
credibility is a social and interactional capital whose value must not be underestimated.
It does not however follow from this that what is said may be considered as a
reliable and undisputable premise when it comes to exchange modelization, because
the commissivity of the utterance is in fact strongly asymmetrical; the necessity for
the demander involved to stick to his/her word in order to preserve its reputation being
restricted to the necessity not to demand less than stated previously but does not forbid
him/her to demand more than previously stated. One may indeed pretend for instance
than (s)he is not interested by something at such a price, and it may simply be false,
the reality being that (s)he would still be interested at that price, as the future may later
prove. Which is consistent with the fact that bluffing may be an essential and normal
part of what will then be called a bargaining or negotiation process, for instance by
pretending that one does not want something at a certain price or that selling under a
certain price would be unconceivable. To this extent, DDCs may have a manipulatory
dimension which must not be ignored or outlawed. But the above-mentioned constraint
of sticking to one’s word does not apply to changes which are conceived as favorable
to the other participant. So that finally accepting something which was initially refused
will rather be considered as a defeat than in terms of lack of reliability. Commitment
thus will be restricted to forbidding any back-tracking that would be disadvantageous
to the receiver of the “comitmental” utterance. Another important dimension of DDCs
is that what an individual demander will answer may prove to be, to some extent,
dependent on the hypotheses (s)he will make about the global IDC of the supplier.
So that on the one hand, it may often be the case that what will be answered will be
based on self-conscious beliefs transforming it into a kind of bet that one may perfectly
loose29.
16.5.2 From IDC as a reaction curve to OFC as a decision curve
But once acknowledged all this background, the main issue will be to know how and to
which extent an IDC will determine or influence what ultimately will take place in the
exchange. Modeling this issue starts with the necessity to predict which reaction the
individual offerer will have to his/her IDC but supposes then to admit that this reaction
28 If the utterance is addressed to a single offerer. If addressed to various offerers, it becomes a call for a
price proposal but remains a commitment, not to someone in particular but to anyone who will react to it.
29 In that sense, it is the case on the one hand that equilibrium between expressed demand and supply
may perfectly coexist with unsatisfied (because unexpressed) demand and effective disequilibrium, and also
the case that because bets are speculations, the idea that expressed demand should always be satisfied is not
rational.
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will be a two-step reaction in which the ordering of constraints will be the opposite of
the ordering which is postulated by the centralized approach to price fixation.
The information provided by his/her IDC allows each individual offerer to know for
each price the quantity that (s)he could sell at that price. But since this quantity is not
most of the time the quantity that (s)he want or can provide at that price, and since (s)he
knows which quantity (s)he could sell at each price if the corresponding demand ex-
isted, our performative offerer is informationally in a position to merge information
about demand and information about constraints on supply into a unique decision
curve in which each price is associated with a quantity (which measure the aggregative
felicity of a price, i.e. the number of times the performative utterance will become
true). As for the modelization of price fixation, the fact that each performative in-
teractant is in terms of information perfectly able to adjust demand and supply at all
prices before having to choose between them is a feature which radically transform the
way price-fixation can be approached and modelized and implies the construction of
what we propose to call an offerer felicity-curve (OFC from now on) from the IDC
base, prior to the price fixation itself which comes as the last step and is described in
terms of making a choice between equally possible prices, all of whom being so to say
“equilibrium”30 prices.
A felicity curve may be defined as constrained by the adjustment/alignment of pos-
sible supply on the one hand and IDC on the other hand, and as aimed at providing a
realistic representation of the options in terms of exchange which are available to the
offerer involved. It may further be defined by an alignment rule which states that it
consists:
for each price, in the quantity that may be exchanged will be either the
quantity which is demanded, if it is superior or equal to what can be sup-
plied, or in the maximal quantity which may be supplied, if it is inferior to
what is demanded 31
and this for all prices for which this quantity is not null.32
In the arguably standard situation in which potential demand decrease with prices
and potential supply increase with prices, there will further be a price which may be
called an inflection price and may be characterized as threshold between the supply
constrained part of the felicity curve associated with lower prices and the demand con-
strained part of the OFC associated with higher prices, but this price of inflection will
play no specific role in what ultimately will determine the final setting of the offerer’s
price, which will be a matter of choosing between all the realistic options represented
by the felicity curve. For its role is only to provide a complete set of “price/quantity”
pairs which all can be felicitous, even though not all prices will later prove to be equally
advantageous for the offerer.
It follows from this that the freedom of the offerer to fix a price is limited to the
felicity curve, so that (s)he is not a price-taker but a felicity-curve taker. An individual
cannot define what is possible, but (s)he may define what takes place.
30 The use of equilibrium here is similar to its use in game theory, where it is interpreted as “possible” and
not as “necessary” (see Cadiot & Nemo, 1997), due to the fact that no assumption is made that there would
be only one equilibrium price, and to the more positive observation that nothing could prohibit this price to
become true if ever for any reason, it was chosen.
31 In classical terms, it means that the felicity curve represent the association of a price with the shorter
side of the market. But plays a completely different role, being a decision curve.
32 This implies that the felicity curve starts at the minimal price for which something could be sold and
ends at the maximal price at which something can be sold, thus representing at the level of the individual the
possibilities of exchange (and hence his/her “market”).
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16.5.3 From decision-curve OFC to price fixation
The final step of the process, and of its modelization, concerns the choice which our of-
ferer will make between all the equally realistic options which are available to him/her
and which are synthesized in the OFC. In this respect, considering this process to be
driven by maximization and optimality is a first approximation, which should not mask
the fact that what exactly an optimal price stand for might prove to be quite variable,
not least because of the variabilility of IDCs in the first place, the variability and dy-
namics of production capacities, and this of the OFC and also because maximization is
strongly time-framed.
It is important nevertheless to stress out that such an optimality model of decen-
tralized performative deeply question the relevance of transforming the constraints of
adjusting supply with demand into a price-setting mechanism, for it assumes that max-
imization takes place first (being a central assumption for the modelization of supply)
and then that the adjustment of supply and demand will decide of the price, whose role
is thus forcefully to ensure this adjustment. Whereas in an economy in which individ-
ual performative price fixation is the rule, adjustment between supply and offer will
(only) be a key constraint for the determination through OFC of the exchange options,
with maximization taking place only in the comparison between these options.
It must also be stressed out that the ultimate right to fix one’s own price cannot be
denied to an offerer under any circumstances or assumptions, for two complementary
reasons, both of which cannot be ignored in any attempt to model price fixation. The
first is that the term price-taker is actually used to denote a market-price taker and as-
sociated with a cournotian line of reasoning according to which when offerers become
too small they loose all capacity to influence the market-price, notably to set it at a
higher price than this market-price. Where in reality and axiomatically any individual
will always keep the right to propose any price for what he has to offer and in particu-
lar to propose a lower price than any existing market-price. So that not model can ever
make the opposite claim, let alone transform price-taking into an axiom and overlook
the complex assumptions which are implicitly associated with it.
Proving it is easy, for it is possible to describe within our three-step model of per-
formative pricing (IDC, OFC, price selection) the kind of situations which allegedly
are associated with price-taking. A first feature of such a situation would require that
in the IDC demand would be inexistent for any price higher than the price offered by
the market (or competitors). Another feature would then be that for lower prices33,
it would require them to be less interesting than the price offered by competitors. So
that ultimately, it may be shown on the one hand that “price-taking” could occur in
many circumstances unrelated to cournotian assumptions, and more importantly that
the interpretation associated with price-taking (namely that the offerer has literally no
option but to adopt the “market” price) is ill-founded, since such price-taking may
only take place34 in a situation in which adopting the “market” price is the best option,
33 The same would be the case for higher prices if demand was not inexistent.
34 Another situation in which something similar to price-taking could be observed is what might be called
“mimetic pricing”, i.e. a situation in which an offerer will choose as its price the same price than his com-
petitors. The rationality of such a strategy could be explained by admitting the simultaneous existence of an
MDC (a mimetic demand curve), i.e. of a set of answers to the question “which quantity would you buy to
me if everybody’s price was p ?” (versus “Which quantity would you buy to me if my price was p” for the
IDC) and of a favorable comparison of the MDC’s outcome with the IDC’s outcome. In any case, it must be
stressed out that mimetic pricing is unrelated with cournotian price-taking notably because the copied price
is a performative one and because, typically, mimetic pricing consists in not proposing a higher price than
the copied one and implies that the “market” price-maker will be the proposer of the lower price, whoever
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and thus remains a choice and something quite distinct from the cournotian powerless
price-taker whose modelization requires performative autonomous pricing.
The same could be said about the idea that price fixation should be a clearing pro-
cess, leaving no demand unsatisfied and no supply in stock at the fixed price, where
in reality it is not part of anyone’s responsibility to set his/her own price to allow for
the satisfaction of all demand at a given price, nor acceptable to assume that anyone
should be especially concerned about clearance per se and the inflection price in par-
ticular.35 Wondering what could happen in an IDC/OFC model if clearance was to
become an exchange issue, for instance if there was frustration or competition among
demanders for an available supply and not only transfer of the unsatisfied demand to
someone or to something else, may nevertheless be interesting. In such a case, one
issue would indeed be to know to who the available supply would be attributed and
is solution widely variable: first arrived first served, priority to regular customer, con-
tacting only a subset of interactants to avoid frustrating the others, temporal queuing,
delayed delivery, ordering or reservation, redirecting demand to someone else, subcon-
tracting, etc. All of which may take place without any necessity to change the price
itself, unless the situation lead to a modification of certain DDCs and hence of the IDC
and OFC. As; for instance, if unsatisfied demanders try to avoid being excluded from
exchange by accepting higher prices than stated previously, especially if their non-
sincere DDC failed, thus changing their DDC (and hence the IDC, the OFC) or finally
if they propose to pay a higher price than others to obtain priority, thus creating a dual
price system. But once again, because an important dimension of any interaction is
that the interactional settings cannot be unilaterally changed36, and because the choice
of a price is made with perfect knowledge of the OFC, adopting a higher price in case
of shortage is ruled out by the fact that the shortage was perfectly known before price
fixation, and cannot thus be considered as a possible driver of price change. It may
thus be said that price per se is not the adjustment parameter, contrary to IDCs, which
may adjust to the situation associated with a chosen price. With the consequence that
the DDC/IDC/OFC/Optimality sequence in itself as a model of price fixation will not
be affected by such variations, which are the simple result of the fact that DDCs are to
some extent revisable.
In any case, what we hope to have shown is that performativity and its modelization
is not a problem but a solution.
16.5.4 Web adjustment to price decisions
Admitting that the capacity for an individual to fix a price is neither absolute nor inexis-
tent, for being absolute within the OFC and inexistent outside of it, what remains to be
described is the way the choice of a price within an OFC may affect other interactions
and thus what we propose to call the exchange web.
The most immediate consequence of the fact that a price/quantity pair is chosen
is to clarify which commitments will have to be fulfilled and which commitments and
provisions are dissolved by this choice,
he might be.
35 Under specific but standard assumptions about the shape of the IDC, cost and maximization, it could be
shown that the quantity sold at this inflection price being greater than at lower prices, the choice of a price
lower than the inflection price could thus be excluded, excluding hence the existence of unsatisfied demand.
Higher prices than the inflection price remain possible and cannot be excluded.
36 Which means in other words that the rule of the game cannot be changed during the game without
recrimination.
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A second consequence is that this clarification will leave many with no other op-
tions than to turn to another offerer or product, thus leading to a modification of some
at least of their DDCs.
A last but crucial consequence is that since all exchange imposes a transfer of what
we shall call “validation rights” - in other words of the power for the offerer to become
a demander and to produce his/her own DDCs - it is also the case that in a closed
economy they will keep on being transferred indefinitely.
As a whole, it is thus the case that each individual exchange will modify the
premises of at least some of subsequent exchanges, through a pattern of propagation
which deserve to be modelized and whose minimal form is an exchange web and the
maximal form an exchange system.
16.5.5 From exchange web to exchange system
So far we have assumed that the performative power to make a price true was dependent
and constrained ultimately by a set of DDCs measuring the acceptability of a set of
price for a set of demanders with validation rights. And shown that any exchange
implied a transfer of such validation rights.
What we shall try to explain now in the short space available here will be that to
fully understand the performativity of price, it is also necessary to question the often
circular pattern of propagation of the validation rights themselves.
The most basic example of interdependencies between DDCs is division of labor
with a single standard of consumption, in other words people consuming A and B but
producing A or B. What is important for us in such a case is that the propagation of
validation rights is forcefully circular, the buying of A by producers of B being the con-
dition for the buying of B by A producers, leading to a situation in which, if hoarding
is excluded, whatever is spent by A producers will later on become their income and
vice-versa for producers of B. So that in performative terms, the performativity of a
price will ultimately be self perpetuating and based on a performativity cycle, allowing
for the clarification of the relationship between the micro-economics of performativity
and its macro-economic dimension.
With no possibility to address this last issue in any detail, it must be stressed out that
an important dimension of performativity appears to emerge from constraints which are
invisible in a strictly individual perspective but which are crucial to the understanding
of the overall relationships between performative prices.
A major constraint in that respect, which has been central to the explanation of
profits, i.e. to the explanation of the capacity of offerers to receive more validation
rights than they have initially transferred, the difference being called a profit, is based
on a complex chain of transfer of validation rights whose paradoxical starting point
is the impossibility for some validation rights to be used for all what is produced,
resulting in the concentration of these validation rights on a part P of what is produced,
which in turns allow the offerers of P to choose price-quantity pairs whose total value is
superior to what they have spent (and thus transferred), leaving them with a difference
that they can use to buy non-P products, with the ultimate constraint of a closure of the
system by validation of its starting point, which thus appears to be self-perpetuating.
The description of what takes place by reversing this sequence is also possible, as
is apparent in the claim attributed to Kalecki by Kaldor (1956, p. 96) according to
which “capitalists earn what they spent, workers spend what they earn” and in Keynes’s
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coining of the term Widow’s cruse37, and as can be illustrated by introducing in our
A+B economy, a new production C, C being for instance a 50 meters long luxury yacht
(or the building of a bridge whose exploitation/use will start only years later38) in a
situation where the producers of A+B cannot afford buying the luxury yacht. What
happens then is that any transfer of validation rights in the production of C will only
be usable to buy A or B, forcing through a rise of price the producers of A and B
to share the quantities of A and B with the producers of C and allowing the value of
these quantities to rise. What is worth understanding in any case is that such eviction
effects will translate directly into the existence of additional DDCs associated with the
production of C39, which will contribute to modify the IDC and the OFC of A and
B40 in the direction of increased demand at all prices and an elevation of the point of
inflection.
The conclusion of all this is that behind the IDCs and OFCs, important forces are
in action which might not be visible as such but which form a crucial background to
account for the performative power of fixing the price at a certain level.
When it comes to the modelization of the performative dimension of prices and
market interactions, what can be generalized from the Kalecki/Kaldor/Keynes41 macroe-
conomic principles is that given that the performativity of prices is directly constrained
by effective validation by validation rights detainers and that the role of validation
rights is to provide access to what is produced (or sold), it can be shown that what-
ever affects and restricts access to what is produced will similarly affect and restrict
the power of validation rights to provide such an access. Which means ultimately that
the role of validation rights in the price fixation process that we have described in the
previous section is itself further embedded on eviction mechanisms and practices, A
reality which can be illustrated by the fact that in the 18th century (see Thompson,
1971), the population was well and violently aware of the fact that the power of wages
to buy cereals was governed not only by climatic hazards and objective rarity but by
the concrete capacity of suppliers to hide cereals or export them away from those who
had produced them. At a local level, this reality was indeed undisputable and shows
that saying that prices reflect rarity, saying that prices are performative, and saying that
eviction is crucial to both are not contradictory claims, once acknowledged the fact that
rarity may prove to a large extent to be artificial and that prices are not mere consta-
tive utterances describing rareness as a preexisting reality, but performative utterances
whose conditions of felicity to some extent are eviction mechanisms and practices and
the capacity to create alone the rarity which they could seem to describe. The tempo-
rary conclusion of all this being that the study and modelization of the performativity
of prices could well allow to associate in a single model of price fixation, the modeliza-
tion of micro-micro-economic interactions, and the modelization of macro-economic
interdependencies, shedding considerable light on the macroeconomic dimension of
37 JohnMaynard Keynes (1930, p. 139) argued that profits forcefully emerged with increases in investment
and increases in consumption out of profits, stating that "however much of their profits entrepreneurs spend
on consumption, the increment of wealth belonging to entrepreneurs remains the same as before. Thus
profits, as a source of capital increment for entrepreneurs, are a widow’s cruse which remains undepleted
however much of them may be devoted to riotous living".
38 Access eviction is a polymorphous phenomenon, which can be the result among other things of: i)
the production of something which will never be sold (and financed through taxation for instance); ii) the
production of something which will take years to be amortized; iii) he production of luxury goods; iv) he
mere reservation of a part of ordinary production; v) the power to create money.
39 Notably wages.
40 We may assume here that if all producers of A (and B) were in a situation of perfect competition, the
IDC of each of them would be identical.
41 For more recent modelization of circuit transfers, see Schmitt (1966, 1996)
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micro-economic interactions, and vice-versa.
16.6 Conclusions
Our starting point was that because attention is scarce, because interactions conse-
quently are limited, because information can only emerge in interactions and has to
be relevant, and because prices are performative utterances which can become realities
only insofar as they are accepted, any model of market interactions which assumes or
axiomatizes the opposite claims cannot but fail to be a model of market interactions,
for it will overlook their inherent complexity and will have to postulate, under the name
of perfect information, an informational chaos.
What we have then started to demonstrate is that accepting all this parameters as re-
alities, far from turning the modelization of market interactions into an impossible task,
provide a reference frame in which its complexity and variability can be expressed. No-
tably by admitting that price theory should start with accounting for the performative
capacity of individual to set their own prices, and with describing the fact that such a ca-
pacity is primarily constrained by the curve of reaction (IDC) of the other interactants,
and then by the merging of this curve with one’s own knowledge of the cost and capac-
ity constraints to form a decision curve (OFC) which serves as the informational basis
for individual price fixation. Thus showing that modelization of autonomous agents
may comes at no price need in terms of capacity to account for interdependencies.
We have finally shown that performativity of prices may also reflect or create evic-
tion mechanisms, and more generally that its study and modelization cannot ultimately
be separated from the study of validation rights, both in terms of the capacity for the
transfer of validation rights, which is inherent to any exchange, to form circuits and
thus to become the condition of their own existence, and in terms of the performative
nature of the validation rights themselves, notably of money itself.
Ultimately however, what is worth considering is not only that the modelization
of autonomous performative prices under a constraint of scarcity of attention and se-
quentiality is possible and insightful, but that the difference between this modelization
and models which postulate the centralized and simultaneous fixation of constative
prices under no constraint of attention nor relevance can be shown to be reducible to
the way the same fundamental constraints are distinctly ordered, with macroeconomic
constraints being upstream of microeconomic ones in the second model and considered
as negligible (or “overlookable”) in the first one, and with the maximization constraint
being a downstream constraint in the second model and an intermediate one (i.e. a
premise) in the first one. In this respect, we hope to have shown that making realistic
hypothesis about the nature and complexity of interactions could be the only way to
understand and modelize the way they interfere.
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Abstract
In this paper, we present a simplified model of micro-economy that de-
scribes the evolution of the wealth distribution in a population. The trades
between economical agents consist of binary exchanges and stochastic
speculation. We explain that the mathematical analysis using kinetic mod-
els allows to prove that, for large wealth, the probability distribution func-
tion behaves as a power law as observed by Pareto.
Keywords. Econophysics, Boltzmann equation, wealth distributions,
Pareto distribution.
17.1 Introduction
The emergence of collective phenomena and self-organization in systems composed of
huge number of agents receives an increasing interest from various research commu-
nities in economy, sociology, biology, ecology, robotics. This has been illustrated by
several lectures during the ISC conference in June 2013 in Orléans, in particular ple-
nary ones by H. Beresticky “Propagation in inhomogeneous media : from epidemics to
contagion of the ideas", K. Fischer “Complex processes in human-robot interaction", S.
Galam “Interacting with a few random liars can jeopardize the democratic balance of a
public debate", E. Goles “Regulatory and segregation networks" and A. Kirman “Ants
and Non-Optimal Self Organization: Lessons for Macroeconomics". Let us mention
the recent and complete book by L. Pareschi and G. Toscani that describes in details
the mathematical tools and the numerical methods that can be used like multi-agent or
Monte Carlo methods Pareschi and Toscani (2013).
These so called multiagent systems can be studied using methods which originate in
statistical physics. The first attempts made in this direction date back twenty years ago,
when the term econophysics was introduced to describe an interdisciplinary research
field Bouchaud and Mézard (2000), Mantegna and Stanley (2000) which aims to solve
problems in economics by means of well-established physical methods. The main idea
is that the description of emerging phenomena could be obtained by assuming that the
collective behaviours of a group composed of a sufficiently large number of individuals
could be treated using the laws of statistical mechanics as happens in a physical system
composed of many interacting particles. Let us mention that statistical physics study
has been also used recently for sociological models, like for example, model of opinion
formation Boudin and Salvarani (2009), Boudin et al. (2012) for which the asymptotics
is called the “quasi-invariant opinion” limit. Let us refer to the recent book by Galam
(2012) for an interesting and personal presentation of the use of physical originated
approaches for sociological issues, that starts more than thirty years ago.
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These methods permit to build complex systems composed of autonomous agents
who, as a result of their mutual interactions, exhibit a well-defined collective behaviour.
The mathematical analysis of the collisional kinetic theory has been a very active field
within the last twenty years. Let us refer to the complete survey written by Villani
(2002).
In this article, we will briefly present an example of such a methodology applied to
a simplified model of interacting economical agents introduced in Cordier et al. (2005).
It starts from microscopic models of simple market economies that describe the inter-
action between couple of individuals and the goal is to extract from this microscopic
model information about the averaged wealth distribution.
The study of wealth distributions has a long history going back to the Italian soci-
ologist and economist Vilfredo Pareto which studied the distribution of income among
people of different western countries and found an inverse power law Pareto (1897).
More precisely if f(w) is the probability density function of agents with wealth w we
have
F (w) =
Z 1
w
f(w⇤) dw⇤ ⇠ w µ,
this equation means that the part, F (w) of the population with an income w⇤ larger
than w decays, for large value of w, like some power of w. Pareto mistakenly believed
that such power laws behavior of the apply to the whole distribution with an universal
exponent µ approximatively equal to 1.5. Later, Mandelbrot (1960) proposed a weak
Pareto law that applies only to high incomes.
The starting point of the present modelling is to describe the so-called microscopic
model i.e. the process of trading between a couple of agents. Then, we describe the
evolution of the associated probability distribution function (pdf) which is described
by a Boltzmann type collision operator. In other word, the exchange of money during
a trade is represented in the model like the change of momentum during a collision
between particle. Then, the idea is to perform an asymptotic analysis in the limit of
large number of small exchanges. This leads to a partial differential equations (PDE)
for which we are able to find the large time behavior and to describe the stationary
or equilibrium solutions. This equilibrium state can be computed explicitly and is of
Pareto type, namely it is characterized by a power-law tail for the richest individuals.
This asymptotic limit hereafter called “continuous trading limit” has been inspired
from the one used in the context of kinetic theory for granular flows, where the limit
procedure is known as “quasi-elastic” asymptotics Toscani (2000). It is also connected
to the so called “grazing collision” limit that permits to pass from the Boltzmann equa-
tion for Coulombian particle to Fokker-Planck-Landau equations (see Villani 2002).
17.2 A kinetic model of money asset exchanges
We consider now a very simple model of an open market economy involving both as-
sets exchanges between individuals and speculative trading, following Cordier et al.
(2005). In this non-stationary economy the total wealth is not conserved due to a
stochastic dynamics which describes the spontaneous growth or decrease of wealth
due to investments e.g. in the stock market. It is important to note that this mech-
anism corresponds to the effects of an open market economy where the investments
cause the total economy to growth (more precisely the rich would get richer and the
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poor would get poorer). The exchanges dynamic between individuals redistributes the
wealth among people.
Thus, from a microscopic view point, the binary interaction is described by the
following rules
w0 = (1   )w +  w⇤ + ⌘w (17.1)
w0⇤ = (1   )w⇤ +  w + ⌘⇤w⇤
where (w,w⇤) denote the (positive) money of two arbitrary individuals before the trade
and (w0, w0⇤) the money after the trade. In (17.2) we will not allow agents to have debts,
and thus the interaction takes place only ifw0   0 andw0⇤   0. In (17.2) the transaction
coefficient   2 [0, 1] is a given constant, while ⌘ and ⌘⇤ are random variables with the
same distribution (for example normal) with variance  2 and zero mean.
Let us describe the three terms in the right hand side. The first term is related to
the marginal saving propensity of the agents, the second corresponds to the money
transaction, and the last contains the effects of an open economy describing the market
returns. Note that since debts are not allowed, the total amount of money in the system
is increasing.
This binary interaction model is related to previous work (Bouchaud and Mézard
2000, Levy et al. 2000). In a closed economical system it is assumed that the total
amount of money is conserved (⌘, ⌘⇤ ⌘ 0). This conservation law is reminiscent of
analogous conservations which take place in kinetic theory. In such a situation, the
stationary state is a Dirac measure centered in the average wealth. Thus all agents will
end up in the market with exactly the same amount of money.
The kinetic model associated with this simple market economies describes the evo-
lution of the statistical distribution of money by means of these microscopic interac-
tions among agents or individuals which perform exchange of money. Each trade can
indeed be interpreted as an interaction where a fraction of the money changes hands.
We will assume that this wealth after the interaction is non negative, which corresponds
to impose that no debts are allowed. This rule emphasizes the difference between eco-
nomic interactions, where not all outcomes are permitted, and the classical interactions
between molecules.
Let f(w, t) denote the distribution of money w 2 IR+ at time t   0. By stan-
dard methods of kinetic theory (Villani 2002), the time evolution of f is driven by the
following integro-differential equation of Boltzmann type,
@f(w)
@t
=
Z  
 (0w,0w⇤)!(w,w⇤)Jf(
0w)(f(0w⇤)   (w,w⇤)!(w0,w0⇤)f(w)f(w⇤)
 
dw⇤ d⌘ d⌘⇤
(17.2)
where (0w,0 w⇤) are the pre-trading money that generates the couple (w,w⇤) after the
interaction. In (17.2) J is jacobian of the transformation of (w,w⇤) into (w0, w0⇤),
which is a usual technical term and the kernel   is related to the details of the binary
interaction and represents the probability to change from pre-trading state to the actual
one. As usual in kinetic theory, we note f(w) instead of f(w, t) to simplify the no-
tations. Let us refer to Cordier et al. (2005), Pareschi and Toscani (2013) for a more
detailed presentation.
We shall restrict here to a transition rate of the form
 (w,w⇤)!(w0,w0⇤) = µ(⌘)µ(⌘⇤) (w
0   0) (w0⇤   0),
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where  (A) is the indicator function of the set A, and µ(·) is a symmetric probability
density with zero mean and variance  2. The rate function  (w0,w0⇤)!(w,w⇤) character-
izes the effects of the open economy through the distribution of the random variables
⌘ and ⌘⇤ and takes into account the hypothesis that no-debts are allowed. We refer
to Cordier et al. (2005) for a detailed interpretation of the chosen form for  . The
above equation can be included in a more general settings where the trade rule has a
more complex structure including, for example, risk, taxes and subsidies (Pareschi and
Toscani 2013).
We remark that, for general probability density µ(·), the rate function   depends
on the wealth variables (w,w⇤) through the indicator functions . This is analogous to
what happens in the classical Boltzmann equation Villani (2002), where the rate func-
tion depends on the relative velocity. A simplified situation occurs when the random
variables take values on the set ( (1   ), 1   ). In this case in fact, both w0   0 and
w0⇤   0, and the kernel   does not depend on the wealth variables (w,w⇤). In this case
the kinetic equation (17.2) is the corresponding of the classical Boltzmann equation for
Maxwell molecules, which presents several mathematical simplifications. In all cases
however, methods borrowed from kinetic theory of rarefied gas can be used to study
the evolution of the function f .
17.3 The continuous trading limit
As explained in the introduction, we are interested in the repartition of wealth due to
a large number of such interactions or, equivalentlty, the large time behaviour of the
equation i.e. the associated stationary states.
It is proven in Cordier et al. (2005) that the kinetic model (17.2) is well posed.
However, it is not possible to explicitly describe the equilibrium or stationnary solution
of this equation. As is usual in kinetic theory and explained in the introduction, particu-
lar asymptotics of the equation result in simplified models (generally of Fokker-Planck
type), for which it is possible to find steady states.
We will consider the situation in which most of the trades corresponds to a very
small exchange of money (  ! 0), rescaling the time scale accordingly (⌧ =  t) such
that both   ! 0 and   ! 0 in such a way that  2/  !  .
As proved in Cordier et al. (2005), the scaled density g(v, ⌧) = f(v, t) obeys
a Fokker-Planck model derived from the Boltzmann equation, introducing a Taylor
expansion in the weak formulation,   being a test function with bounded moments
d
d⌧
Z 1
0
g  dw =
1
 
Z
IR2
Z
IR2+
µ(⌘)µ(⌘⇤)g(w)g(w⇤)( (w0)   (w))dw⇤dwd⌘ d⌘⇤. (17.3)
This derivation is similar to the quasi-elastic limit of granular gases of Toscani (2000)
and is of major relevance for the study of the asymptotic equilibrium states of the
kinetic model. The right-hand side is nothing but the weak form of the Fokker-Planck
equation
@g
@⌧
=
 
2
@2
@w2
 
w2g
 
+
@
@w
((w  m)g) . (17.4)
The limit Fokker-Planck equation can be rewritten as
@g
@⌧
=
@
@w
[(w  m) +  
2
w)g +
 
2
w
@
@w
(wg)]. (17.5)
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The stationary state of the Fokker-Planck equation can be directly computed and,
by assuming for simplicity
m =
Z
R+
f(w, t) dw = 1,
it can be written as
g1(w) =
(µ  1)µ
 (µ)
exp
  µ 1w  
w1+µ
(17.6)
where µ = 1 + 2  > 1. Therefore the stationary distribution exhibits a Pareto power
law tail for large w’s as observed by Pareto (1897) on real economical data as an “uni-
versal” behavior" . Thus, the proposed model agrees with this observed repartition of
weath for richest individuals.
17.4 Conclusions
Note that the numerical simulations of a Boltzmann equation (17.2) to compute its
steady state are usually based on Monte Carlo methods as explained in Pareschi and
Toscani (2013). Note that such Monte Carlo methods rely on the underlying micro-
scopic process (17.2). Some numerical test are presented in Cordier et al. (2005) that
illustrated numerically the “continuous trading asymptotics”.
This simple market economy model, based on binary exchanges of money and
speculative trading becomes at suitably large times, in presence of a large number of
trades in which agents exchange a small amount of money, a linear Fokker-Planck type
equation, which admits a stationary steady state with Pareto tails. The analogy between
the trade rule (17.2) and a one-dimensional molecular dissipative collision suggests in
a natural way the continuous trading asymptotic which is well-understood in kinetic
theory as quasi-elastic asymptotic (Toscani 2000). Furthermore, the formation of over-
populated energy tails for large times in the kinetic model is in accord with the analo-
gous result valid for the Boltzmann equation for a dissipative granular Maxwellian gas.
Let us mention another model where interactions between individuals is replaced
by exchange through a financial market where a finite number of assets are available
(Cordier et al. 2009). In this case, the similar asymptotic approachs yields to a log-
normal distribution behovior for large wealth.
This short note presents a very particular case of complex system - a population
of agents that interacts by trades - that is given to illustrate how the mathematical
framework of collisionnal kinetic theory (see Villani 2002) can be useful to understand
and predict the formation of equilibria. We refer to Pareschi and Toscani (2013) for a
recent book on related topics with numerous other applications.
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Abstract
Since Becker’s (1964) contribution, the accumulation of human capital
has been developed only within the framework of individual choices based
upon wage expectations. For over forty years, this approach showed itself
fruitful. However, with the rarefaction of jobs during periods of crisis, it
seems light to explain most of the decisions regarding human capital ac-
cumulation. Indeed, because nobody can be sure to obtain an employment
which will yield a positive return to education, the decision to acquire fur-
ther education can only be apprehended as a strategic decision taken in a
situation of imperfect information. This individual decision will depend
on the answer to the following simple question: With the level of studies
which I intend to acquire, will I have bigger chances to obtain a job than
my classmates who stopped their studies at a lower level? It’s the reason
why we model studies’ length as a two strategies evolutionary game to
show under which condition the population of players splits in two class
of strategies in equilibrium.
Keywords: Labor Economics, Evolutionary Game Theory, Strategic
Interactions
18.1 Introduction
In economics, many topics should be considered from the complexity point of view.
First of all, while it took approximately four hundred years to establish a utility
theory from the early works by Edme Mariotte2 — see Mariotte (1717) —, thirty years
were sufficient to make the building vacillate on its basis.
Among other sciences, Behavioral Psychology and Neurosiences question the very
existence of a utility function derived from preferences and used to construct practical
decisions. The assumption that human behavior can generate rational decisions3 has
been denied by new experimental evidences from the recent access to the brain through
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and molecular biology. Thanks to the MRI, it is
now proven that decisions can not be taken without reference to emotions and that we
are sensitive to chemical substances which alter profoundly our behavior and decisions
— see Damásio (1994), Lehrer (2009).
2Mariotte is the second name to appear in the appendix of Jevons (1871) dedicated to mathematico-
economic books, memoir, and other published writings.
3This assumption originated from the great greek philosophers (essentially Aristote), followed by Daniel
Bernoulli, Emmanuel Kant (for the moral point of view), Jeremy Bentham, Stanley Jevons and Von Neu-
mann, among many others
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At the same time, with the emergence of a new type of society where information
is huge and plethoric, we have begun to understand that the brain is, in some aspect, a
wired electrical network with limited transmission speed4 and limited capacity to treat
information5. Furthermore, since Poincaré, but more effectively since Edward Lorenz,
we know that linearity, through which we believe to understand the most essential
structure of our universe, is misleading and that a very small departure from it can
produce some processes that are truly indistinguishable from randomness — Poincaré
(1890), Lorenz (1964) and also Devaney (2003).
At last, we begin to understand that strategic interactions, which are mainly de-
scribed in the setting of standard game theory may not bee understood from rationality
itself.
Nevertheless, despite all these new evidences, many analysts are globally satisfied
with their inherited instrument and are not yet ready to change paradigm. For instance,
the core of the modelling of economic markets has not been fundamentally changed in
thirty years.
For instance, let us have a look at labor economics. Since the development of the
Human Capital Theory—Schultz (1961), Becker (1964) —, economists have concen-
trated their attention essentially on the main advantage that the education confers to
individuals: an increase in their income.
The mechanics highlighted under this original human capital theory allowed, in
a standard neo-classic framework, to propose an alternative explanation to the theory
of compensatory differences, that was first advanced by Adam Smith and in which
individuals were considered as indistinguishable.
Two research areas have caught the attention and the energy of economists. On
the one hand, following Mincer’s works — see Mincer (1974) —, an effort has been
made to estimate empirically education returns through some earning functions. That
approach enables to estimate a return curve for each educational level and to make
international comparisons. On the other hand, more recently, human capital has been
introduced in models of endogenous growth.
Following Lucas (1988), macroeconomists have favored the stock of human capi-
tal over technology to explain growth, and the differences of rates in its accumulation
to explain the persistence of international differences in growth rates. In particular,
because of the externalities generated by its human capital, for a given qualification’s
level, a worker is more productive in a country already strongly endowed with human
capital. Therefore, he is better paid. This mechanism could explain the strong migra-
tory pressures of the South towards the North.
Without questioning the legitimacy of the Beckerian individualistic approach of hu-
man capital accumulation, it seems, nevertheless, important to reinterpret the contem-
porary logics of its accumulation in the context of jobs competition. In the Beckerian
4Here, we can plead for the limited capacity channel in Shannon-Hartley theorem on the maximum rate
at which information can be transmitted over a communication channel of a specified bandwidth in the
presence of noise — see Pierce (1980). But we can also plead for the problem of the acquisition of the expert
performance as in Ericsson et al. (1993) or Shim et al. (2005).
5 According to Marois & Ivanoff (2005), despite the impressive complexity and processing power of the
human brain, it is severely capacity limited. There are many way to approach this fact but an interesting
one is linked to the magical number seven±2 — see Miller (1956) — which has been recently replaced by
the number 4 — see Parker (2012). The problem is to know how many element can be hired in the human
memory. We must underline that the working memory is one of the central concepts of the current cognitive
psychology. As the place of holding the information necessary for ongoing treatment, the limits of working
memory constrain a large part of our thinking activity and the evolution of these boundaries with age plays a
vital role in the intellectual development — see Barrouillet & Camos (2008).
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logic, the rise of the level of education appears as a real solution against unemploy-
ment, from the individual point of view, because the level of education is positively
correlated with the speed of transition towards employment. This transition advantage
is also assumed by the filter theory developed by Arrow (1973) and the signal theory
developed by Spence (1974).
Other things being equal, considering a homogeneous population, this transition
advantage given by education is expected to motivate all individuals to apply for further
education and training. Hence, the ultimate consequence of this dynamic process is the
deletion of the number of non-graduates.
In practice, we observe a conflicting logic which substitutes itself to the Beckerian
individualistic approach as soon as such a situation is reached or, at least, as soon as a
critical threshold of graduates is exceeded. Indeed, the diploma competitive advantage
tends to disappear with an increase in the number of its graduates. Outside a conflicting
approach of the human capital accumulation, we can only predict a desertion of the
educational sphere: education does not generate any more a return on investment which
can be evaluated in comparison to an investment in stocks.
However, from the empirical point of view, it is rare to observe parents preferring to
donate the cost of their education to their children in the form of a financial endowment
because its seems to them higher and less risky than that of the studies that their chil-
dren undertake. Indeed, in spite of its depreciation, human capital can become the entry
key to active life. So, on the contrary to the predictions of the Beckerian model, the
model of the conflicting logic seems to predict a wild race towards the accumulation,
the non-accumulation appearing as an almost insuperable handicap.
However, if a model which rests on a conflicting logic ends in an extreme distri-
bution — either every player graduates or nobody graduates —, it must be rejected as
empirically not relevant because, as far as one can observe, in populations where the
individual characteristics are distinguished with difficulty, the coexistence of the two
logics of accumulation of human capital — i.e.: the maximalist logic of the acquisi-
tion of the highest diploma and the minimalist logic of the acquisition of the lowest
diploma.
This paper proposes to examine the evolution of the graduate population within
the framework of the theory of evolutionary games. For every generation, for a given
unemployment rate, the percentage of graduates is predetermined by their expected
remuneration relative to the previous generation. The graduates, in a context where
the diploma gives essentially a priority access to jobs, are all the stronger as there are
few qualified people. Consequently and a priori, we should expect that the global
educational level does not stop to grow excluding the possibility of a mixed balance,
that is a balance of population in which coexists both categories of agents. However,
when the trained population is numerous, the high training costs decrease the relative
advantage conferred by the studies and can incite to disinvest in education.
The problem hereby underlined is a real problem that all developed countries seem
to encounter. For instance, in France, for the year 2000, it has been revealed that one
third of the youth undergo a downgrading. Even if the apex of the phenomena has been
observed between 1986 and 1995 for the graduates at the Baccalauréat (High School
exit examination) level, and between 2001 and 2004, at the BAC+2 level (two-year
post-secondary or tertiary level degree), due to the overall decrease in employment,
even the higher-level graduates got heavily impacted. The chances for a newly graduate
to get a position as an executive fell from 85% to 70%. Only 26% of the youth have
a perfectly matched job according to their formation, in level and in speciality. At
the same time, we still observe that the higher the level of the diploma, the higher the
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smoother the transition towards the first job — see Mazari & Recotillet (2013).
In the first section, we consider the static evolutionary game and its dynamics when
the matching of the young job-seekers is realized pairwise. The second section consid-
ers explicitly the effect of the unemployment growth on the population dynamics. The
third section studies the formation of the long-term balances when irrational mutations
appear. The fourth and last section is devoted to the commandability of the education
system6.
18.2 Pair matching dynamics
Here we study more particularly a game in which the players have two strategies:
¨ undertake short studies — strategy (S)7;
≠ undertake long studies — strategy (L);
At first, we are interested in two players that compete for a job, both of them as-
signing to it a common present value V . The agent having adopted the L strategy will
be given priority access to the job compared to the agent having adopted the S strategy.
This preference for the most qualified refers to the human capital theory — under its
shape filter or under its shape signal. Because our focus is on the advantage conferred
by education, we suppose that the level of the remuneration V is independent from the
educational level.
Labor markets are segmented and it is notable that the multiplication of the grad-
uates at every level of study entailed a toughening of the dualism — for a definition
of the dualism, we can consult8, for example, Taubman & Wachter (1986). Young
people that are excluded from markets, which access conditions correspond exactly
to their diplomas, are thus brought to look for an outlet on a market for which they
are overqualified. This downgrading search creates an additional bottleneck for their
companions who had acquired the diploma required to enter on the secondary market.
We can unwind this reasoning up to the markets which require no specific training
and which are, in turn, assailed by young graduates. This logic leads to a more or less
important eviction of the non-graduates of the labor market9. Naturally, later in their
active life, some individuals will manage to return to their desired market, but they will
certainly represent an exception to the rule of the strict dualism. So, on an isolated mar-
ket, we can expect to observe applications emanating from young graduates possessing
the minimum level of required diplomas — see Figure 18.1.
A rather reliable indicator of these observations would be established by the ratio
between the level of education of the candidates at public service job competitions and
6See the survey published by the CÉREQ at http://www.cereq.fr/gsenew/concours2008/
cereq/G98ind/premierepage.htm.
7On the sociological motivation of the short studies and its evolution in time see — Jaoul-Grammare &
Nakhili (2010).
8Nevertheless, one can follow Piore (1978). According this theory, the labor market is divided in two
sector : a primary which give right to better paying, promotion, more stables opportunities and a secondary
which contains the poor paying unsecure and otherwise unattractive jobs.
9It is not in our objective to explain why the non-qualified market can not be itself balanced, while we
describe a balancing process by downgrading rejection of populations towards the least qualified jobs, and
while the existence of an involuntary unemployment is a necessary condition for the justification of the
model.
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Figure 18.1: The graduates’ downgrading process
the education level required by the examination10. We observe that a large share of
the candidates have a must higher level of education and qualification than required
by the examination. As a consequence, these overqualified candidates systematically
evict the least endowed without benefiting of a more generous salary scale. On the
other hand, on the analytical point of view, we can imagine that the status of the labor
market is such that companies are in a position to monopolize a rent or to make sure of
the honesty of their employees. This point was developed in particular by Shapiro &
Stiglitz (1984). Returning to the model, let us assume that initially all players were used
to short studies. As, ex ante, none of the players is able of determining the stemming
from the overcoming conflict, by adopting Laplace’s insufficient reason principle, it is
possible to suppose that they anticipate to each have a 1/2 probability to monopolize
the desired job. The couple of payoffs in a conflict between two individuals having
adopted the short strategy is thus: (0.5V, 0.5V ).
Let us suppose that after a punctual mutation11, a fraction 1   ✏ of the population
decides to opt for a new strategy consisting of a cycle of longer studies. These players
can be perceived as predators by all those players who have decided not to change
strategy. Indeed, we suppose that it is of common knowledge that, if a long player is
accidentally mated to a short player, the first one will obtain the employment and will
be paid12 V , while the second will have to pursue its job search. However, we suppose
that, compared to strategy S (short studies), the long studies yield a fixed additional
cost C. The couple of payoffs bound to such a confrontation is then: (V   C, 0).
Obviously, a mutant can be mated with an other mutant. As previously, in this case,
they will obtain the couple of remuneration (0, 5(V   C); 0, 5(V   C)). Presented
under normal form, the bi-matrix of the payoffs, associated with this game, can then
10It’s not a red herring to say that in the French public function examination, a huge part of the candidates
are overqualified — see Kopel (2005). Obviously, this is not a French exception phenomenon — see Green
& Zhu (2010). So, in a first approximation, we can postulate that V is independent from the education level.
11The term of mutation, borrowed from the biologist vocabulary, is here excessive. We can imagine
that this phenomenon comes upstream from a human capital investment behavior or, more simply from the
invasion of the labor market for the non-qualified by individuals stemming from a qualified labor market
which has reached saturation, hypothesis which is defended in the body of the text.
12We use V because all the monetary values here must be understood as present values since the decision
of the studies length is made for the complete life cycle of the players.
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been spell as in Figure 18.2.
S L
S
✓
V
2
,
V
2
◆
(0, V   C)
L (V  C, 0)
✓
V   C
2
,
V   C
2
◆
Figure 18.2: Payoff matrix for the game
In what follows, we will postulate that 0  C  V  2C. This hypothesis is as
fundamental as natural. First of all, we imagine badly a negative cost. Then, because a
cost lower than the present value of the income of the promised job is a necessary and
sufficient condition to ensure that some individuals will wish to bear it. And finally,
one has to impose that V   2C. Indeed, let us suppose the opposite: V > 2C. In
this case, (V  C)/C which is the ex post rate of return of longer studies is lower than
the unit. Now, if the return was greater than 100%, there would be no student to not
undertake longer studies.
18.2.1 The game as a perfect information game in normal form
Assume first, that each player knows his opponent, that is to say the other player
who will apply to the same position as him. In pure strategies, under the hypoth-
esis V < 2 C, there are two Nash-equilibria in this game13: PSNE1 = (S, S) and
PSNE2 = (L,L). Both equilibria are symmetric — i.e.: both players must choose the
same strategy —, which in itself is not so astonishing since the players are indistin-
guishable. To those pure strategy equilibria, one must add a mixed strategy equilibria.
One finally has :
MSNE1 = (0, 0), MSNE2 =
✓
V   C
C
,
V   C
C
◆
et MSNE3 = (1, 1)
Figure 18.3 gives the three equilibria as intersections of the players’ reaction cor-
respondences14.
In front of the embarrassment induced by the multiplicity of the Nash equilibria,
game theorists have developed a number of procedures aiming at extracting a single
equilibrium, which will most probably be played by the player15. The first seducing
approach consists in postulating that the players are going to notice that one of the
two pure equilibria is socially more favorable than the other one, in the sense that the
14In Figure 18.3, the line player chose a mixed strategy (p, 1   p) and the column player a strategy
(q, 1  q). Normally, since players must solve two linear programs to find the mixed equilibrium, we would
be obliged to use an algorithm of the Lemke-Howson type to find numerically this equilibrium, or any more
modern approach, but in the case of two strategies one can easily find the analytical solution — see, for
instance, Nisan et al. (2007).
15In a finite game, every pure strategy Nash equilibrium is also a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
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V−C
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p = R1(q)
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y = Rj(x)
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= 1 if x ∈
]
V−C
C , 1
]
∈ [0, 1] if x = V−CC
= 0 if x ∈
[
0, V−CC
]
p = R1(q)
q = R2(p)
Figure 18.3: The Svastika for Nash equilibria
expected payoff is higher there — here, it is about the (S, S) which gives a payoff
equal to V/2 which is greater to the payoff of (V   C)/2 associated to thee second
pure strategies equilibrium. (S, S) is called the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
A standard approach of the selection of the multiple equilibria was proposed by
Harsanyi & Selten (1992). This approach to equilibrium selection is known as the risk
dominance. This approach of equilibrium selection presents the interest of a double in-
terpretation. A player can realize an experiment in which he tries to guess the strategy
adopted by the opponent with whom he will be mated — this is a game theory inter-
pretation. He can also, ex ante, try to conceive the characteristics of the distribution of
the players between both strategies as members of the population to which they belong
— this is a sociological interpretation.
Let us begin by replacing us in a frame where only pure strategies could be elected
and let us endorse the clothes of one for the two matched players. If he thinks that
his opponent will choose the S strategy with probability q and the L strategy with
probability 1  q, his expected utility is :
EU1(s) =
⇢
(1  q)  V2   if s = L
q
 
V
2
 
+
 
V C
2
 
if s = S
The player will prefer to adopt the S strategy — the L strategy — over the L
strategy — the S strategy —, if :
EU(S) < (>) EU(L)
Writing q, the q value which makes the player indifferent between both strategies,
we find that :
q =
C
V + C
Now, the player’s choice depends of his mental scheme which drives him to pos-
tulate a q specific value. However it’s clear that if 1   q   q — or, more simply, if
q   1/2 —, which is the present case since C  V , the opponent will take a greater
risk in postulating that the player will choose the S strategy over the L one. As this is a
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symmetric game, what is valuable for one player is also valuable for the other. So one
will say with Harsanyi and Selten that the (L, L) equilibrium risk dominate the (S, S)
equilibrium if q > 1 q, which means that there is a greater likelihood that both players
coordinate on the (L, L) equilibrium than on the (S, S) one. In this game, according to
the risk dominance concept, the players should be incited to adopt a coordination over
long studies.
18.2.2 The static evolutionary game
The application of traditional game theory to the duration of education raises two prob-
lems:
¨ On the one hand, we cannot consider two isolated players, because the game is
played by a very large number of players simultaneously.
≠ On the other hand, the players have to make decisions without knowing which
type of player they will later be mated with — an S player or an L player.
Now, the ex ante yield of a strategy depends on the percentage of players which
endorse it in the population. In particular, even if there are S players in the pop-
ulation, a player can be interested in being an L player because the probability
to be mated to an S player is low and because, by choosing to be an L player, he
does not have to support the additional cost of the extra time of studies.
We begin by studying the pure strategies game. Let us note16 ✏, the percentage of
players who use the S strategy. In such a way, the expected payoff of a S player in a
mixed population is :
EU(S|L) = ✏U(S, S) + (1  ✏)U(S,L) = ✏
✓
V
2
◆
where U(X,Y) is the utility of a X player matched with a L player. In the same way,
one can write :
EU(L|L) = ✏U(L, S) + (1  ✏)U(L,L)
= ✏(V   C) + (1  ✏)
✓
V   C
2
◆
=
✓
1 + ✏
2
◆
(V   C)
In the evolutionary game terminology, a strategy X is evolutionary stable if :
U(X,Y) > U(Y,Y)
for every other Y strategy. This means that X offers a better fit17 to the game than every
other Y. Maynard-Smith (1974) has shown that X is evolutionary stable18 if the two
following conditions are satisfied :
¨ A Strict Nash Equilibrium Condition : U(X,X) > U(Y,X).
≠ A stability Condition : if U(X,X) = U(X,Y) then U(X,Y) > U(Y,Y).
16We must distinguish here p — q —, which are variables relating to personal choice of ✏ that is the
percentage in the population of people using the C strategy.
17In the sense of greater expected utility.
18One speaks of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy— ESS.
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It is obvious that the pure strategies Nash equilibria are ESS, which here was pre-
dictable as far as the game is symmetric. Consequently, by neglecting the fact that they
are immersed in a larger population than that of both matched players, and as far as
they manage to coordinate on an equilibrium — for example the risk dominating equi-
librium —, the players protect themselves against the invasion of mutant players, who
would have adopted the other strategy. Now, in the same way as in the traditional in-
terpretation, what happens if one allows mixed strategies? If one redefines the utilities
in terms of mixed strategies, that is:
EU(p|q) = ✏  p>Up + (1  ✏)  p>Uq 
where p = [p, 1   p]> is the mixed strategy of the first player, q = [q, 1   q]> the
mixed strategy of the second one and U is defined as earlier. Evaluating in the same
way EU(q|p), we can define an Evolutionary Stable Mixed Strategy — ESMS — in
the same way as for the ESS. In that case the Maynard-Smith theorem gives that p is
and ESMS if two conditions are verified:
¨ A Nash Equilibrium Condition : p>Up > q>Up.
≠ A stability Condition : if p>Up = q>Up then p>Uq > q>Uq.
Now, for exactly the same reason as in the pure strategy case, the three Nash equi-
libria are ESMS.
18.2.3 Population dynamics
The direct ESS19 or ESMS approach are clearly insufficient. Indeed, unlike the classic
theory of antagonistic games, evolutionary game theory does not postulate any form of
rationality from the players. Generally, it considers that they inherit their behavior. On
the labor market, and in an unstable environment, the only way of making a decision
more or less justified, is, from one period to the next, when the information is available,
to observe the relative fit of a strategy with regard to an other one. Therefore, on a
macroscopic plan, one shall notice an increasing evolution on behalf of the population
which adopts the strategy C if that strategy gives, on average, a satisfactory payoff in
the matching with the upper strategy L.
If students can observe that the C strategy can offer a greater utility than the average
utility associated with a population divided out of ✏(t) percent of their own type and
1   ✏(t) percent of the other, then in all likelihood, ✏(t) is going to rise. This leads to
a Malthusian population dynamics of the C players called replication dynamics. This
dynamics is describe by the following differential equation20 :
✏˙(t)
✏(t)
= EU(C)  [✏EU(C) + (1  ✏(t))EU(L)]
=
C
2
(1  ✏(t))(✏(t)  ✏)
19It is important to distinguish both because the first one is clearly less debated than the second. Numerous
economists refuse to consider mixed strategies.
20Only a small bunch of studies was interested in the justification of the recourse to the replication dynam-
ics in the economic environment. Nevertheless, we can quote Weibull (1995), who shows how the dynamics
of replication can appear as approximation for imitation behavior.
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with 0 < ✏ = (V   C)/C < 1. This dynamics21 to translate the idea according to
which the C players’ population growth rate is proportional to their relative payoff in
a mixed population. Now, the average payoff in a mixed population is defined by the
sum of the product between payoffs and probabilities of the realization of a specific
matching. This replication dynamics may be also written as :
✏˙(t) = ✏(t)[1  ✏(t)][EU(C)  EU(L)]
which gives also the following interpretation : the increase of the C players popula-
tion is proportionate to the expected utility differential gap between both strategies,
conditioned by the emergence of a mixed matching22.
Define the h(✏(t)) function as :
h(✏(t)) =
C
2
✏(t)(1  ✏(t))(✏(t)  ✏)
which leads to rewrite the replication dynamics as :
✏˙(t) = h(✏(t))
The h(t) function possesses three fixed points: ✏0 = 0, which is the case for the
degenerated population composed exclusively of L players; ✏1 = ✏, which corresponds
to a mixed population; and ✏2 = 1, which is the case for the degenerated population
composed exclusively of C players. These three fixed points are the three SMES . As
the derivative of h(✏) is h✏(✏) = (C/2)[ 3✏2 + 2 (1+ ✏)✏  ✏], it is very easy to show
that ✏0 and ✏1 are locally stable equilibria23 when ✏2 is locally unstable, the C strategy
is completely evinced in favor of the L strategy. From a formal point of view, we can
develop a symmetric argumentation24. So there are two attraction manifolds for the
locally stable equilibria — see Figure 18.4:
¨ a first attraction manifold B0 = [0, ✏[ for ✏0.
≠ a second attraction manifold B1 =]✏, 1] for ✏1.
Thus, according to its initial distribution — ✏(0) 2 B0, ✏(0) = ✏0 or ✏(0) =
✏1 —, the population converges towards the Pareto-dominant equilibrium— (S, S) —,
remains in the internal equilibrium — if by chance it was yet at this equilibrium —, or
converges towards the risk dominant equilibrium — (L, L).
We can propose a simple explanation for this result. For an initial population such
as ✏(0) < ✏, the players are matched with numerous players who, on average, have
made long studies rather than short. The cost of longer studies is more than compen-
sated by the low probability to be mated with an other long studies player. The expected
relative advantage of a strategy over another determines its adoption.
Hence, at the final stage of the dynamics, the S strategy is completely evinced
in favor of the L one. From a formal point of view, one can develop a symmetric
argumentation25 for the case where ✏(0) > ✏.
21To obtain EU(C) and EU(L) one needs only to substitute ✏(t) to q — cf supra.
22It would be possible to generalize the dynamics by the use of an increasing function of the right side of
the replication dynamics, but this does not change the qualitative behavior of the dynamics.
23If we note xj(t) = ✏(t)  ✏j , in the neighborhood of ✏j , we get x˙j(t) = h✏(✏j)xj .
24Since h(0) = 0 and h✏(0) < 0, as ✏2 2]0, 1[, h✏(✏2) is, by necessity, positive.
25When ✏(0) = ✏, the population repartition is temporally invariant.
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Figure 18.4: THE REPLICATION DYNAMICS
However, this symmetry is only visible. Indeed, if we suppose that, initially, only
the short studies existed and that a spontaneous mutation has moved a small percentage
of players towards the L strategy, it is not very likely, that this percentage makes tip
over the initial condition to the attraction manifold of the other SMES, i.e. to the long
studies attraction manifold.
While the risk dominance argumentation is more convincing than the Pareto-dominance
argumentation, in the final equilibrium choice decided by the population of players, it
seems that the replication dynamics pleads clearly in favor of the eviction of long stud-
ies from the education system. This, unless, it is possible to produce an initial mutation
which drives the initial population in the other attraction manifold — i.e. : which
moves ✏(0) over ✏. A classic argument is then to suggest the appearance of behavior
determined by a rationality still weakened by the number of agents.
18.2.4 Population dynamics with continuous mutations
As pointed out in Orlean (1995), this dynamics leaves aside an important aspect of the
evolutionary logic, namely the constant presence of mutational factors. Indeed, two
elements can overlap to explain that the moving decision of a number of players is not
directly driven by the relative advantage of a strategy. First of all, there is always a
certain percentage of the population which has a very restricted access to information
— in the replication dynamics, the access to information is supposed free and without
cost for the players. Similarly, a certain percentage of the population is likely to decide
to undertake or not to undertake long studies only based on its interest for the studied
fields.
Then, the State, for reasons which run from the adequacy of the population to
jobs which require an accumulation of human capital always more important for the
prolonged, to the young people withdrawal of the labor market in period of under-
employment, to make migrate sub-populations having adopted a particular strategy to
an other one in a permanent way. So, a second dynamic system is build upon the first
one, and this new system does not answer the arguments of the replication dynamics.
This dynamics translates into the fact that, over a lapse of time of length h, a per-
centage m of the players go from the L strategy to the S strategy and a percentage l
goes from the S strategy to the L strategy. In t + h, the percentage of the population
that has adopted the S strategy is then determined by the recursive equation:
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✏(t+ h) = [1 mh✏(t)]| {z }
probability not to migrate
for a C player
✏(t) + [lh✏(t)]| {z }
probability to migrate
for a L player
(1  ✏(t))
S
✏(t)
L
✏(t)
mh✏(t)
l
 
lh
✏(
t)
l
 
m
h
✏(
t)
lh(1  ✏(t))
1
Figure 18.5: The continuous mutations population dynamics
By making h stretch to dt, one finally obtains:
✏˙(t) = [l   (m+ l)✏(t)]✏(t) = k(✏(t))
This dynamics has two fixed points ✏0 = 0 and ✏4 = l/(m + l). As k✏(✏) =
l   2(m + l)✏, ✏0 is locally unstable, unless l ⌘ 0, and ✏4 is locally stable. ✏1 = 1
is no more an equilibrium. It could be under the restriction m ⌘ 0, in which case
✏4 = ✏1 = 1. This has a very simple explanation : if at each period of time some
S players migrate to become L players, it is impossible that the final population-state
be fixed in an all S players population. This dynamics, which could be called a rational
extreme dynamics26, in opposition to the replication dynamics, insists on the central
role of an equilibrium where S players and L players coexist — see Figure 18.6.
Let us consider the general population dynamics corresponding to the juxtaposition
of the two types of behavior: the strategic behavior and the pre-determined behavior.
It takes the form :
✏˙(t) = h(✏(t)) + k(✏(t))
=

C
2
✏(t)(1  ✏(t))(✏(t)  ✏)
 
+ ([l   (m+ l)✏(t)]✏(t))
= ✏(t)
✓
C
2
⇥
(1 + ✏)✏(t)  ✏+ ✏2(t)⇤+ [l   (m+ l)✏(t)]◆
= H(✏(t)|m, l) (dm1)
Here the mutations remind a trembling hand process — see Orlean (1995). They
constitute a permanent and autonomous source of variability inside the labor market
system.
26This type of dynamics is not derived from the rationality of learning as in the evolutionary game and its
associated replication dynamics. Nothing forbids the agents to base this type of behavior on another logic,
even a logic of maximization.
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Figure 18.6: The extreme arational dynamics
Then one can also envision a new population dynamics in which, ↵ percent of
the population share a quasi-rational behavior, when the other 1   ↵ has adopted an
irrational one. In this case, the dynamics becomes:
✏˙(t) = ↵h(✏(t)) + (1  ↵)k(✏(t))
= ↵

C
2
✏(t)(1  ✏(t))(✏(t)  ✏)
 
+ (1  ↵) ([l   (m+ l)✏(t))✏(t)]
= K(✏(t)|m, l) (dm2)
It is particularly noticeable that both dynamics are not reducible. Indeed, in the
dynamics (drnl), the irrational dynamics appears as stacked over the replication dy-
namics, whereas in the dynamics (dm2) they work in parallel. In this case, for one unit
value of ↵, we get back to the replication dynamics and for ↵ = 0, we find the irrational
dynamics. However, in spite of these differences, the two dynamics approach the same
phenomenon in an increased complexity with regard to both elementary dynamics.
In what follows, we will adopt the subsequent strategy: we will pose ↵ = 1, m =
l = 0 from the replicator dynamics, and study the deformations induced on it from
small variations of the parameters.
The (dm1) dynamics
Let us note that the (dml) dynamics is identical to the replicator dynamics for m =
l = 0 because: H(✏(t)|0, 0) = h(✏(t)). As the presence of two new parameters fairly
complicates the problem, let us begin by assuming that l ⌘ 0. In such a way, we start
with three equilibria: ✏0=0, ✏1 and ✏2.
First case: [l ⌘ 0]
In this case, let us leave from the replication dynamics to study the way a tiny
variation apply on it. An equilibrium of the (dml) dynamics is characterized by:
H(✏(t)|0, 0) = 0. Let us suppose that the value ofm increases fromm = 0.
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The equilibria move in the neighborhood of ✏i — i = 1, 2, 4 — in agreement with
the equation:
H✏(✏(t)|0, 0)d✏+Hm(✏(t)|0, 0)dm = 0
() d✏(t)
dm
    
m=0
=  Hm(✏i|0, 0)
H✏(✏i|0, 0)
Now: (
Hm(✏i|0, 0) =  ✏i
H✏(✏i|0, 0) =
 
C
2
  ⇥ 3✏2i + 2(1  ✏)✏i   ✏⇤
In consequence of what, a small variation ofm induces — the results are shown in
the (a)-quadrant of Figure 18.7 —:
¨ an invariance of ✏0 since in that case Hm(✏i|0, 0) = 0.
≠ an increase of ✏2 = ✏ since :
d✏
dm
    
m=0
=
✏
(C/2)✏(1  ✏) > 0
Æ a decrease of ✏2 = 1, which is driven inside [0, 1] since :
d✏
dm
    
m=0
=
 ✏
(C/2)✏(1  ✏) < 0
So, a small variation of m in the neighborhood of m = 0 when l = 0, eliminates
the all in C equilibrium, in which all the players become C players — i.e. : eliminates
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. In fact, the disappeared equilibrium swerves inward,
which gives now two internal equilibrium, the new one being stable and at the heart of
its attraction manifold.
As long asm remains smaller than em = (C/2)[(1 ✏)/2]2, nothing changes. Then,
at m = em, there is a drastic qualitative change27 because, even if ✏0 remains stable,
both interior equilibria merge to become a saddle node equilibrium — noted ✏5 —,
which will be reached from every starting point ✏(0) > ✏5 but not from a starting point
✏(0) < ✏5 — see the (b) quadrant in Figure 18.6. Finally, if m > em, ✏0 remains
an equilibrium. The (d) quadrant in Figure 18.6 — called the equilibrium bifurcation
diagram— summarizes the qualitative properties of the equilibria.
The main lesson induced by the perturbation of the replicator dynamics, with the
exclusive irrational flight from the S players to the L players, is that, whenm rises, the
attraction manifold of the all L players equilibrium, is the emergence of a mixed stable
equilibrium which may vanish with a further increase ofm beyond em.
In this scenario, the risk dominant equilibrium tends to win over the Pareto equilib-
rium. One has :
¨ 3 equilibria form 2 [0, em[,
27H(✏|m, 0) has ✏0 = 0 and ✏± = (2 C) 1[C(1+ ✏)±
p
 ] with  = C2✏2  2 C2✏+C2  8Cm.
One can see that, whenm = em: ✏+ = ✏ .
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Figure 18.7: The mixed dynamics for l ⌘ 0
≠ 2 equilibria form = em,
Æ 1 equilibrium form 2]em, 1].
Furthermore, we can observe that it is really the irrational dynamics — a pure mu-
tation dynamics —, which pollutes the replication dynamics because the subset of m
value for which one has a stable mixed equilibrium is very small. This tends to confirm
that the replication dynamics plays the central role in this scenario.
Second case: [m ⌘ 0]
Now that the scenarii analysis tools have been set up, we will proceed with a graphic
analysis based on Figure 18.7. This time, a small variation of l induces the immediate
disappearance of the equilibrium ✏0 = 0. In that case, it could not be any more the
case of the convergence towards a state where nobody chose to become a S player.
✏2 remains a stable equilibrium in all the declinations of this situation. At first, two
internal balances coexist, the equilibrium ✏5 arisen from the shift of the defunct ✏0
being stable, while the equilibrium ✏0, born from the ✏ equilibrium remains unstable.
But, when l reaches the limit value el = (C/2)(✏/2)2 , there is a fork which compacts
both internal equilibria in a unique saddle point, which immediately disappears. Only
one equilibrium remains. One has :
¨ 3 equilibria for l 2 [0, l[,
≠ 2 equilibria for l = el,
Æ 1 equilibrium for l 2]el, 1].
Here again, it is the irrational dynamics which pollutes the replication dynamics be-
cause, whenm rises, ✏ and its siblings— interior equilibria generated by them induced
sliding of ✏, change only at the margin in their qualitative behavior.
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Figure 18.8: The mixed dynamics form ⌘ 0
Naturally, the most realistic situation corresponds to m 6= 0, l 6= 0 and m 6= l.
However, this situation is particularly complex and a more precise approach could be
obtained in posing l = m. In fact, one can rely on intuition to assume that the values
ofm and l are not too much apart from each other. First of all, they are mutation rates
and, by nature, they are restrained on [0, 1]. Then, if those mutations are irrational,
i.e. induced by purely subjective elements without any reference to any strategy from
mutants, in all likelihood one can suppose that, in a great population, we will observe
very similar percentages of mutant from both populations.
Third case: [m = l = k]
✏˙(t) =
C
2
✏(t)(1  ✏(t))(✏(t)  ✏) + k[1  2✏(t)]
Once again, let us study the properties of this case from a purely graphical point
of view — see Figure 18.8. In contrast with the two polar cases studied above, the
focus in this case is concentrated on the internal mixed equilibrium. Indeed, not only
the increase in k drives both extreme equilibria to their disappearance but the internal
equilibrium nature is modified by the variations of k. For k < ek = (C/2)(✏2   ✏+ 1),
it is unstable, while stable for k > ek. In fact, in ek there is a bifurcation of the dynamics
and the internal equilibrium is the only equilibrium to remain — see Figure 18.9 for
the separation hyperbola as a function of ✏ for C given — one must not forget that ✏ is
a function of C and V .
Consequently, as soon as k exceeds ek, the replication dynamics is absorbed by the
irrational dynamics, which imposes its properties on the replication dynamics equilib-
rium. As far as a stable mixed equilibrium seems to better correspond to the observed
situation of the labor market than any other equilibrium, the model preaches in favor of
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Figure 18.9: The mixed dynamics form = l = k
a significant pollution of the replication dynamics by the irrational dynamics. Contrary
to what asserts Orlean (1995), with the increase of k, the attraction manifold of the
risk dominant equilibrium — but also the attraction manifold of the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium —, if it can rise for a moment, eventually disappears to make way for a
unique stable equilibrium.
This conclusion applies to the general model, i.e. to the model for which m 6= l.
Indeed, by the methodology of the tiny variations in the neighborhood of m = l = 0,
if the measure or the variation ofm is equal to that of l, we find the same result as the
one from which we had just moved from. It would therefore be useful to explore in
detail the casem 6= l.
The (dm2) dynamics
We can immediately observe that in the case of this representation of the pollution of
the replication dynamics by the irrational dynamics, only one value of ↵ = 1 allows
to find the Pareto-dominating balances and the dominant risk anew. The general case
pleads for internal equilibria, even for a unique stable internal equilibrium when the
irrational dynamics dominates the replication dynamics. Some simulations — which
are not presented here — prove that the irrational dynamics dominates very quickly the
replication dynamics. Consequently, the (dm2) dynamics seems to confirm the results
obtained during the study of the (dm1) dynamics see Figure 18.10.
In fact, this description is only true on the surface, because the dynamics embed a
local emergence phenomenon. While one should expect that, with the decrease of ↵,
the only observed behavior of the dynamics is the change of sign of its slope leading
the internal equilibrium from instability to stability, we can observe for a very peculiar
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Figure 18.10: The bifurcation frontier for the mixed equilibrium — l = m
range of values of ↵ the emergence of an unexpected unstable equilibrium .
Unfortunately, we can not show this emergence other than by specifying the pa-
rameter values. We have chosen ✏ = .5 and l = m = 0.1. For this specific range, a
simple simulation shows that for the approximate value of their bounds, we have the
emergence of an unstable internal equilibrium on ]0, ✏[ when ↵ 2]0.167667, 0.285667[
— see Figure 18.12 .
18.3 Conclusions
In this paper, we have tried to explain the persistence of a mixed equilibria composed
of S players and L players. It is no way, at least in the evolutionary game formalism, a
trivial affair since one is obliged to pollute the standard evolutionary game by irrational
behavior to generate such an equilibrium. We even show that there is an embedded
emergence phenomenon inside the mixed model.
Many extensions to this approach are under study: First of all, a differential wage
distinguishing job introduce according to their place in the dual hierarchy of the labor
market can easily be introduced. Then one can also improve the description of the
matching by introducing two distinct effects: agents can run several things at once,
in that they can not receive a simple but several jobs and / or not be matched in pairs
but by N-tuple. One can also introduce rigid agents who never change their mind
according to the length of the study. Finally, the information available on the labor
market is necessarily dated and it would be interesting to see what is the impact on the
evolutionary dynamics of a delayed reaction.
In all the cases, this approach reveal the complexity of the specific decision whether
to undertake studies even in a stationary world.
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Figure 18.11: the (dm2) dynamics
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